Through European Eyes
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For us denizens of the often dull and (at least half of the year) dark northern wastes of Europe it is surprising when someone from outside finds us interesting. Well, we got that interest in spades from Alyson Bailes. Not only has she lived and worked with us in Norway, Finland, Sweden and Iceland, but she has learned our languages, studied our poetry and mythology, taught our students and prodded our analysts and politicians.

Along the way Alyson has also combined a full diplomatic career with an active and serious engagement in security studies. Alyson rose from a Third Secretary in Hungary in the early 1970s to Ambassador in Helsinki in the first years of this century, via postings in Brussels, Bonn, Beijing and Oslo, interspersed with stints at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London as Deputy Head of Policy Planning and later Head of Security Policy.

Alyson mirrored this with an equally voracious research career: in an EU ‘Wise Men’ study team on institutional reform in the late 1970s; on sabbatical at Chatham House in the early 1990s; as Vice-President responsible for security policy programmes at the East–West Institute in New York in the late 1990s; as Director of SIPRI in Stockholm between 2002 and 2007, and now as taskmaster and inspiration at the University of Iceland where she is Visiting Professor.

I first met Alyson in the early 1990s when she, as Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Oslo, frequently and vigorously visited the Institute for Defence Studies where I was a young researcher. My first impressions were of her tremendous energy, her no-nonsense approach to everything and her very great intellectual generosity. What always counted for her were the contents, not the trappings. As a prolific writer and a generous mentor it is thus apt that this small selection of her speeches be interspersed with the contributions of her young colleagues. From the depths of this cold Nordic heart I hope that Alyson may continue to provoke our complacency, enrich our analysis and invigorate our intellectual quest for long to come.

Tomas Ries
Stockholm, March 2009
Editor’s Note

The speeches by Alyson Bailes are reproduced in this publication as they were delivered, in the four years from 2005 to 2008. The texts of the speeches have been preserved in an ‘oral’ style and have not been updated or otherwise changed to reflect later developments. They were not edited in any real sense, but were amended for consistency of style or in order to give a significant time context or any other essential information—all so that young people will years from now correctly understand the insightful remarks of Alyson Bailes and her protégés about world security in this period. A few footnotes have been either left in place from a previously published piece or added in order to supply an important source, and in a few instances information that was originally presented as slides for a talk was incorporated in a text.

The writings of these seven young colleagues who worked under Alyson’s supervision have been published before, most of them by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) when she was the Institute’s Director. For all of them, notes identify where and when they were originally published in full text. I would like to thank them all—as well as Nenne Bodell, Head of Library, and Cynthia Loo, Special Assistant to the Director, both at SIPRI—for helping us put together this volume. Finally, on behalf of these young colleagues of Alyson Bailes I want to point out that they expressed their pride in having their contributions included in this volume commemorating her work because she has been so very helpful to them.

Connie Wall
Stockholm, March 2009
Author’s Introduction

I am extremely fortunate to have been offered many chances, sometimes more than I could take up, to see my writings in print since 1990. The idea for this volume was not born out of any sense of a lack of public exposure. Rather, I had three things in mind in offering this selection of my unpublished speeches—or ones hitherto published only online—from the past five years.

The first impetus came from reaching an important milestone in life with my 60th birthday on 6 April 2009 and feeling grateful to have been spared to commemorate it. The second idea was to celebrate the fact that I can spend that birthday as a university teacher working in Iceland, which counts as the realization of a dream for me on both accounts. Thirdly, I wanted to offer a showcase for at least some of the excellent writing produced by young scholars while working with me, in my time as Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and elsewhere. The article “‘Societal Security’ and Iceland”, reproduced in Part IV of this volume, is the odd man out in terms of format, but it hits the last two of these three targets by representing the fruits of my latest collaboration with a young Icelandic political scientist in my current position at the University of Iceland.

I expect, and hope, that it is mainly young people who will find this collection of use and interest. The electronic method of publication been chosen with their needs in mind. The selection of texts, which is heavy on pieces with a longer historical perspective and reflecting my own life experiences, is also motivated by a sense of passing the baton to a new generation. University teaching has confirmed my faith in young thinkers’ ability to leap over the compartment walls and escape the idées fixes that have dogged the efforts of post-World War II baby boomers to understand the 21st century. Given the fearsome new agenda facing the world after the economic crisis of 2008, that is just as well.

I also want to salute, however, the many colleagues, institutes and other institutions that have given me the opportunity to make speeches like those included in this anthology, and many more. Life on the conference circuit has its downsides, but for me it has been a process of constantly rediscovering the value of good partners, new experiences and new audiences to learn from in Europe and beyond. I mean to go on with this as long as I can.

In connection with this volume and this anniversary I would like to thank Tomas Ries, Connie Wall and Thór Ingólfssson for their contributions to this volume; my former colleagues at SIPRI and present ones at the University of Iceland; my mother Barbara Bailes, and my entire family.

Alyson J.K. Bailes
Reykjavík, April 2009
PART I
GLOBAL SECURITY
1 SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Talk to the Danish Chief of Defence’s Security Policy Course, Hellerup, Denmark, 18 August 2008

This is the sixth time I have been asked to speak to this course and the fifth on this particular topic: and while I am more than pleased to be invited back, the topic itself doesn’t get any less impossible to deal with—especially when I have barely 40 minutes to cover it. Even the meaning of the title could be debatable. I guess we can all agree on what ‘the 21st century’ means, but what kind of ‘security’ are we talking about, and for whom? Are we focusing on the eight years of the century that we know something about, or are we guessing what may happen in the rest of it? Are we thinking of how we want to change security conditions, or of how we must be prepared for them to change us?

Trends Past and Present

Of course, at any given time in history there are plenty of people who are keen to tell us the answers, and as a result there are dominant trends and fashions, not just in official policy making but also in how both interested specialists and educated people in general conceptualize security problems and the answers to them. The length of the cold war gave time for us all to get deeply indoctrinated in the agenda of East–West confrontation, including the fear of arms build-ups and belief in disarmament as a solution; and in the assumption that it was natural to have quite different security conditions in Europe—where the balance of terror prevented conflict—and everywhere else in the world, where nations could both invent their own conflicts and be driven into new ones as proxies of the Eastern and Western blocs. That state of affairs ended abruptly, taking with it all our comfortable certainties, almost 20 years ago now. Now we are surely not in a post-cold war but rather a post-post-cold war phase; but if we haven’t yet found any other widely agreed reference point or definition for the age we live in, it’s perhaps because we are still striving to grasp the new realities, let alone to work out what new mental maps and policy tools we should adopt to make the best of them—for the sake of both European security and world security in general.

We have gone through extraordinary swings of thinking and indeed of feeling from the early to middle 1990s, when there was all the false optimism about ‘the end of history’ or a ‘single European home’; through a more bitter period dominated by the failures and eventual lessons of policy on the Balkan conflicts; through the late 1990s when we grappled with the need for the enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), not least to deal with Balkans-type instability, but also with the difficulty of reconciling the Russians to it; and then most
recently, of course, the highly dramatic agenda of the so-called ‘new asymmetric threats’ of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the controversies triggered by the high-impact, high-risk interventionist policies that the United States adopted (and tried to get its friends to support) in response to those threats.

As of today, we are watching this latest set of dominant ideas starting to be deconstructed and politically discredited in their turn, as the new-threat analysis and the gospel of pre-emption have revealed their own weaker and darker sides, their contradictions and above all their extremely high costs. It is not that the threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation have been discredited. Life itself is telling us all the time to take them more seriously: whether through the continuing series of brutal terrorist attacks on Europe’s own territory, or through the fact that we seem as far away as ever from solutions on the real WMD challenge presented by Iran and have only made progress with the Libyan and North Korean challenges by acting exactly the opposite way from the classic ‘Bush doctrine’. Rather, there are two parallel processes that are both pushing us back again from certainty towards complexity:

• The enormous difficulties that the US-led coalition and the Iraqis themselves have met in trying to establish a new stable democracy after Saddam Hussein, and the parallel problems in Afghanistan, have forced us all to think again about how far military intervention and enforced regime change can really provide an answer to the ‘new threats’—but no one has yet shown how any other method could be guaranteed to work better.

• On the second hand, other kinds of threats and risks for human life and for international security have pushed themselves back onto our agenda: from the new outbreaks of what might be called ‘independent’ conflict in places like the Congo and Sudan and the latest violent twists in the ‘old’ Middle Eastern conflict; or our sudden rediscovery that energy can be used as a weapon even by the ‘white Arabs’ of Moscow, and that East–West tensions are not just history but can come alight again from embers that were never really extinguished; through to the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) experience and fear of a new bird flu epidemic, or the massive human and economic costs of the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, or the issue of longer-term environmental damage and world climate change on which it is now clear that the new US Administration will join the mainstream of Western concerns. And while most of these examples are leading our attention towards what might be called ‘even newer threats’ or even wider extensions of the so-called human security spectrum, we unfortunately can’t rule out that the bad old kind of armed conflict between states won’t come back to haunt us in this new century: for instance if China goes to war to regain Taiwan, or if the always fragile peace between India and Pakistan or Israel, Syria and Lebanon should break down again.

In addition to all these purely security headaches there is of course now a poisonous added ingredient in the still deepening economic and monetary crisis aggravated by surges in vital commodity prices: which is partly a direct result of the George W. Bush Administration’s military overspending and thus gives further proof of the counterproductive nature of many of the last few years’ policies. The problem is not only that it redistributes economic power and initiative into the hands of many countries considered problematic by the West in traditional security terms, but also that these countries are among the least likely to use their influence for good solutions to the
world’s common non-military challenges, or indeed to help out the poorest countries that are simply suffering most of all from everything that happens—as usual.

Summary of the Challenges

Now, I’m aware that none of this so far is offering you any kind of good news or even a good guide to understanding. The real point I want to make at the outset is that there is no single explanation for the problems of world security today; nor any simple priority that can be set between the different aspects of security; and least of all any single guideline for what we should be doing about it. For instance, it’s not too difficult to divide up the multitude of threats into a few rough categories—first, traditional war and other armed conflicts; second, threats like terrorism and the illegal possession of WMD (which are called asymmetrical because they allow smaller players to terrorize and seriously damage larger ones); and third, challenges to all mankind like epidemics and accidents, violent weather and environmental damage, loss of vital resources or collapse of the infrastructure. But in today’s conditions, all of these are tending to break out from the old categories of international politics and diplomacy, and in the process are undermining most of our traditional solutions, because:

- they may all involve non-traditional, non-official actors (not just terrorist and weapon smugglers but all the different kinds of groups who may engage in conflict, private security companies and other parts of the private business sector, scientists and technologists, campaigning and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and so on); and
- all of them can take on a highly transnational character, meaning that they can flow across national boundaries and even leap from continent to continent with unprecedented speed.

Another crucial point is that all the different types of security actions, threats and risks are becoming more interconnected all the time through the processes of social and technical evolution and the impact of globalization on relations between both states and ordinary citizens. A study conducted by experts for the Swiss Government in the early 1990s¹ showed that a catastrophic breakdown in a European country’s electricity supply could be caused by a wide range of things from enemy action to a natural storm, and that it would do huge damage to all fundamental dimensions of national security—from hospitals, through all computer-controlled processes, to the country’s long-term credibility and export prospects. In fact, the knock-on effects were calculated to be more serious than those of an isolated nuclear explosion!

Global Security and the Mismatch of Demand and Supply

When we move on, however, from brooding over the problems to considering what to do about them, we come up against a multiple mismatch between what the world community actually needs in the way of security action and what its various players are capable of

and willing to give. Above all, it should follow from everything I’ve said so far—and no
doubt from your own experiences—that the only good response strategy would be a
truly global one and also a multi-functional, multi-actor approach: where military power
and traditional security tools would not have the only or perhaps even one of the main
roles, and where human potentials would be harnessed for the cause not just at national
but also at supra-national and sub-national levels. Just to recap or further draw out the
reasons why the only working solutions are global ones, they include:

• Human security threats like climate change and disease, where coping mechanisms
  are only as strong as their weakest link;
• Problems of energy supply, which make all players fundamentally interdependent
even while they compete on the surface (and the same is true of economic inter-
dependence more widely, cf. the significance of India for outsourcing or of China for
the US fiscal balance);
• The globalized nature of terrorism, proliferation and organized crime (look at the
  way that some Islamist terrorists squeezed out from Iraq have simply set up shop afresh
in Afghanistan!);
• The increasingly wide diffusion of technology, meaning that technology and export
controls can’t work unless applied also by developing-world producers and unless they
also grip upon non-state traffickers and customers;
• Population deficits and excesses, which aggravate the challenge of controlling
  migration and of making multi-ethnic societies work;
• The repercussions of regional conflicts: while the direct impact of these on others’
  security interests is less obvious than in the cold war (with the end of ‘proxy’ wars and
escalation risks between the superpowers), the indirect compulsion to tackle them is
increasingly strong because of growing awareness of their ultimate impact on the world
economy and world order—and of the ability of conflict to create/aggravate generic
transnational threats—in addition to the humanitarian motive.

