M. Ackrén, N. Hokkala, P. Lægreid, E. Palmujoki, A. Trengereid, Á. E. Bernhardsdóttir, M. Koraeus, R. Olavson, B. Thorhallsson and K. Vrangbæk (pages 409-422)

This comparative study of the seven Nordic countries supports the assumption that cooperation problems and bureaucratic infighting in small states during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic were primarily the result of insufficient planning and unclear institutional rules, rather than conflicts over scarce resources. In Norway, Sweden, and Finland, ambiguity in legal mandates, overlapping agency responsibilities, and fragmented lines of authority significantly impaired coordination. These three cases reflect well-known vulnerabilities in small-state public administrations, where limited bureaucratic capacity and multi-role institutional structures can make decision-making processes both slower and more prone to miscommunication. The cases of Denmark and Iceland underscore how administrative cohesion and leadership clarity can compensate for size-related vulnerabilities. In both cases, informal coordination and trust-based decision-making – hallmarks of small-state governance – were mobilized effectively to maintain coherence under pressure. The Faroe Islands and Greenland present a different facet of small-state crisis management. Here, the main constraint was not coordination failure but capacity fatigue. While their compact administrative structures may have helped streamline decision-making, the chronic shortage of personnel and limited logistical resources meant that sustained response efforts taxed their systems heavily. These cases suggest that very small states may face a different kind of risk during protracted crises: not fragmentation, but exhaustion.