Let’s contrast this picture of the demand, however, with what is available/or happening
on the ‘supply side’ of the security equation:

• There are patent differences of purpose and priority between the different world
constituencies. The ‘rich men’s agenda’ is different from that of poor developing
countries, but there are USA–Europe differences—and intra-US differences!—also
within it. North–South differences have evolved into something more like a three-way
division of old-rich, new-rich and poorer-than-ever countries, with repercussions for the
management of world trade (as seen in the current blockage of the Doha Round of the
World Trade Organization, WTO) and also for the way many ‘human security’ threats
are perceived and prioritized. Then we have the new challenge of China and India as
‘emerging powers’; the signs of growing alienation in parts of the Arab/Islamic world,
while its internal governance challenges have if anything got worse, and so on…. 
• At the same time, we see an overall mal-distribution of resources and an inappropriate
mix of instruments in the specific defence and security sphere. Too many resources are
tied up in the ‘traditional’, static elements of armed forces in the rich world, or locked
up in local arms races elsewhere; too few are available for conflict management or for
transformational tasks in poorer regions. There is an even more inadequate range of ‘non-military security’ or ‘soft security’ resources attuned to today’s threat profile, and too little understanding of how to coordinate them with other parts of public policy both in normal times and during conflict cycle. This is without mentioning other major headaches in defence governance such as transparency, answerability, the legalities of intervention and so on…

- All this is compounded by institutional weaknesses and inequalities. Ideally, a collective security entity designed to let states pool their strengths for tackling the new environment should have not just united and properly adapted policies, but also (i) substantial funds and other material resources under its own control, (ii) law- or rule-making powers, and (iii) the capacity to act (alone or with partners) worldwide. The United Nations is relatively weak in all three, so is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); NATO has the capacity to act militarily and politically but can’t control large funds of its own or make laws; the EU meets all three criteria but (so far) lacks the necessary policies or will to rise to its full potential as a military integrator, security builder, and spreader of democracy and reform. Integrated groupings in several other regions are trying to strengthen themselves (and perhaps to avoid EU mistakes), but this adds to another systemic problem in world governance: namely the ‘lumpiness’ of the world power system where individual great powers with differing aims, and integrated regions also with partly different aims (and definitely different types/levels of integration), have to coexist and find ways of working together through the UN or the WTO.

Ways Forward

Doing nothing is not an option in this situation: but at the other extreme it should be more than clear by now that there isn’t a ‘silver bullet’ or single master plan that is going to turn the balance of demand and supply in security in a more positive direction. What we need most is the intellectual and policy equivalent of multi-tasking: that is, to see as many dimensions of the problem as possible at once, and to apply a mixture of techniques, instruments and actions to deal with the practical manifestations here and now. At individual level this doesn’t mean that any of us should give up our specific skills and disciplines, but rather that we should grasp and respect better the importance of different and complementary skills and find better ways to work and explore synergies with the people that have them, either in our own country or more widely. At the collective governmental level, and within the more closely integrated organizations like the EU, it also means taking a much broader and tougher approach to the allocation of resources. We need to ask ourselves not only where the biggest or most immediate threats are, and which are the ones proper for our state or organization as such to deal with, but also how to get the balance right:

- between preserving life and the quality of life, including human freedoms;
- between doing things that directly serve our own security, and using resources to help others in ways that will eventually stave off larger threats against ourselves; and
- between short-term challenges, and the needs of future generations.
In the last main part of this talk, I’d like to ask you to think about a simple three-way division of the methods that a community, a country or the world can use to try to overcome the outstanding problems of multidimensional security. It’s my own model rather than a conventional one, but I believe that just about any specific initiative could be classed under one or another of these three headings: Intervention, Legislation and Integration. You won’t be surprised if I give away in advance that I think the secret of success is to use the three in combination and to keep them properly balanced.

(The next section is presented here as it was in the original speech, in the form of a self-explanatory matrix showing the three methods’ ‘key characteristics,’ their drawbacks, and possible guidelines for solutions.)

### Intervention

**What is it?**

- Active
- Case by case
- Not just military
- Can serve own and/or others’ interests

**Issues**

- Costs and risks
- Strength-based: legitimacy?
- Where, when and how?
- ‘Surgical’, not full cure

**Answers**

- Find right framework (use more actors?)
- New code? (Responsibility to Protect?)
- Review priorities/means
- ‘Peacebuilding’ ideas, institutions, resources

### Legislation

**What is it?**

- Rule-based approach (national, regional, global)
- Aims to equalize performance, apply restraint
- Can cover different actors

**Issues**

- Who makes rules for whom?
- Monitoring and enforcement
- Rigidity, formalism

**Answers**

- Universality/transparency, ownership
- Stronger mechanisms and incentives
- Subsidiarity and adaptation

### Integration

**What is it?**

- Pool powers/resources, central authority
- Eliminate/sublimate conflict, strong restraint
- Multi-dimension, multi-sectoral (strong impact on non-state actors)

**Issues**

- Sacrifices and costs: who is ready?
- Only works if voluntary, ‘emasculates’?
- Coordination and prioritization

**Answers**

- Self-selection, cost/benefit balance
- Common discipline, collective power
- Better governance and subsidiarity

### A Last Word on Democracy

Going back to my opening remarks about short-lived fashions, many of us may already have forgotten how strongly President G.W. Bush stressed one additional issue at the start of his second presidency term, namely the crucial need for democracy to guarantee
good security between countries as well as within them. At the time some saw this as just another excuse for regime change and anti-Islamic policies, but I was among those who saw it as perhaps the beginning of the end for the very dogmatic anti-terrorist and anti-WMD priorities of the first administration. The point was that Washington could gain more room for manoeuvre by admitting that not everything could be explained in terms of the ‘new threats’ of 9/11 and that political goals and forecasts—not just military ones—should have some part in judging foreign realities. A more complex approach did actually allow the USA to show more flexibility in cases like North Korea, and even Iran to the extent that the threat of military action against the latter has never quite materialized. US policy has grown warmer towards the intrinsic value of NATO and other regional organizations, and there has been a definite easing and de-dramatizing of relations between the USA and its European partners since early 2005—perhaps not least because Washington has been reminded that we Europeans are after all among the other most important and powerful democracies of the world. It is particularly striking that relations are going well today, even with little help from a weak and confused British Government, so that French ideas are now forming the basis for suggestions that a breakthrough—for instance—in NATO–EU relations could be just around the corner in 2009. Whatever honeymoon successes the new president of the USA may now achieve, the curious truth is that some of them will be based on belated policy adjustments by the lame-duck president now on his way out.

But the question about democracy as a guide for security policy remains wide open precisely because the Bush team never thought it through or carried it through convincingly. We can surely agree that lack of democracy, whether caused by a weak-state situation or a dictatorial system, causes or aggravates many of the conflicts we have to intervene in, and it also helps to explain why we have found it so hard to rebuild or even find the right models for nations like Iraq and Afghanistan, which were without freedom for so long. The methods that most Europeans instinctively prefer for solving security challenges, by rule-making or by closer integration, clearly can’t work either in political settings where laws are not made in a fair and transparent way, or citizens don’t identify with them and respect them, and where individuals are not free or empowered to take advantage of creations like the EU’s single Schengen area or single market.

On the other side, however, we can see even from our own and our neighbours’ past experience that adding democracy to a given security situation doesn’t necessarily create more security in the immediate term and often does the opposite. If the community concerned is seriously divided or has serious economic inequalities or has inadequate protection of law and order or has popular hatred of its neighbours or popular hatred of the Western world or all those things put together, the results of increasing individual freedoms and group competition for control of government can be literally explosive. In the Middle East we have seen how elections can bring terrorist movements (Hizbollah and Hamas) to power before they themselves have had the time and chance to move away from violence and before others are ready to accept them as political actors, in contrast to the very long processes that have allowed some Irish Republican and Basque movements to start entering the mainstream. If we think about Russia and Chechnya we can see the dilemma of whether it is better for us that Putin should stay powerful and Medvedev’s softer features turn out to be mainly cosmetic, or whether we do want authoritarian rule to soften into probably not one but a number of new power centres
as Moscow would lose control both of major wealth creation and of territorial security in strategically sensitive areas like the Caucasus. If we think about what has happened in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan in recent years we can see that the mere fact of the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in fragile countries surrounded by tough neighbours cannot bring easy solutions for their problems or overcome the continuing differences of interest within their own societies, and that charismatic winners of elections do not necessarily become or remain the wisest of government heads. All this suggests to me that when going out to try to improve local or global security conditions, we would do best to think of security and democracy as two separate goals that are not always easy to combine, but which nevertheless must be made to support each other over the longer run if the people concerned are to be guaranteed life and happiness as well as liberty.

But are we even sure ourselves what democracy is, and what the model is that we should be guiding others towards? Many people, including many Americans themselves, have pointed out that G.W. Bush’s slogan of democracy was undermined from the start by anti-democratic, illegal and inhumane actions of the USA itself, whether at Guantánamo Bay or Abu Ghraib or in the handling of terrorist suspects among its own citizens. Linking democracy as a value with the particular policies pursued by the USA against terrorism and proliferation risks linking democracy with the sense of threat and unfairness and indignation which millions of people in the Arab and Islamic and even the wider developing world now feel about the way the USA has chosen to use its power since 9/11. And as you well know, these are not just contradictions that we can observe from a distance in US policy but are also dilemmas that face us every day in our own national and European contexts. Is it more important to engage in our own democratic right of free expression, for example when drawing cartoons, or to respect the freely adopted religious beliefs and sensitivities of other populations and to hope that such respect will give us a better chance of influencing their practices in a more liberal and democratic direction in the longer term? What does that issue mean also for the correct approach to integration of people with different beliefs within our own societies? How far can we safely go in limiting all our citizens’ rights of privacy, freedom of movement and other freedoms in the name of more effective anti-terrorism security measures designed to keep our country free and to preserve our civilization overall?

Was it right of the EU’s top leaders to agree on a not very much changed version of the original Constitutional Treaty despite the clear vetoes given earlier by two countries’ populations, and right for most EU leaders still to be plotting to force this divisive treaty through after another No from Dublin? And if the leaders are doing it because they are sure that the strategic strengthening of Europe as a world actor that this new treaty should allow will serve the best and even essential interests of their peoples, what do they propose to do now to make sure that the people understand that, too, and that this kind of gap in the most basic perceptions of what our European Union is about will not reoccur in future? More frankly, is the combination of Sarkozy, a wounded Brown, a weakened Merkel and Berlusconi capable of leading Europe towards some new political bargain that will both strengthen and allow it to coexist more smoothly with Washington, or is this the beginning of the end of any real European feeling of solidarity and collective interests?? When handling the now very sensitive EU and NATO enlargement dossier, is it more important to protect the advantages that our own democracies enjoy and to stick to the strictest standards designed originally for a rather few countries in Western
Europe, or should we be ready to take on new risks and burdens in order to give more distant countries an extra boost in the dynamics of their own probably much more difficult transformation?

We may seem to have come a long way here from the classic subject of global security, but I wanted to end as I started, by stressing how different policy fields and different sets of actors are getting more and more mixed up with each other in today’s globalized security environment. No hard lines exist any longer between security, politics and economics; or between internal and external security; or between the roles of civil society and business, governments and inter-governmental organizations in all the security processes I have talked about. Among other things, this means that security policy making has to be about not just facts but also ideas and ideals, that it has to be a matter of moral and normative as well as practical or technical choices. That doesn’t make your task or even my task any easier, but it does underline that we are gathered here to talk about one of the most challenging and exciting, as well as important, subjects in the whole field of public policy today.
If ideas also have destinies of their own, it is hard to ignore the fact that the ideas of arms control and disarmament have been going through a difficult time in recent years. They are actually quite old ideas: back in the Middle Ages the Church tried to stop methods of warfare that it considered especially cruel, and attempts to limit arms races between nations have been made ever since the 19th century. However, in retrospect it is clear that the real Golden Age of arms control was the cold war in the second half of the 20th century plus the first few years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

There are two rather obvious reasons why countries were willing to accept, or even actively to seek, limits on their choice of weapons during this period, both within specific regions and at world level. The massive and tense military confrontation between the Western and Eastern blocs in Europe gave both sides a strong interest in avoiding war and thus in controlling possible factors of instability and reducing the risks of surprise attack. Setting limits on the type and number of weapons held by each superpower or each alliance helped to build stability and at the same time to save resources; while the risk of attacks, accidents and misunderstandings could be reduced by the softer methods of restraint, transparency and learning about each other that became known as confidence-building measures (CBMs).

At global level, meanwhile, there was a general reaction after World War II against the use of WMD, which led to the negotiating of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as treaties on stopping the spread of such weapons to outer space, on limiting and then stopping nuclear testing, and on banning all chemical and biological weapons.

4 Information about the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) can be found at <http://www.cacda.org.cn>.
Thanks to the global nature of these last measures but also to the creation of local nuclear weapon-free zones and confidence-building communities, by the end of the 20th century there was no country that was not bound by at least one, and usually more, of the different sets of obligations that limited its choices in both weaponry and methods of war.

Last year, 2006, marked the 40th anniversary of the creation of the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI), and we took the opportunity in our Yearbook for 2006—the yearbook that we are launching in its Chinese-language edition today—to take a new look back at world developments since 1966. When you look at the story of 40 years of arms control in that way, it becomes necessary to admit that the achievements of the cold war in this field were actually neither complete nor perfect. One point is that specific limits on nuclear weapons only ever applied to the United States and the Soviet Union, not to the other three recognized nuclear-weapon powers. Secondly, despite the best aims of the NPT, three more states acquired nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and one more has tested a weapon since then, while several other countries came very close to a nuclear weapon capacity before deciding to go further. A third more general point is that all the strongest measures adopted over this period, especially at global level, referred either to weapons of mass destruction or to low-technology items that were banned for humanitarian reasons, such as landmines. Only in Europe were binding limits negotiated on the larger conventional weapons of war like tanks and artillery; and the UN had limited success even in trying to achieve an accurate record of conventional arms stocks and sales for the entire world. While smaller arms like guns may cause most of the deaths in conflicts and certainly deserve more serious efforts to control them, it is medium and large conventional armaments that usually decide the actual winning and losing of wars.

For those of us who believe in arms control, recognizing such gaps and weaknesses should be just the first step towards finding new ways to overcome them. However, the world in general has not devoted much energy and political priority to improving or even to maintaining the achievements of arms control since around 1995. As we know, the changes in strategic realities and in security attitudes and practices since the end of the cold war have been profound, and they have been tending to turn attention away from the traditional goals of arms control for at least three reasons.

• First, relations between Moscow and Washington but also between both these capitals and Beijing have relaxed to the point where no superpower sees it as its main task to control the arms of another great power or, at least, feels ready to accept new limits on its own forces for that purpose. Russia instead focuses on controlling its own territory and as much as it can of conditions in the former Soviet Union, while the USA is giving top priority to ending the threat from a number of smaller states that have acquired or might acquire WMD. This shift of strategy also shifts the focus from mutual defence limitations to non-proliferation, which means essentially that one side can keep its advanced capacities while denying them to the other. Meanwhile, the geographical shift in threat means that the USA is paying less attention overall to security conditions in Europe and does not seem to have paid much attention recently to preserving the achievements of cold war-period arms control there.

• The second point is that many other countries around the world—including all the members of the EU and NATO, but also African nations and the members of
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China itself—are directing their military strategy increasingly towards peace missions and other applications of their defence resources abroad. The tough demands of such tasks, which include the need to keep a secure technological edge over local opponents, have rapidly created an assumption that any active and responsible modern state should be increasing and polishing its force capabilities just now rather than reducing them. Arms control and disarmament in this connection becomes something that is imposed on the people defeated in a conflict or on a state that has had too many armed factions competing before.

- The third problem is that many of the threats that worry people most today, in the developing world as well as the leading powers, came from non-state actors such as terrorists, criminals and smugglers, and the unofficial combatants in civil wars. Traditional methods of arms control such as treaties and official inspections simply do not work against such targets, and the creation of disarmament and confidence-building regimes for specific territories has little effect against enemies who exploit the full transnational mobility of a globalized system. Terrorists and smugglers can also help to spread WMD and, in the worst case, terrorists might try to use mass destruction techniques with greater impact than they have managed in the past.

In the USA, the Administration of George W. Bush has sometimes argued that the combination of these problems makes treaties no longer a suitable or efficient way to control the challenges of arms and destructive technology in the wrong hands. If bad states and terrorists can escape the rules, why should good states obey them? There are of course some good answers to that which I will come back to later, but for the moment what I’d like to point out is that these attitudes—and the objective difficulties of pursuing arms control in a post-cold war world—have not actually had the effect of stopping efforts for the control of weaponry. They have simply pushed them in different directions and towards the use of less traditional instruments.

For instance, if you take the three trends that I just mentioned, the USA itself has tried to handle the problems of WMD programmes in what it calls ‘rogue states’ in three main ways: by defeating them militarily as in Iraq; by paying them to stop, as in Libya; and by negotiated bargains containing both security and economic elements like the one that was reached this February with North Korea thanks to the Six-Party process presided over by China. We do not know yet whether Iran can also be dealt with by this last method, as most people would prefer. What already seems clear is that military defeat is not a very good method of arms control, not just because of the huge costs and dangers involved, but because the invaded country may feel motivated to build up its strength again as soon as it can. Bargains including economic incentives may, however, work quite well as long as they can achieve a general stabilization in the relations between the country concerned and the outside world—something that is by no means clear, but which we must all hope for, in North Korea’s case.

The new trend for more frequent intervention to prevent, control and end conflicts has also opened up new roads to arms control that are not limited to the so-called DDR—disarmament, demobilization and reintegration—programmes in post-conflict states. The settlement reached in the conflict between Serbia and its neighbours included a regional arms control regime that has actually worked very well, and similar approaches going at least as far as confidence-building measures have been used in various parts of
Latin America. The Western idea of security sector reform (SSR), which was developed in the context of democracy and good governance efforts as well as conflict handling, can have an indirect effect of restraint on armaments—as well as on aggressive behaviour—because it guides states towards more rational methods of defence planning and towards military cooperation rather than competition with their neighbours. Indeed, one could make a general argument that the whole phenomenon of regional security cooperation that has created and strengthened so many multilateral groupings in the past 50 years is also a very good way of stopping arms races and allowing states to reduce their defence expenditure to a reasonable minimum. I personally consider it a very positive thing that the Shanghai process and its more formal successor, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), have created lasting military restraints and confidence building on China’s borders with the Russian Federation and several Central Asian neighbours, and we will be making this point in a new, independent study of the SCO that SIPRI is publishing this month.5

Thirdly, the new focus on non-state actors has inspired a number of new approaches in recent years that have given the world a wider choice of methods of pursuing global arms control, even if they are not always described by that name. One well-known and perhaps still rather controversial example is the Proliferation Safety Initiative (PSI), whose 70 or so supporting states are committed to help each other *inter alia* with intercepting illegal transports of weapons and WMD equipment by sea. There has been a dramatic growth in the more traditional practice of export control on dangerous goods and technologies, with the well-established multilateral groups revising their rules and methods to focus more directly on non-state challenges. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 made it an obligation for all states to have in place, among other things, effective export controls against the risk of WMD proliferation, and more specific embargoes to be applied by all states have been introduced in more recent resolutions on North Korea and Iran.

We have also seen new efforts to control types of conventional weapons that may be especially attractive to terrorists, such as man-portable air defence systems—MANPADS. The initiative currently being pushed by European and other states at the UN for a universal Arms Trade Treaty is motivated by concern about arms struggling and brokering to non-state as well as state customers, although not all great powers agree that it is wrong to supply arms to non-state partners as such. Last but not least, we have seen a multiplication of efforts for better physical safety and security for all kinds of WMD-related products and installations, as well as the destruction of outdated or surplus stocks. Since all these measures tend to reduce the number of dangerous objects in the world as well as the risks of them spreading, I myself think that it would be illogical to deny that they also represent a kind of progress in arms control. Indeed, compared with some other arms control methods they have the attractive features of being open to and applicable to all kinds of states, being easy to apply in a collaborative way, and also opening up very interesting new forms of collaboration between state authorities and private industry. My own institute is working especially hard at the moment to develop new ways of cooperation in export and technology control, both with private producers and traders and with independent scientists.

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One conclusion to draw from all this is that arms control today is not dying; it is merely dying down in some places and dimensions—including places where perhaps it is not needed any more because of improved security conditions—and growing up in other, newer places and ways. Personally, I think that conclusion would be too complacent. You need only consider the recent crisis in Europe over the USA’s proposals to place new bases close to Russia’s frontiers, where Russia has caused anxiety for many Europeans by threatening to stop complying with the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty, which, it should be noted, has been defunct since December 2007, when Russia declared that it was no longer bound by the treaty) or possibly also the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). These events have reminded many people, rather late in the day, that the formal treaties restraining Western and Russian armaments in Europe are still important for stabilizing conditions and avoiding possible military violence so long as Russia’s relations with the West remain tense in various ways, as they certainly are today. I suspect many people would be equally sorry if they suddenly found that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had collapsed because too many states had been allowed to disobey it in various ways, or if the treaty banning biological weapons turned into an empty piece of paper because of the lack of machinery to enforce it.

The fact is that successful arms control to deal with the great complexity of today’s security conditions, and the whole range of different actors now involved, demands that we apply in mixture of all the different old and new techniques available to us; and within that mixture the clear standards and legal obligations of treaties (and similar international instruments) still have a vital role to play. Treaties do not enforce themselves and that is why all the other more practical methods are necessary, though preferably stopping short of the usually counter-productive use of military coercion. But without the treaties, what standards would there be to enforce? And what guarantee would there be that states were not choosing their targets for enforcement for selfish and biased reasons, while perhaps failing to observe other important rules themselves? The USA has already exposed itself in recent years to the accusation of acting in precisely that way, and all of us who also consider ourselves ‘the good guys’ need to look quite carefully at our arms control policies from time to time to make sure we are not slipping into the same kind of ‘double standards’. We need the treaties to measure our goodness and help ourselves and others to stay good, not just as a weapon for tackling the (actually not very numerous) cases today of major violations by those we think of as the bad guys.

I have left it until the last minutes of my talk to introduce to you the other major translated work that CACDA is launching today; the Chinese version of the report of the WMD Commission, chaired by Dr Hans Blix. But in a sense, everything that I have said up to now is also about that report: about the seriousness and complexity of the problems it had to address, and about the rationale for the answers it gave in its 60 different proposals. I had the honour to be a member of the Commission during its work in 2004-2006, together with General Pan Zhenqiang of China, who I am happy to greet here today. I can assure you that the General and I, and indeed all of us on the Commission, tried to be extremely practical throughout: trying not to underestimate the problems in the way of WMD control and nuclear disarmament, but also not to exclude any measure or indeed any motive that might lead humanity along a better road. Thus you will find the Report arguing that mass destruction weapons are still a problem when they
belong to the big states and the ‘good guys’, and that all countries with nuclear weapons including India, Pakistan and Israel must play their part in reducing their reliance on these weapons, avoiding the development of new ones, and dropping doctrines and technical options that might lead to offensive first strikes. You will find the Report calling for peaceful political and economic bargains to solve the challenges of Iran and North Korea, and for further international efforts in all the practical fields of export, safety and security and safe destruction of old stocks that I was talking about before.

But you will also find the members of the WMD Commission calling unanimously for greater respect for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, including the need to bring the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty into force, and indeed the need to create some new treaty instruments such as an agreement to stop the production of fissile materials (a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, FMCT). The Commission’s report is practical here, too, in arguing that treaties have to be supported by bigger expert staffs, especially at the disposal of the UN Secretary-General, and by better techniques of monitoring and verification and more efficient working methods in the world’s various disarmament institutions. The report does allow itself just one conclusion that could be called idealistic, namely, that the world would be a better place if we could get rid of all the weapons that have such terrible effects and therefore that we should be studying already now what kind of agreements and what practical first steps might lead us towards that ideal situation. Even if many governments have trouble accepting the idea of a nuclear-free world, I can assure you that it has been received with enthusiasm by non-governmental peace movements in many countries; and I personally think it is important for experts to communicate also with that audience, because the final element needed for good and lasting arms control solutions is often the understanding and support of the people.
3 REGIONAL SECURITY AGAINST NEW AND OLD THREATS:
EUROPE AS MODEL, LABORATORY OR WARNING?

Talk to the 8th ‘New Faces’ Conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Auswärtige Politik,
Stockholm, Sweden, 30 September 2005

The only article I ever managed to publish in NATO Review was called ‘Sub-regional
Organizations: The Cinderellas of European Security?’ Even today, my own devotion
to the study of regional security processes is driven partly by my feeling that they are
still treated as Cinderellas by all too many other people: and I suspect that one of the
reasons is a certain suspicion of intellectual fuzziness around the subject. For a start,
in French and English and in Brussels-speak we have the confusion between a ‘region’
within one country and a ‘region’ made up of several countries. Traditional ‘regional
studies’ are something different; and we should be wary about the words ‘regionalization’
and ‘regionalism’, which belong more in the field of economic and social analysis and
can carry negative overtones.

What I assume we want to talk about here are active and deliberate processes of
multi-state regional cooperation, connected in some way with security, which are typically
led by national governments but often most successful when they involve other layers
of society. And here we come to the second part of the problem, which is that when
such processes succeed, they tend to produce frankly boring results. Conflicts between
states stop; other conflicts are contained and the impact of other threats reduced; the
biggest fights that take place are word-fights between weary politicians after all-night
meetings, and the most painful disputes are over how to share out the profits or over
how many more members to let into the club. You do not have to be wildly macho or
the old, military-obsessed kind of security analyst to feel that studying North Korea may
be more interesting than Vietnam nowadays, or Ukraine more interesting than Slovenia,
after the bland influences of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the European Union (EU), respectively, have done their work.

As G.K. Chesterton once wrote, however, an arrow that hits its target is actually far

6 This text was previously published in Security Challenges in Times of Change: Regional Options for
30–October 2, 2005, eds May-Britt Stumbaum and Magnus Christiansson, DGAPbericht no. 5, 2007,
20 REGIONAL SECURITY AGAINST NEW AND OLD THREATS

more surprising and exciting, and should be more emotionally moving, than one that misses. I have argued throughout my time at SIPRI that we need to devote more effort to studying what works; and it’s in that spirit that I’d like to pick up two particular issues now:

- whether and how the practice of regional security cooperation has adapted itself to the quickly changing constellation of security challenges; and
- what is the significance of the European Union, the oldest of what I would call the ‘new generation’ of regional organs, for the other (steadily multiplying) efforts at security-through-integration that are going on around the world.

I will also comment briefly at the end on issues raised by the apparently unstoppable spread of the regional security virus for the larger picture of world security governance.

‘Old’ and ‘New’ Security, ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Regionalism

During the cold war, the security scene in Europe was dominated by two equally matched superpowers and two blocs that were each other’s military and ideological enemies. This confrontation cast its shadow over most other parts of the world, with equally polarizing effects. The dominant security concerns were about open war between states and groups of states, and there were four basic ways in which regional cooperation could try to cope with this:

- by binding local states together so that at least they would not fight each other;
- by binding them together to balance and deter the enemy—these first two functions of course combined by NATO, but also for a while by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Western and South-East Asia;
- by creating a structure around two opposing blocs that reduced the risks of their competition and allowed some cooperation as well: a role quite successfully played by the CSCE and then the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe; and
- by keeping a group of states out of the main confrontation and shielding them from its effects: this was the role of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), but it is quite a rare variant and doesn’t require all the members to come from the same region.

Now, the major changes that have taken place in the security agenda during the last phases of the cold war and since it finished will be well known to you all. There are three points I would particularly pick out:

- the shift from risks of inter-state conflict to intra-state conflicts, with their dangers both for security and humanity; this has gone together with a rise in positive and active military cooperation, even between former opponents, and with a demand that the more fortunate states of the world should not just look after their own security but help in exporting it to others;
- the growing prominence of worries about non-traditional threats ranging from
terrorism, crime and WMD proliferation, through various kinds of natural catastrophe and disease, to social and economic problems ranging from starvation to infrastructure collapse; and

• new awareness of the interconnectedness of all these threats and risks, both in their causes and effects, and the multiple vulnerability it creates both for richer and poorer communities.

In the early 1990s people used to wonder whether these changes would make old-style defensive alliances like NATO redundant. By now we have seen not just that old alliances can learn new and more constructive tricks, but also that the new environment has offered new rationales for regional cooperation. To mention just two,

• States can get together to ‘export security’ more effectively, in all its different forms just mentioned.
• They can get together against all the new non-military varieties of challenge and threat: to protect their own lands and peoples against them, and to make a stronger input to the global policies and responses that they demand. (In the economic dimension, we may note the parallel issue of how far regional integration can help its participants to deal with the notorious challenges of economic globalization.)

The question of democracy, and of reform and transformation more generally, has also come into the picture in a big way. Even old-style groups like NATO created pressure on their members to be democratic and to behave democratically towards each other. With today’s wider security agendas it has become more obvious how security, good governance and democracy are related: apart from anything else, many new challenges need the willing and effective help of private actors right down to the individual level, which is problematic both in weak and oppressive states. So we find the enlargement of institutions like NATO, the EU and ASEAN—and even their less integrated ‘partnership’ frameworks—being used consciously as way to promote democratization and reform in neighbouring states and through key strategic dialogues like that with China. We find the new African Union, in its admirable basic documents, linking together seamlessly the ideas of conflict avoidance and control, of democratic governance, and of sustainable development. We find a new explicit recognition among both conflict management experts and development analysts that bringing a weak or wounded state into a stable framework of security cooperation with its neighbours is one of the best ways to boost its progress and ensure a lasting recovery.

New threats for the integrated regions cannot, however, be countered with old tools and I would highlight four new practical demands that they have brought to the fore:

• Unlike military alliances, multilateral security approaches to the new agendas demand relatively high and constant inputs of money and other resources, and are pushing towards increasing centralization and collective use of these.
• Challenges involving non-state actors and individual persons can only really be mastered with the help of individually applicable laws and norms, formulated within states as well as between them.
• The interconnectedness of many of the threats gives an advantage to groupings that can combine military competences with other security ones, and both of these with political, economic and other functional capacities.

• Respectable regional organizations, as much as nations, are increasingly called on to show their relevance to the whole world both by ‘exporting security’ and by collaborating on the universal generic challenges.

The European Union

These last four desiderata—resources, legislative capacity, multi-functional competence and global outreach—are all combined at least in theory in the European Union. No other European body has them all: NATO doesn’t have any significant collective budget or law-making capacity, and the OSCE has only one of the four—multi-functional competence. I think people in other regions see just as well or even better than we do the importance both of having these tools and of combining them for the right security effect—even if for their own regional organizations, this is still much more of an aspiration than a viable programme. In this situation, the EU seems to be providing both a model and encouragement for other regions to move ahead and go deeper in integration, and a lot of food for thought on what not to do or on what could be done better.

In reality, though, how useful can the EU be as a source-book for regional design in quite different regions of the world? Problems of widely different cultures, histories and economic levels might come to mind, but I’m not sure that that is the real point. Culturally similar and culturally diverse groups of states, and groups that are all poor or all rich or rather mixed, can achieve and have achieved workable forms of security community. If we need to offer warnings about the ‘exportability’ of the EU model, I think they belong at a broader level of analysis. I have already hinted at one of them, i.e. that our Union has been working in the field of true integration longer than anyone else, and like any pioneer is bound to have run straight into all the traps that others should learn to avoid. Among other things, it created a single market and an almost single immigration space long before it realized how those arrangements would expose its citizens to transnational threats like terrorism, crime and disease, let alone set about developing collective responses to those challenges. It started off with a complicated set of institutions and was slow and often clumsy in redesigning them to deal better with new demands, notably including the demand for tight cross-functional coordination and for a single face and voice in dealing with the outside world. Here I would like to highlight, however, two other sets of issues that are very much alive in debate among Europeans themselves.

First is the question of how larger and smaller states can work together. The West Europeans in the 1940s decided to conduct their military cooperation with the USA, which indeed was the only way to keep the Soviet threat at bay, but they set up their deeper economic (and eventually political) cooperation only among themselves. The subsequent story of the EU suggests that progress in integration is relatively easy in a region that has no single dominant state but a balance among two, three or more larger ones; and this same diagnosis could be supplied in broad terms to the relative success of the Latin American organizations, the African Union and ASEAN. But the EU as such doesn’t offer any answers—and NATO has never really found a permanent
and satisfactory one—on how to build successful cooperation where there is one much larger state in the neighbourhood and it cannot simply be excluded from the exercise or treated in the older style as an enemy. That is the challenge with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with India in South Asia and with China in the East, and also in the former Soviet space, where Russia’s attempts since 1990 to re-create a security community have never really delivered the goods either for itself or for others.

Secondly and last is the problem of popular consent and support. All regional structures dealing with security need to be led by national governments so long as the prime formal, and practical, responsibility for security lies at the governmental level. But it is all too easy for cooperation then to become the property of elites and to develop in a ‘club’ atmosphere from which ordinary people in the region, as well as those outside, feel excluded. For the results, you need only look as far as the debacle over approval of the draft EU Constitution: but there is a broader point that organizations claiming to protect and promote democracy can risk their whole credibility when their own stakeholders find them undemocratic. The EU has plainly not solved this challenge, and other regional groups should ponder hard on its lessons. Of course, effective security work has its own disciplines, and it will rarely make sense to hand over operational control to parliaments—let alone to delegate further. But what the EU’s leaders, and all other regional leaders, do need to think about is a combination of informing and consulting ordinary people better about the security aspect (and all other aspects) of regional integration: and mobilizing and engaging them better especially in the newer areas of security creation and emergency control.

A ‘World of Regions’?

A last word on what all this means for the global security structure and security governance. Today we have one superpower and it is not in any real sense ‘regionalized’. Indeed, many Americans see regional organizations as a challenge to themselves, a deliberate attempt to balance and limit US power or to make the world more ‘multi-polar’. As I see it, the EU and all the more successful regional groups exist first and foremost to meet their own people’s needs; and they often realize that those needs can best be met by constructive cooperation or complementarity with the USA. Any more defensive points in their thinking are likely to be about avoiding American bullying or divide-and-rule tactics on their own territory, or being able to make their case against the USA when necessary in forums such as the World Trade Organization—which is hardly unreasonable. In the big picture, however, it is clearly harder to find ways of running the world that are efficient and fair to everyone when we have such a messy combination of single (non-integrated or imperfectly integrated) big powers; a few successfully integrated or integrating regions; and other regions like the greater Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, where states of more modest size are creating dangers for themselves and the world precisely because they haven’t yet found or even sincerely tried to find a working regional formula. Shouldn’t those of us who believe in the regional method be trying a good deal harder, if nothing else, to tackle that last problem and to find some better way of talking to the USA about it?
4 RECENT TRENDS IN RESEARCH ON REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

Martin Sjögren


Introduction

In an increasingly globalized world, and with a global competitive market as well as the emergence of transnational security threats such as terrorism and international crime, it is not surprising that cooperative frameworks have been established in most regions in order to address these issues more effectively. Some form of regional organization now exists in virtually every region, although the formal frameworks that exist in South Asia and the Arab region do not actually lead to much cooperation. There are, however, notable exceptions to this trend, such as the North-East Asian region.

As has been widely documented, regionalism experienced a resurgence during the 1990s and is now commonly termed ‘new regionalism’. The new regional organizations and existing organizations that underwent further development were designed to deal with a steadily growing range of issues. Although economic cooperation has remained the dominant issue for a lot of these organizations, cooperation in the field of security was a goal of several of them from the outset and has been a continuing development for others.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term ‘region’. Geography is of course an important determinant for the demarcations between various regions, with continents forming natural regional borders. As the current debate about the further expansion of the European Union (EU) to countries such as Turkey reveals, however, these regions are also to a large extent political constructs. This is further demonstrated by the fact that some of the larger world powers, such as the USA, Russia and China, play an influential role in several of these regions simultaneously.

This paper begins by discussing recent research on the topic of regional security cooperation, of its gaps and of the efforts being made to fill them. The second part

of the paper addresses possible areas for future research, focusing on the question why regional security cooperation has failed to develop in some regions, paying particular attention to North-East Asia.

Research on Regional Security Cooperation

There has been a significant amount of research conducted on the theme of regionalism in international politics, as well as on regional cooperation. Although some of this research was done during the cold war, most of it coincided with the so-called “new regionalism” of the post-cold war era. The majority of this research has looked at economic cooperation and the role of regional groupings in the globalized international political economy.

However, some research has also been conducted on issues of regional security. This research generally falls within one of two categories. The first category, which was developed in the early 1990s, focuses on regions as security entities within the international security system. This research has taken issue with Realists, who tend to view states as the predominant actors in international relations, as well as Globalists, for whom states are losing their importance in an increasingly globalized world. The new research emphasizes regions as primary arenas for security. Perhaps most important among these is the work by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and their concept of Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). The central premise of their theory contends that the world is divided into a number of regions, and that most security concerns and activities are internal to these regions rather than global in nature.

The second category of research takes a different approach, focusing instead on specific regions and the security dynamics and patterns of cooperation within them. Within this body of research there is a substantial and growing amount of literature focusing specifically on regional security cooperation. This has been the case with Europe in particular, where much research has been carried out on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as well as on other organizations such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Although this research provides a lot of insight into security cooperation taking place in Europe, its contribution to the comparative understanding of regional security cooperation elsewhere in the world is limited because of the peculiarities of European organizations—notably their advanced nature and multiplicity.

Indeed, recent literature on regionalism and regional cooperation lacks theoretical and comparative studies of the forms and tasks of regional security cooperation. This gap is unfortunate given the increasing involvement of regional organizations in security affairs and the aspirations of more distant regions towards developing such frameworks.

In an effort to bridge this gap in the literature, a series of recent and forthcoming publications by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has sought to categorize the current forms of regional security cooperation, as well as establish criteria for assessing the impacts of various regional groupings. There are four general patterns and functions of regional organizations in the field of security. Firstly, these regional organizations serve as frameworks for security dialogue for conflict prevention and management, either indirectly or more actively through the establishment of field missions, as in the case of the OSCE, or by sending peacekeepers, as in the case of the
African Union (AU). A second general pattern is that regions have developed new forms of military cooperation, which place more emphasis on dialogue and cooperation than on traditional arms control. Examples of this, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and ESDP, have developed cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and even peace enforcement.

The third new pattern of regional security cooperation has been a growing commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is perhaps most obvious in Europe, where a number of organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, actively work to promote democracy among their member states. The European Union has also specified strict democratic requirements for membership, and has also made efforts to promote democracy beyond its borders. Promoting democracy among their members has also been an important task of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the AU, while other regional organizations, such as those in the Asia–Pacific, have been more cautious in this regard.

A fourth and final new trend in regional security cooperation has been the effort to address the so-called ‘new threats’ encompassing the broader security agenda. Several of the regional groupings have developed more comprehensive security concepts, attempting to address such disparate issues as energy security and violent non-state actors, particularly those involved in terrorism. Such cooperation can grow naturally out of cooperation in the economic sphere, even for groupings with no previous specific security agenda. Examples of this are the policies of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on both terrorism and piracy.

Apart from these efforts to categorize the new patterns and functions of regional security cooperation, recent research has also attempted to establish criteria for evaluating whether regional groupings have positive aims and effects. Although regional groupings such as the EU and NATO have generally had positive effects for their member states, this was considered necessary since other groupings, like the Warsaw Pact, were largely detrimental for many of their constituent members. Five such criteria have been suggested: whether cooperation is coerced and hegemonic; whether it is based on a zero-sum relationship with the outside world; whether it is rigid or static; whether it is artificial and superficial; and whether its management and resource use is inefficient. One region in which the newly formed regional groupings may have ‘failed’ on several of these counts is in the former Soviet Union. Groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are to a great extent dominated by their larger member states (Russia in the case of the CSTO, Russia and China in the case of the SCO), have largely undemocratic practices and are often seen as trying to ‘block’ US or Western strategic influence.

As demonstrated in this section, research relevant to regional security cooperation is being conducted (although not thoroughly enough) and efforts are being made to fill gaps in this research. But the research in this field still remains underdeveloped. The following section suggests possible areas that require further exploration.

**Further Research Areas**

Despite attempts to address gaps in the research on regional security cooperation, much research still needs to be done in this important field in order to fully understand its
implications and potential. As a starting point, all the new security-related patterns and functions mentioned above need to be explored further, especially if the roles and functions played by regional security organizations continue to develop in these areas. A number of other possible research directions could be pursued as well, such as the interactions between these regional groupings and the wider implications of security regionalism for global governance.

One such area that requires further research, and which the rest of this paper will attempt to address, is why regional cooperation has not taken root in certain regions or subregions. These under-regionalized areas often have plenty of internal security problems, which in a globalized world have implications far beyond the region’s borders. Many examples can be mentioned in this regard, such as the greater Middle East, where organizations like the Arab League remain very weak and the Gulf Cooperation Council is both weak and potentially divisive, and South Asia, where the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has failed to develop into the effective regional organization many hoped it would. This section will, however, seek to explore this question in relation to North-East Asia, where analysts increasingly speculate that security threats such as those posed by North Korea, as well as tensions among other states in the region, can only be addressed through institutionalized regional cooperation.

Several factors may explain why certain regions have not been able to develop strong frameworks for regional security cooperation. Firstly, regions with a clear power discrepancy among their states have tended to develop weaker institutions, since the smaller states suspect that such an organization would be dominated by the larger state(s). This pattern holds true in Latin America, where the OAS has remained weak due to the overwhelming power of the US, as well as in South Asia, where smaller states such as Sri Lanka remain wary of the intentions of the much larger India. NATO does, however, stand out as a notable exception to this trend.

Differences in size and power largely explain the problems with regional cooperation in North-East Asia. Most obviously, the size of China makes other states in the region wary of its intentions and possible influence. This has not only been the case with states such as Japan, but also with North Korea, for whom China remains the closest ally. North Korea has attempted to gain increasing independence from China, largely due to lingering mistrust stemming from the perceived Chinese ideological betrayal through market liberalization and rapprochements with South Korea and the USA.

The other power with disproportionate influence in the region is the USA, especially in relation to its allies South Korea and Japan. Tension has been growing here, too, especially between the USA and South Korea due to the latter’s efforts to implement a more independent foreign policy. The discrepancy between the approaches of both states towards dealing with North Korea, coupled with mounting public discontent over the presence of US military bases in South Korea, has caused the USA–South Korea alliance to come under increasing strain.

Another related factor that may explain the lack of security cooperation in certain regions is adversarial intra-regional relations. Regions with low levels of tension among their states have normally been more successful in establishing cooperative security frameworks, as was the case in Western Europe following the Second World War. Conversely, regions with higher levels of tension among two or more key players, such as South Asia and the Middle East, lack such frameworks. This explanation also applies
to the case of North-East Asia. There is not only obvious tension between North Korea and almost all the states in the region. Territorial disputes are still very much alive, such as those between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands and between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo Island. In addition to this, a longstanding rivalry persists between Japan and China, stemming partly from historical events, but also from growing competition between the two states for regional supremacy.

As the experience of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates, however, such high levels of tension may not necessarily be a barrier to developing security cooperation, as long as the region is clearly divided into two blocs. Although never to the same extent as in Europe during the cold war, this may have partly been the case in North-East Asia. Since the end of the cold war, however, tensions have emerged within the respective blocs. As we have seen, China and North Korea have been drifting further apart, especially since the revival of international concern over North Korea’s nuclear policies. Relations between the USA and South Korea have also been weakening. This lack of a clear bloc structure has made the region all the more complex, undermining efforts at building regional security cooperation.

Historical reasons may also explain the lack of regionalism in North-East Asia. Most importantly, the region does not have any past experience of regional cooperation. Relations between the states in the region, as in East Asia as a whole, have traditionally been conducted on a bilateral basis. Until now, the USA has deliberately cast its own key Asian relationships in that form. Although all states in the region (including North Korea) now take part in the meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and most are members of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework and the new East Asian Summit grouping, a strong commitment to the values of regional cooperation has not yet taken root, and multilateral activities have hardly penetrated the spheres of security and democracy-building. Added to this lack of experience of cooperation is the historical legacy of war and colonization in the region. Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as its invasion of China during the Second World War, still cause tension. This is evident from the frequent disputes over Japanese textbooks, the issue of Korean ‘comfort women’, and the tensions erupting over former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

Do all these negative factors indicate that North-East Asia and regions with similar problems will likely fail in their efforts at regional security cooperation? The current situation does not look promising, especially in light of North Korea’s nuclear tests on 9 October 2006. However, discernible trends in the region hint at a brighter future. Firstly, several states in the region have expressed the desire to establish such regional structures. This is most notably the case in China and South Korea, but more recently the USA has also made motions in this direction. Secondly, there are signs that bilateral relations between the states in the region may improve. The new Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, chose Beijing and Seoul as the destinations for his first official visits abroad, raising hopes that Japan’s relations with China and South Korea may improve. Indeed, if anything positive may come out of the North Korean nuclear tests, it could be that states in the region will realize that regional cooperation offers the best hope of addressing the common threat posed by North Korea. A new commitment to such cooperation was manifested by the relatively quick adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), which imposed sanctions on North Korea.
Regional security cooperation in North-East Asia would greatly benefit both the region itself and international security as a whole if it follows the criteria outlined above as closely as possible. Threats emanating from the region, as well as from other under-regionalized regions such as the Middle East, have truly global consequences, especially in the case of nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, looking at the benefits that other regions have gained from such cooperation, a framework for regional security cooperation seems like the most promising long-term solution to the region’s security problems.

**Conclusion**

The trend towards increased regionalism in world politics that arose during the 1990s lost its momentum and appeal a couple of years ago. The first George W. Bush administration was in many ways outright hostile towards regional groupings, preferring to conduct its foreign relations bilaterally or through ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’. Furthermore, the most advanced of the regional organizations, the EU, was in crisis following the failure to adopt its constitution. However, several recent developments seem to indicate that the trend is again turning towards increased enthusiasm for regional cooperation. Foremost among these developments is a change in US policy, as outlined in the revised National Security Strategy of March 2006, which expresses support for regional and global cooperative institutions. Moreover, the ESDP has continued to develop despite the lack of a European constitution. Other regional organizations have gained in popularity and influence as well. Both India and Pakistan have expressed interest in joining the SCO.

This revived enthusiasm indicates that regional cooperation is likely to continue to flourish and develop into an integral part of the international system. As this paper has attempted to demonstrate, some research is currently being conducted on this topic. This research does, however, remain underdeveloped. It is therefore essential that it become the subject of further research in order to improve understanding of its various dynamics and impacts.
THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: 
A CENTRAL ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

Ruslan Maksutov
August 2006
An excerpt

I. Introduction
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as an intergovernmental organization on 15 June 2001. The territory of the SCO member states constitutes 60 per cent of the Eurasian landmass and has a population of approximately 1.455 billion. Together with the four SCO observers—India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan—the organization represents a robust grouping of states that possess huge energy resources as well as a significant number of nuclear weapons, in the arsenals of China, India, Pakistan and Russia.

The landlocked states of Central Asia are equally distant from Beijing and Moscow, and they face a variety of overlapping foreign policy challenges in relations with both China and Russia. There is a clear asymmetry of economic and military capabilities among the SCO member states. In contrast to China as a rising power and Russia as a power still to be reckoned with, the newly independent states of Central Asia have yet to establish themselves economically, politically or militarily. In addition, these states are significantly less populated and their trade and economic opportunities are limited by geography. Nevertheless, major regional and global stakeholders, including China and Russia, have been increasingly active in the Central Asian region and have thus played a part in heightening both the degree of international attention drawn to developments in this part of the world and the profile of the SCO as a relevant institution.

Unfortunately, the research undertaken so far to explore the nature of the SCO and its growing regional and global role has lacked a sufficient focus on Central Asian states as members of this young but also rapidly evolving organization. Fundamental questions remain to be answered, including: (a) What is the role of Central Asian states in the SCO? (b) What influence does the SCO have on regional security, economic development and cooperation? (c) How successful has it been in meeting the actual day-to-day challenges faced by Central Asia? (d) What could be the broader impact of the SCO on the region?

9 The full text of the present chapter was originally published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in August 2006 as a Project Paper; the full text is available on the SIPRI Euro-Atlantic Security Programme site at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/eurosec.html>.
This paper attempts to provide answers to these questions and to analyse the SCO from the perspective of the Central Asian states.

Some analysts—although usually not those directly involved in the work of the SCO—have speculated over whether the organization might develop into a counter-weight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and whether the world is witnessing the start of a new Asian ‘alliance’. Such prospects are generally regarded with reserve given the uncertain implications for the security and other interests of the West. A more objective analysis should help to avoid misunderstanding of the actual nature of the SCO and its possible effects, both regionally and globally: surveying the security and cooperation efforts of the SCO from a Central Asian perspective is one way to help achieve this. Such an analysis—rather than looking only at the SCO’s implications for global security—can, among other things, bring into proper focus the impact that the SCO could have on regional security and on the economic development of its member states.

One of the most intriguing issues to explore is how far the purported and actual agenda of the SCO corresponds to the national interests of Central Asian states—and, conversely, how far the national interests of countries in the region can and do shape the agenda of the SCO. While this is a complex question, affected by a number of implicit contradictions in terms of the goals pursued by different SCO members, most notably China and Russia, addressing it could lead to a deeper understanding of the SCO’s prospects as a regional cooperation and security framework.

This section provides a brief background to the development of the SCO as a whole. Sections II, III and IV consider respectively the ‘balancing’ nature of Central Asian states’ role (and objectives) in the organization; the development of multilateral security cooperation in the SCO framework; and the relationship of these developments to the Central Asian states’ own interests. Section V presents the conclusions.

**Background: The History and Nature of the SCO**

The motives underpinning the establishment of the SCO on the threshold of the 21st century included unprecedented achievements in settling the longstanding disputes along the 7000-kilometre border between China and the Soviet Union and its successor states; the successful implementation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the border areas; and recognition of the need for a more coherent response to regional security and economic development challenges generally.

China and Russia also saw the SCO as a vehicle for pursuing a number of interests connected with the continuing challenges to their central authority in Xinjiang province and Chechnya, respectively. These specific concerns, as much as any generic appreciation of ‘new threats’ (note that the SCO was launched before the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States), explain the implantation of the themes of opposing ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ (the ‘three evils’) into the SCO’s agenda. Combating the so-called three evils became the foundations of much practical SCO activity and were simultaneously enshrined in the 2001 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which was adopted and signed together with the Declaration on Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Although the consolidation of progress in border delimitation and management and the fight against the ‘three evils’ were important drivers for the creation of the SCO, there were motives that went beyond these specific fields. More broadly, through the SCO China and Russia embarked on a policy of restructuring their relationship in a new global security environment, notably with a view to assuring their respective access to the very large, untapped hydrocarbon reserves of Central Asia. Given that China and Russia are nuclear weapon states with a history of tense relations, some of which still persist, they could see such a ‘regulated coexistence’ as vital for both regional and global security.

Seeking common ground in their relations, the founding members of the SCO defined their joint priorities as:

- strengthening mutual trust and good-neighbourly relations among member states;
- promoting effective cooperation in political affairs, economy and trade, and the scientific–technical, cultural and educational spheres as well as in energy, transportation, tourism, and environmental protection;
- jointly safeguarding and preserving regional peace, security and stability; and
- striving towards the creation of a democratic, just, reasonable new international political and economic order.

The last objective in the strikingly diverse list is of particular interest because it is a formulation that could ‘mean all things to all members’—apparently sanctioning both the Chinese and Russian advocacy of a multi-polar world and the interest of the Central Asian states in maintaining a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy on topics of common interest.

The central distinctive feature of the SCO as a regional cooperation and security framework is that it enables Central Asian states, at least formally, to take part in generating regional approaches to cooperation and security on an equal basis with the larger regional powers. It is an opportunity that Central Asia has not had before in modern times. Even such prominent structures as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), of which Central Asian countries are members, have been less appealing to the leaders of the states of the region. This is primarily because of a general lack of interest in the region in the OSCE and the local authorities’ ambivalence over the prominent goals of democratization that are embedded in its agenda. Moreover, the pan-European security approach of the OSCE is perceived to be of little use for Central Asia, since it does not focus on regional ills specifically. It is also relevant that every other regional security or economic cooperation initiative excludes China, while the country’s growing significance for the region is beyond question.

Participation in consensus-based multilateral decision making potentially elevates Central Asian foreign policy to a qualitatively new level after a period characterized by lack of focus and discipline or, to be more exact, reactivity. On the face of it, regional cooperation in such a framework could have numerous benefits in terms of economic development and of establishing a more efficient security arrangement to fill the vacuum left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Central Asia is exposed to the potential dangers of falling into the orbit of Chinese or Russian domination at a time when China and Russia have tense relations with the West over both internal governance and foreign policy issues. This unique mix of prospects and challenges is one of the major elements that heightens the significance of the SCO as an actor in the international arena.
The fact that the SCO unites mainly non-democratic regimes (including the observer states, with the exception of India) has not failed to be noted and is one of the core reasons for the preoccupation in the West with the future of this new organization. As seen locally, the SCO’s political agenda is not ‘burdened’ with democratization and human rights issues. Rather, it is predicated on diversity in patterns of political development and on the creation of an environment where states are free to pursue their respective internal models independently. The real merits of this approach are, however, coloured by the fact that under non-democratic regimes the right to choose the model or direction of development is usually vested in an incumbent elite. This is why, in many instances, analyses of Central Asian or SCO developments need to differentiate between the interests of the ruling political establishments and those of the population. An objective assessment is thus complicated and may be influenced by ideological assumptions. Depending on the course of socio-political development in the member states, some of the concerns about the longer-term normative influence of the SCO could be either reinforced or alleviated over time.

II. The Balancing Role of Central Asian States in the SCO

Balancing between East and West

It is clear that, in their interaction with large powers such as China and Russia, the states of Central Asia are significantly influenced by these two regional powers’ agendas. On the other hand, the smaller powers of the SCO are still able to outline their national interests and security and economic concerns, and to articulate them within the frameworks provided by the organization. Given that the pivotal membership of both China and Russia in the SCO leads these two states constantly to seek common ground on a variety of issues, the role of the Central Asian members in the organization could be seen as an important potential feature of balance, (a) internally, in relation to the regional interests and broader aspirations that the large states seek to further through the SCO, and (b) externally, in complementing or offsetting the impact of the SCO on the region’s general international orientation.

An important starting point for exploring this issue is that the terms of SCO membership do not directly limit Central Asian states’ freedom to participate, together with non-SCO members, in other initiatives, programmes and undertakings aimed at establishing security and cooperation in the region. This is crucially important for the local states themselves, since the freedom to implement security policies with different partners maximizes the chances of building themselves a more effective, overarching security and development framework for the longer term. While further developing the substance of multilateral efforts for security, such varied relationships can also give Central Asian countries a certain leverage for maintaining more independent positions when interacting with the larger powers of the SCO.

Perhaps the most evident example of this kind of Central Asian ‘balancing’ is NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, in which all the Central Asian states participate. There are, however, several other, no less significant undertakings, projects and organizations that strengthen the case: including the Central Asian military facilities currently used by troops of the US-led anti-terrorism coalition; the foreign military
financing provided to local states by the US Department of State, and bilateral military-
to-military training and exchanges; the OSCE’s law enforcement training programmes;
and efforts for technical interoperability between local defence structures and the West.
In addition, there are independent security initiatives taken by the Central Asian states
such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building measures in Asia (CICA) and the establishment of stronger ties with other outside actors not previously involved in cooperation with the region. India, for instance, has been actively seeking ways to foster bilateral cooperation with Central Asian states, especially those which are viewed as potential energy suppliers.

The barely concealed internal contradictions within the SCO leave little room for the organization to evolve into a strong institutionalized alliance like NATO. While most analysts have supported this judgement with reference to underlying Sino-Russian tensions, there have been hints that implicit ‘red lines’ defined by at least some Central Asian states have also placed important limitations on the larger powers’ ambitions. The fact that at least three countries of Central Asia either have established or plan to establish strategic partnerships with the USA is evidence enough: and in fact, some Western military presence can be observed in all Central Asian states. Consideration of these facts should at least alleviate some misunderstandings about the intrinsic purpose and nature of the SCO as well as its current and potential evolution.

Uzbekistan was an ally, or ‘strategic partner’, of the United States until the time of the May 2005 bloodshed in Andijan. A Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework between the two states was concluded in 2002, just nine months after Uzbek President Islam Karimov had signed the founding documents of the SCO. Kyrgyzstan, while a member of the SCO, still hosts a military base for the US-led anti-terrorism coalition forces. In spite of the fact that Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev supported the often-cited SCO Astana Declaration of 5 July 2005 on scheduling the withdrawal of the US military from the region, Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement with the USA in July 2006 on the further deployment of troops and facilities in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, with no change of conditions for the continuing US military presence other than the financial terms. More generally, the two states have maintained their friendly relations and mutual understanding on security matters. In retrospect, the fact that Kyrgyzstan supported the Astana Declaration, implying closure of the US military base at Manas, may be seen as an example of adhoc policy manoeuvring by weaker Central Asian states when confronted with pressure from larger powers in foreign policy matters. As later revealed by Bakiev, the initiative to adopt the headline-grabbing Astana Declaration came from none other than the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.

Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, Kassymzhomart Tokaev, stated in an August 2006 interview in The Washington Times that ‘the United States and Kazakhstan hope to sign a wide-ranging “strategic partnership” accord when President Nursultan Nazarbaev travels to Washington in September’. This is hardly consistent with the interpretation of the SCO as an anti-West bloc, especially considering that Kazakhstan is the third largest SCO member and sits on significant energy reserves. Kazakhstan has also contributed personnel for US-led coalition forces in Iraq. By sending 27 troops of the Kazakh peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) as a part of the international peacekeeping operation in Iraq with a mandate to carry out humanitarian activities, Kazakhstan signaled the
emergence of a new Central Asian component in the political paradigms of the SCO—particularly symbolic given China’s and Russia’s clear disapproval of any involvement by their purported ‘satellites’ in the Iraq venture. Furthermore, in January 2006 an Individual Partnership Action Plan between Kazakhstan and NATO was finalized for ratification. Kazakhstan thus became the first Central Asian state to assume the full status of a NATO partner country.

An important general factor is that, in contrast to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or NATO, the SCO legal framework and foundations do not provide for collective defence against external aggression, and even less for the projection of military force. According to Richard Weitz, the SCO ‘lacks the internal cohesion and capabilities found in strong multilateral security institutions such as NATO’. Indeed, military cooperation is probably the most limited field of development within the SCO framework compared with border, law enforcement and anti-terrorism cooperation (although the last of these is hardly fully developed either). It is even difficult to imaging the SCO developing into a group that would move towards a military alliance at a later stage given the fact that China, the informal lead player in the SCO, has a formal stated position (and good practical reasons) to avoid such commitments. All the Central Asian states and their leaders share this position in practice, even if this is not always clearly articulated, because forming a military alliance would mean the end of their multi-vector external policy.

The concern about a ‘NATO of the East’ being formed in Asia thus seems unfounded. In any case, the concern is odd because of the way that NATO’s own agenda has been evolving to meet the challenges of a new world ‘without dividing lines’, profiling the alliance increasingly as a contributor to stability and security on a global level and for the general good. This makes it hard to argue that the creation of an organization that genuinely pursued similar goals from an Asian base should be feared per se. Such reasoning would be a reversion to the zero-sum East–West calculations of the cold war, from which NATO’s own doctrine has consciously distanced itself. Rather, today’s challenge for policy makers is to see whether and how Western, Asian and other security initiatives can complement each other—and it would suit no one better than the Central Asian states if that vision of new modes of cooperation could be made real in the specific case of the SCO. In this context it is worth noting that a majority of the SCO’s practical activities and plans have reflected substantive priorities that resemble or echo, rather than contradict, generally accepted Western policy aims: for example, anti-terrorist exercises on the territory of Central Asian states, measures for countering trans-border crime and for border protection, high-level diplomatic contacts and other confidence-building measures, and other practical cooperation projects between the member states. There are, of course, exceptions, such as the joint military manoeuvres held by China and Russia in 2005, which were difficult to see as a genuine ‘counter-terrorism’ exercise, even though it was called that. In fact, Chinese and Russian motives had more to do with signalling to the USA that it should not interfere militarily and strategically in what Moscow and Beijing perceive as their own sphere of influence. This exercise, however, was held outside the multilateral framework of the SCO proper.

**Balancing the Regional and Global Agendas**

Another aspect of balancing in the development of the SCO that is important for Central Asian agendas concerns the delicate interface between the SCO’s regional endeavours...
and the aspirations of the larger members to project influence beyond regional borders. The broader role of the SCO as an instrument for the latter is more appealing for China and Russia than it is for their smaller neighbours, for obvious reasons that are closely linked with both of these two large states’ belief in a multipolar world and with the general dynamics of Chinese–Russian–US relations. As the larger members of the SCO struggle to increase their influence in the world as ‘old’ or ‘emerging’ power centres, they are impelled to bring more and more international aspects into the activity of the SCO.

As one symptom of this larger vision, the SCO has sometimes clearly expressed an underlying goal to outbid other national or institutional players seeking influence in the region. The Fifth Anniversary Declaration of the SCO points out that ‘What specific means and mechanisms should be adopted to safeguard security of the region is the right and responsibility of countries in the region’ to choose. This would seem to identify the SCO as an attempt by its member states to build an independent regional approach to security and development, not dependent on Western guidance or protection schemes. At the same time, however, it may reflect a more positive realization by the regional powers and Central Asian states of the need to continue seeking and generating new multilateral security and development models for the area. The emphasis on ‘independence’ as a principle for tackling issues of regional security, economic development and cooperation can also be seen as a logical desire for policies and mechanisms that would accurately and effectively address the unique challenges faced by SCO members. Among other things, this could provide some excuse for the SCO’s repeated refusal of observer status for the USA, which has elsewhere been viewed as a signal of ‘anti-Western’ orientation.

The Central Asian states themselves are clearly most interested in the SCO’s practical undertakings for regional security and development such as confidence building, anti-terrorism activity, fighting drug trafficking and securing borders, trade and economic cooperation, investment projects, rehabilitation of transportation networks and exploitation of transit potential. Various Central Asian member states have made efforts, although never in a common front, to keep the SCO agenda focused on addressing these types of local challenge. On the other hand, the two larger SCO members and especially Russia have as one of their goals the prevention of the emergence of any kind of purely Central Asian cooperation framework in the area. One of the notorious examples is Russia’s success in merging the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)—the only exclusively Central Asian multilateral project to date—with the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), which is dominated by Russia in practice.

Perhaps the most overt example of Central Asian agenda balancing comes from Kazakhstan, which has in general been successful in avoiding excessively intimate relations with either the West or China and Russia. Kazakh Foreign Minister Tokayev stated in a speech in July 2006 that, ‘as an active member, Kazakhstan would work to keep the SCO a universal and well-balanced organization’, thus implicitly assuring the USA that his nation would prevent China and Russia from generating anti-US policies in the SCO. While Kazakhstan’s rich energy reserves help it to balance between the interests of major actors, a consistent approach to securing national interests is what has principally allowed the country to keep its room for manoeuvre and to move towards the category of an independent international player rather than ‘just’ a post-Soviet state. Admittedly, the concessions to Kazakhstan made by important international stakeholders in pursuit of
economic gains have also maintained a comfortable setting for President Nazarbaev’s far from democratic internal policies.

Other Central Asian states have taken a less clear and consistent stance in defining the kinds of balance they seek by lobbying both in the SCO and elsewhere. The relative economic weakness of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan pushes them all towards a reactive foreign policy, with Uzbekistan in particular swinging from one extreme of alignment to another, depending on the changing context. However, another important reason why these three states fail to generate a more or less consistent stance is their shared preoccupation with sustaining current leadership regimes. There are some hopes that further economic development may help to overcome the syndrome of a short-sighted foreign policy and result in a liberalization of the domestic political situation in these states. It may be noted that in the July 2006 speech mentioned above the Kazakh Foreign Minister also spoke for many in the Central Asian political elites when he said that ‘it is important to achieve success in the economic area and then to build up a solid middle class, which will serve as a pillar for democracy’.

In sum, the so-called multi-vector foreign policy of Central Asian leaders has allowed them to manoeuvre between the interests of big powers, albeit rather ineptly, resulting in a very mixed pattern of international engagement in security and cooperation schemes in the region. At present, this suits the desire of Central Asian political elites to derive benefits from as many actors as possible while preserving the status quo in their respective countries. While such an approach gives them flexibility to accommodate new drivers, such as the ‘necessity to cultivate a solid middle class’ or the emergence of new threats, it brings significant and cumulative dangers because it makes their foreign policy so tactical in nature, and thus highly sensitive to the slightest changes occurring in the region. Against this background one merit of the Central Asian states’ participation in the SCO might be to help them develop more strategic approaches to various issues, especially to those agendas that are shared by larger powers within the SCO and beyond.

The Political Dimension

Foreign Involvement

In the earliest stages of the SCO, Central Asian leaders tended to view the organization less as a platform for real regional cooperation and more as a low-cost way of resolving their differences with their large neighbours. Interestingly, it was only after the West started paying more attention to the region (notably in connection with events in Afghanistan) that Central Asian political elites gained a—possibly exaggerated—sense of their own new potential importance in security matters. This made them look more seriously at the potential of the SCO, among other things, as a way of realizing their multi-vector foreign policy more fully than could ever have been possible before, as well as an additional route to capitalize on international attention and associated aid.

After September 2001 and the US-led coalition’s entry into Afghanistan, Central Asia became a point of intersection for the great powers’ interests in combating terrorism. It was perhaps the first time that China, Russia and the USA agreed on a strategic issue of such significance, even though the concord did not last long. Unfortunately, however, aside from unifying the interests of major regional and global powers, the anti-terrorism theme also provided the authoritarian leaders of the region with new opportunities
to exploit their position. While Operation Enduring Freedom and the anti-terrorism campaign dominated the agenda, it led both the larger SCO members and the West to place disproportionate emphasis on military security in, and military cooperation with, Central Asia at the expense of any commitment to democratization and the development of political and economic systems. As this was gradually understood in the West, the demand for commitment to democracy started to be linked more emphatically to aid for security and economic purposes. Meanwhile, the shifts of approach by foreign powers combined with the real fear of terrorism allowed Central Asian leaders domestically to further undermine the position of political competitors and concentrate power more firmly with the incumbents.

If the weakening of political opposition must be attributed partly to unbalanced foreign involvement, it is fair to say that the SCO as such played a secondary role in this. It is true that the two largest SCO members’ interests coincide with blocking democracy, not least because this limits the scope for any genuine Western influence in the region. However, the failure of the West for some years to protest against Central Asian authoritarian backsliding, linked with a heightened focus on military security and stability, also had its effect; and even when the concord between major Western and Eastern powers started to dissolve, authoritarian leaders were left well placed to continue playing the two sides off against each other.

Today, the authoritarian political elites of Central Asian states are comfortable with the SCO’s inherent political, economic and security guarantees, above all because what they gain from the organization is not accompanied by any demands for democratization or any risk of relaxing internal political and economic control. Combined with the other elements of a multi-vector foreign policy, this makes SCO membership an efficient instrument for pursuing the leaders’ interests. In the present, more confrontational atmosphere of US relations with China and Russia, Central Asian establishments use their membership of the SCO to evade Western pressure for democratization and, conversely, use Western involvement as a counterweight to possible Chinese and Russian domination. In the process, economic and security benefits can be gained from both sides as well.

Internal Demands for Democratization

As shown above, the non-interventionist, pro-status quo political agenda of the SCO has thus far served Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes well. On the other hand, the SCO as such is unlikely to prove strong enough to block the broader course of political developments of the kind that have already led China’s rulers to relax some internal controls in pursuit of modernization and could in future lead Central Asian states down the same path with more intensive economic development. The growth of economic activity is likely to stimulate a stronger business lobby and the emergence of influential interest groups, which would significantly diversify domestic political life. These optimistic scenarios, however, depend on progress in realizing those economic goals of the SCO that correspond to the national interests of the Central Asian states. More importantly, it will depend on how major external democracies rethink their policies in the region, and in particular on whether they can play their part in this positive development scenario without allowing current political establishments to consolidate their grip on developments for some time to come.
Along with the internal dynamics of democratization, it is possible that deepening cooperation between states could help weaken authoritarianism. The rate of democratic progress differs at present between individual countries. Kyrgyzstan has traditionally been considered more democratic than its neighbours, while the progress made by Kazakhstan in democratization was praised by US Vice-President Dick Cheney during a visit to the country in 2006. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (the latter not a member of the SCO) have, on the other hand, been heavily criticized for human rights abuses and growing undemocratic practices; and much remains to be done in all the Central Asian states, notably in terms of decentralization of power, freedom of the mass media and market liberalization. Given growing multilateral integration, the inequalities in the depth of democratic transformations in Central Asian states might produce an upward levelling effect, provided that this occurs in a way that does not affect the vital interests of larger SCO member states. Formally speaking, the organization’s political agenda is neutral as to the choice of political orientation of its members—even if, in practice, China and Russia find the status quo more conducive to promoting their energy and geopolitical interests in Central Asia.

A further sensitive issue that could play a part is the Central Asian states’ nervousness about becoming too influenced by Chinese and Russian interests and about being manipulated by these large states for their own geopolitical aims. These fears have little to do with internal political affinities but more to do with Central Asia’s long historical experience of being a periphery for one or more stronger states. If nothing else, Central Asia’s present leaders are extremely committed to maintaining their sovereignty and independent position. The dilemma they face is that a more democratic orientation and greater openness to the West would be one of the most obvious ways to bolster their independent position vis-à-vis Beijing and Moscow.

The eventual outcome will depend on what is more important for Central Asian leaders—their independence, or maintaining the status quo in domestic affairs—and predicting their choices is not easy. At present their behaviour indicates different priorities: Uzbekistan, for instance, opted to uphold its regime during and after the notorious events of May 2005 in Andijan, whereas Kazakhstan is making more consistent efforts to reinforce its independent position, in particular through closer connections to the West. The path eventually chosen by Central Asian political establishments could have a profound impact on the evolution of the SCO agenda. Either the latter will remain harnessed to protecting the interests of current authoritarian elites, or it could evolve to focus more on the real national interests of Central Asian states. In either event, it would be a mistake to see Central Asian interests as inherently or inevitably contradicting those of China and Russia: cooperation with neighbouring regional powers will always be a rational option both for security and economic development, and the SCO members’ geographic closeness makes some kind of modus vivendi between them inevitable.

The political dimension of the SCO agenda is perhaps its most controversial but also its most unpredictable aspect. The organization, like its individual members, faces strategic choices for future development. China’s and Russia’s freedom to dominate the political agenda at present arises not just from Central Asian weakness but from the disengaged and often hostile attitudes towards SCO affairs that are prevalent in the West. It is worth speculating whether a greater Western engagement not just with individual Central Asian states, but with the evolution of the SCO as such, might help tilt the balance towards more positive scenarios.
A Central Asian Perspective on the Issue of SCO Enlargement

Misunderstandings about possible SCO enlargement drew unprecedented international attention to the SCO anniversary summit of 2006 and generated special concern in some parts of the West. The summit meeting itself, which did not change the SCO observers’ status, proved the most dramatic predictions wrong: in fact, an enlargement of membership in the given conditions would have been doomed from the beginning. Upgrading the status of India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan from observer to member would boost the SCO’s strategic scale and weight: the organization would represent half the world’s population; its full members would include four nuclear weapon states, some of them known to have extremely tense external relations; and it would possess more than a quarter of global hydrocarbon energy reserves. Yet there are also strong objections to enlargement that are perceived especially clearly by the Central Asian states themselves. Most obviously, admitting new members would diminish these states’ own significance within the SCO and reduce their benefits by diverting more diplomatic and economic resources to the more strategically attractive new members. It would also bring China closer to realizing its larger Asian aspirations, thus inevitably distracting it from Central Asian affairs. The economic potential of the four current SCO observer states is incomparably higher than that of the Central Asian members, both as energy providers and trade markets. Central Asia could find itself relegated to little more than a transit territory for others’ economic undertakings. This role is, of course, also inherent in many Chinese and Russian ambitions for the region today, but the problem would be sharply aggravated in the event of SCO enlargement.

Kazakhstan spoke firmly against accepting new members, arguing that this would be difficult even in technical terms since the SCO lacks mechanisms to effectuate quick membership. Kazakhstan’s actual motives for this stance reflect a mix of economic and geopolitical factors. For their part, and contrary to many views expressed outside the SCO, China and Russia are not pressing for early decisions on wider membership as they can see how profoundly their own invention—the SCO—could be affected. At bottom, both the Central Asian states and the larger powers of the SCO prioritize institutional strengthening and the realization of existing undertakings, which among other things can increase the attractiveness of the SCO as a cooperation framework for other players.

Another important aspect for Central Asian states is that, by siding with Iran in an organization like the SCO, they would be aligning themselves with explicitly anti-Western players in the region. This would have far-reaching implications for their relations with both Western and various local regional powers. It would mean the end of the multi-vector foreign policy that has served Central Asian political establishments so well. Most importantly, losing the support of the West would mean a deterioration of Central Asia’s position as an independent actor both within and outside the SCO. China and Russia would obtain significant leverage to reinforce their own influence and preponderance. This helps explain why Kazakh President Nazarbaev expressed a striking degree of support for the authority of the United Nations when he stated during his recent meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that, ‘if the United Nations introduces sanctions against Iran, Kazakhstan will also have to obey’. This sincere and open position of the Kazakh leader also conveyed the general message from SCO members to Iran that Iran should not seek to burden the SCO with its nuclear problems.
Iran is, in fact, the most eager as well as the most controversial candidate for full SCO membership. It hopes that China and Russia would support its stand against US pressure. When underlining the possible benefits of Iranian membership of the SCO, however, President Ahmadinejad has also targeted the areas of key Chinese and Russian interest in the energy sector. At the 2006 SCO summit he offered to host a conference of the SCO energy ministers in Tehran in order to explore opportunities for further development of cooperation in the energy sector, including transportation and joint exploitation. Clearly, China and Russia are not ready to endorse Iranian membership, particularly not in reinforcing any sense that the organization is a ‘club for dictators’; but this does not mean that specific Iranian proposals will be overlooked when they could serve SCO members’ common interests in economic cooperation without political or security liabilities.

V. Conclusions

There has so far been little comprehensive, let alone objective, study of the SCO, and even less effort has been made to explore the role of the Central Asian states in this comparatively young but intriguing grouping. Enough work has been done to show at least that the SCO is filled with implicit contradictions and surrounded by concerns about its possible regional and global impact. A lack of transparency in the organization itself and its members further complicates any attempt to fully understand the ‘Shanghai Spirit’.

One lesson that seems to emerge from the present study is that outside interest in the SCO’s broader geopolitical repercussions may have caused some undervaluing of its activity at the regional level. In reality, the stated goals of the SCO’s agenda for Central Asia do not conflict directly with those pursued by major democracies. The tension with Western aims rather arises, first, from the fact that the SCO’s work is being carried out by leaders who are probably unrepresentative of their populations’ true range of interests; and, second, because it is still not clear whether closer integration will bolster the Central Asian states’ independent identity along with their prosperity or whether the latter will be bought at the cost of greater Chinese–Russian domination. What can be said is that the Central Asian states would certainly find it much harder to protect their interests in a context of increasing globalization, and keen great-power interest, if they did not have this and other formal cooperative frameworks to work within.

The role that Central Asian states themselves play in the SCO and their capacity to balance great-power aspirations both within and beyond the region are also often underestimated. Whether or not the autocratic elites fully understand this and want this result, the consequence of a multi-vector policy that is increasingly multilateral has been to foster a more multi-dimensional pattern of security and economic development in the region. The existence of the SCO framework is clearly functional in this context, in regularizing local states’ relations with China and Russia: but for full value, it would need also to be more fully exploited for improving relations among the Central Asian states themselves, on the one hand, and on the other hand (directly or indirectly) promoting advantageous cooperation with outside players and institutions. Progress in both these latter points would automatically strengthen the corrective elements and enhance the variety within the ‘Shanghai Spirit’.

Another visible dilemma in the SCO context is that the Central Asian states’ short-
term security and development priorities, while understandable, do not necessarily meet the requirements of a longer-term development strategy. The first elements of an approach that would do more justice to the latter may be seen in various SCO members’ attempts to build up multidimensional dialogue in such areas as law enforcement and border management, the economy, culture and the environment, and their interest in developing parliamentary and non-governmental contacts. The achievement that such contacts represent for these countries should not be ignored, given the way that their elites have been distancing themselves from each other for more than a decade.

Any closer study of the three major dimensions of the SCO regional agenda clearly shows the importance of distinguishing between the interests of incumbent elites and those of their populations. While many security measures have a largely or even primarily repressive function, other efforts for progress in, for instance, major transportation, energy and trade projects have the potential to boost democratic transformations that would involve and demand the relaxation of internal controls, if only to maximize possible profits.

In the security dimension, the SCO agenda corresponds to the immediate needs of Central Asia by focusing on the build-up of law enforcement capacities, border and military forces to deter the forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism from offensive moves. Simultaneously, however, there is a growing understanding among Central Asian states that the long-term security of the region requires that they tackle the very foundations of threats such as poverty, unemployment, and intra- and interstate tensions. Such an understanding, in turn, ought to move SCO members towards generating a more inclusive security agenda that would combine deterrent capabilities with economic development and confidence building.

The economic dimension of the SCO agenda is perhaps the most intriguing and controversial for Central Asian long-term development. The larger states of the SCO, especially China, have led the way in shaping a legal and instrumental framework that could support in particular the creation of new infrastructures for economic development in the region. While these larger states are undoubtedly serving their own interests rather than viewing Central Asian economic rehabilitation as an end in itself, an economically developed transit zone could genuinely facilitate east–west trade in ways that would also be of keen interest for local states themselves. As noted, however, economic ‘opening’ is by no means an unmixed blessing for the weak and unevenly developed economies of the region, so the Central Asian leaders are likely to want to apply the brakes and channel as many benefits as possible through direct bilateral investments for some time.

The regional political agenda of the SCO is associated with perhaps the most numerous concerns about the impact of the organization on Central Asia. The SCO’s political approach has undoubtedly sat well with authoritarian practices so far. The desire of SCO member states to maintain the status quo has been carefully and correctly traced by SCO analysts. Nevertheless, the frameworks that now support autocracy will not necessarily continue (or suffice) to do so as both internal and external demands for democratization grow. As argued above, the very differences in the degree of democratic transformation among different states could cause greater ‘regionalization’ to have also a kind of levelling-up function, if properly stimulated. A carefully considered and balanced approach by the major democracies towards each state of Central Asia could be one such stimulating factor, as might closer interaction with the SCO in general.
Following the example of Central Asian states in fighting for their own room for manoeuvre, the West could make use of the very lack of cohesion within the SCO to work towards democratization in the area. Labelling the organization in confrontational terms that also assume its unitary nature—for instance, as an ‘anti-NATO’—risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conversely, a constructive critical dialogue between the West and various SCO actors could strengthen such elements as already push local efforts in a cooperative and constructive direction. Ironic as it may seem, helping Central Asian states to effectively lobby for their national interests within the SCO could contribute to precisely those goals of long-term security with democracy and sustainable economic development in this region that are most strongly advocated by the West.
PART II
THE LEGACY OF 9/11
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Remarks at a seminar hosted by the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces,10
Geneva, Switzerland, 20 November 2003

Introduction
When looking for evidence of ‘order’ in the world, the majority of Europeans will always be inclined to see the glass half full rather than half empty. We could seek mystical/philosophical explanations for this, noting for example the fact that practically all the dominant world-views and concepts developed on European soil—from Greek ‘kosmos’ onwards—have stressed order as a goal, or an inherent quality of the universe, or both. It is also relevant that when European regimes or philosophies have arisen which saw themselves as standing above the traditional order, or set out to overthrow it—in modern times, Fascism and Communism—they have caused terrible suffering for both Europe and the world.

Thus, many Europeans were only too willing to believe in the dawn of a ‘new world order’ (of a positive kind) after the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the cold war: and not surprisingly, given the radical easing of threats and burdens which these events brought on our own continent. The Balkan wars which followed were especially painful because they challenged this view, but they were actually remarkably contained and in particular, did not prevent the steady progress of most of post-communist Central Europe towards full integration in the ‘ordered’ integrative systems of NATO and the EU. This latter trend, it is true, itself aroused and still arouses concern from some West Europeans who think it may dilute and undermine their own ‘order’. However, since ‘9/11’ (the attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001) it is easier to see that spreading the principles and disciplines of core European organizations over as much territory as possible is the best way to give defence in depth to all European states and societies, against possible internal as well as external foes.

Latest Threats to ‘Order’
So what is the problem? It can actually be seen as the combination of three trends in the first years of the 21st century:

10 On the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) see its website at <http://www.dcaf.ch>.
• the greater saliency of, or at least focus on, forces inimical to order and which actually exploit order’s creations (the EU’s single market area, Schengen, or globalization) against us: terrorism, crime, the proliferation of weapons with ‘asymmetrical’ potential, and states who support or permit all these things;

• the perceived inability of familiar security institutions and of the established rules of ‘order’ to deal with these things, notably because: (i) they were not designed for non-state antagonists; and (ii) they are essentially the products of consenting states and not generally well equipped to deal effectively with non-consenting and non-compliant actors, in either conceptual/political or material terms. Even if many still regard these institutions as holding unique authority to mandate the use of force in extreme cases of non-compliance, it is far from clear that they have—or possibly could have!—a strong and consistent will to do so; and

• in face of the first two factors, the world’s sole superpower—the United States, which to a great extent provides conceptual as well as political leadership for the West—has adopted methods of protecting its vital interests that many others see as inimical to order. Some of its spokesmen have expressed explicit hostility to the constraints of international institutions and laws, asserted a unilateral right to act (and act pre-emptively) in defence of national interests, called for the active (non-consensual) transformation of the existing ‘order’ notably in the Arab world (= ‘régime change’), and emphasized the role of plain military force in achieving all this.

Hence the large number of academic and media writings we see today with witty titles about ‘New Disorder’, and about the USA’s attempt to create a ‘New Order’—which many seem to assume will succeed, whether they like it or not. The resulting image of what the ‘new order’ would look like is not always clearly spelled out, but seems to involve a uni-polar US hegemony with its friends kept in line and enemies progressively eliminated by compulsion—until someone else (China?) arises who is strong enough to lock horns with the ‘dominant male’. It is possible under this vision that laws and institutions will survive, but they will be there for the passive and the weak to obey, not to constrain the strong. This dystopic vision of our future could be summed up as ‘order without orderliness’—or fairness, equality, transparency…

A European View

Having been asked to comment on these issues as a European, I can for once enjoy the luxury of commenting in a one-sided way and bringing forward only the arguments which speak against, or tend to moderate, the vision set out above and its logical foundations.

If we look just at the new transnational and ‘asymmetrical’ threats, it is important first of all to get them in proportion. It is hard not to be shocked by the vicious destructiveness of the new ‘super-terrorism’ and the apparent ease with which it penetrates and exploits even the strongest developed societies. However, the number of (known) super-terrorist movements like Al-Qaeda is still very limited, and this is still a minority brand of terrorism compared with the bulk of terrorist activities (and resulting deaths) that are limited to very specific political contexts, in old-style conflicts or within individual states. Again, the ‘asymmetrical’ nature of the super-terrorist threat arises precisely from the fact that it is the revolt of the weak against the strong, and our own strength to deal with it as
been greatly increased by the fact that earlier or potential ‘symmetrical’ antagonists—like Russia and China—are thoroughly on our side on this issue.

When it comes to finding the right way to combat terrorism, it seems a bit contradictory to stress on the one hand how new, insidious and asymmetrical the threat is, and then to declare an old-style ‘war’ relying significantly on military resources against it. A better approach would be one that does not dignify terrorists as equal adversaries on a battlefield, but outlaw and aims to eradicate them as criminals and parasites on our legitimate order. Tough action to isolate, infiltrate and decapitate terrorist movements should be combined with efforts both to keep the moderate majority (in all regions and religions) on our side, and to protect by all possible means the self-confidence, calm and normality of our own societies. Our own stubborn attachment to an order based on fundamental human rights is the best weapon against terrorism and certainly the best platform for asserting, as we must, our moral superiority over it.

Keeping the post-9/11 ‘new threats’ in perspective also means devoting due attention to other equally new and serious threats to our civilisation from—for example—the evolution of human and animal disease, climate change, environmental degradation, and the effect of all these on problems of poverty, unequal development and migration. These problems share some asymmetrical characteristics but what is clear, and what the USA has often been the first to stress, is that they are not at all amenable to war-like, military or other coercive solutions. The only hope of dealing with them lies through broad, peaceful, orderly and very often formally regulated international cooperation.

Second, how inadequate are our traditional institutions in point of fact? To start with, their achievements and effectiveness should be measured not just by the few who defy them but the huge majority of states and citizens who obey them, and/or who vest in them their deepest hopes of improving their lot. Abandoning the organs and rules of order would be a betrayal of this well-behaved majority and could only risk shaking their confidence in the value and wisdom of continuing their good behaviour. Secondly and as already noted, the USA itself is investing considerable reliance and energy in building organized multilateral approaches to such challenges as AIDS, SARS, and indeed many aspects of terrorism (vide UN action against terrorist finance, strengthened multilateral export controls, cooperation on immigration controls and aviation security, etc). Thirdly, it is in fact possible to target and tackle non-state actors through measures agreed in inter-state fora: notably through ‘supply-side’ restraints (blocking finance, export controls on dangerous materials and knowledge, etc), and through agreements which create uniform or compatible jurisdictions within states and can thus move towards universally ‘criminalizing’ terrorist behaviour and proliferation at individual or group, as well as state or quasi-state, level. Last but not least, and more generally, there is ample evidence since 9/11 that institutions are capable of questioning, re-inventing and adapting themselves. Genuinely innovative examples include Kofi Annan’s new enquiry on the future of the UN, the strides forward taken by the EU in developing its ‘strategic’ doctrines and role, and the re-direction of NATO resources to deal with new threat-related military tasks outside Europe—not to mention the significant advances agreed in a number of other regional organizations.

Last but not least, how justified are the fears about the USA becoming a kind of ‘Lord of the Jungle’ and imposing a law of the jungle on us all? If we examine US actions rather than words, this vision immediately seems exaggerated for several reasons. The USA has
used the method of forceful, and to some extent pre-emptive, military intervention in just two cases since 9/11—Afghanistan and Iraq—and in the first case, with the support of a clear majority of the world’s states and institutions. It has tackled the proliferation threats from Iran and North Korea in a quite different and explicitly non-military way. Secondly, there has been evidence already during 2003 that if a super-power uses excessive or misdirected force it can quite quickly ‘bounce off walls’, including both the domestic limitations of finance, political support and public tolerance, and the limitations inherent in external realities which cannot simply be re-shaped in the manner the USA wishes by military force alone. In the case of Iraq, the serious difficulties encountered have already led the USA back to contemplate, and even demand, a greater role for the UN and the involvement of a much wider range of international partners and organs.

Next, the rest of the world is today very far from being a tabula rasa on which any player, however powerful, can easily impose its will (as the Romans were said to have ‘made a desert and called it peace’). There is plentiful evidence, both from the EU and other regions, of groups of states who are organized in orderly fashion among themselves drawing together to strengthen their security-related cooperation since 9/11, thereby pursuing—admittedly—many of the specific goals demanded by the USA, but doing so in a way that makes US intervention in their affairs both less likely and less feasible. The USA of course may not always welcome this, and has not always been above using direct or indirect ‘divide and rule’ tactics. But, first, it may not succeed in dividing (at least for long); and secondly, if it did manage to reintroduce bilateralism and internal divisions to areas like the EU, the Americas or the Asia-Pacific region, it would be breaking up just those cohesive groups that it needs to work with to strengthen international action against new threats—not to mention the continued viability of the world’s free-market trade system.

A final set of remarks concerns the future of democracy, which—so far at least—has been inextricably associated with the development both of organs of world order, and of orderly international behaviour in general. First of all, let us be clear that the worst enemies of and dangers to democracy lie outside the Western, and to a great extent the Northern, hemisphere. There may, however, be some contradiction between the (very welcome) increasing emphasis on the universalization of democracy as an explicit goal of US policy, and the choice of some of the tools and concepts the present Administration has developed to pursue the goal. Imposing diplomacy on any state or society by coercion (military or otherwise) is a contradiction in terms. Global hegemony or the unilateral re-shaping of global order, even by the most democratic state, would be contrary to democracy at the inter-state level. Breaking up independent and cohesive regional groupings would also be a step backwards in this context: because it is not only characteristic of (mature) democracies that they do not go to war with each other, it is also typical of them that they engage in ever closer cooperation with their neighbours—and that they invest in such multilateral modes of being certain values that are higher even than the national interest.

To sum up: the established vision of ‘order’ at social, inter-state and global level has much more life in it than the fashionable view since 9/11 may suggest; and the alternative vision of a ‘disorderly order’ has still far to go to make good either its boasts or its threats.
HAVE THE TERRORISTS ALREADY WON?

Speaking Notes for a Scanbus\textsuperscript{11} Conference of Northern European IT users, Riga, Latvia, 14 September 2004

In the 1970s, when the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang were operating in Germany, they openly declared that they were trying to provoke the authorities into hitting back at them in ways that would break the law and damage Germany’s carefully constructed post-war democratic safeguards. Given the basic aim of destroying the established regime, they concluded that it could most quickly be broken by forcing it to break its own rules, corrupt its own nature and destroy whatever trust existed between the government and the governed. The most famous of our modern terrorist enemies, Osama bin-Laden, has to the best of my knowledge not explained his aims in precisely this way: partly because he believes that the world’s secular governments are totally corrupted and illegitimate already. But the Baader-Meinhof challenge is one that remains totally relevant for us today and that we perhaps need to take more seriously than ever as the fight against terrorism grows both more global and more intense. For today, I will break it down into three separate questions, while promising in advance that I will deal with the last one only briefly:

- Are the terrorists forcing us to eat up our own precious store of human rights and civil liberties, as well as (in more obvious ways) making it harder for us to help extend those good things to other parts of the world?
- Are they provoking us to load unnecessary burdens and restrictions on the freedom and profitability of our economic life, and notably on the operations of the private economic sector?
- Are they tempting us to forget who our friends are and to weaken and split up our most important cooperative institutions, notably at the international level?

If even one of these things is true, let alone two or three of them, then we would have to conclude—as the title of this talk suggests—that the terrorists have already won. What’s more, we might have to face the possibility that they have won not only a battle but the war, since things that are broken in this way are extremely difficult to put together and to activate again.

\textsuperscript{11} Scanbus is an association of members and customers of Steria. Steria is a forum for i.a. IT-user networking and information exchange, located in Sweden; see <http://www.steria.se/index.gan?id=11002425&subid=0>.
Human Rights and Civil Liberties

In this field, the problem starts with the very idea of a ‘war on terrorism’, because a war means a condition where by definition the life of every citizen changes and the government can change any or all of the normal rules to meet the higher logic of survival. As we know, some people in the Bush Administration have tried to push the logic one stage further by suggesting that suspected terrorists don’t even deserve the privileges normally granted to normal prisoners of war, such as freedom from torture. The disgraceful results from that line of thinking have now been exposed and have hopefully been stopped in Iraq, but let’s remember that hundreds of earlier detainees from the Afghanistan campaign are still held at Guantánamo Bay in circumstances that deny them any of the normal rights of prisoners under either national or international law. Looking more widely, the range of problems that human rights defenders have warned about not just in America but in other Western countries when looking at the flood of new measures taken against terrorism include:

• new rights for the authorities to arrest and detain suspects without the normal protections of the laws of evidence and with no guarantee of early trial;
• dangers for data privacy from new intelligence collection, eavesdropping and interception powers, and from travellers’ personal data being exchanged as part of new aviation security measures;
• limitations on the freedom of speech and publication in the name of security;
• the risk of heightened suspicion, scrutiny and prejudice against certain ethnic and religious groups in our mixed societies;
• greater difficulties of travel for all citizens of countries that are considered problematic or vulnerable, because of tougher visa rules and longer delays (this has i.a. caused a significant drop in the numbers of Arab, Indian and Chinese students going to US universities), and slower and more difficult travel for everyone because of increased security; and
• what might be called a second-stage problem of inadequate democratic scrutiny and control of the government agencies (and others) carrying out these new tougher policies: a problem that is even worse when the new measures are introduced by multinational organizations like the EU, since the European Parliament has even less right to scrutinize and correct such measures than national parliaments would have at the national level. To give a concrete example, most people are speculating that the EU’s new anti-terrorism coordinator (Gijs de Vries) will be too weak, but what parliament or similar representative body would have the right to call him to account if he acts too strongly?

This list could no doubt be made much longer: but I will stop here because I want to highlight two further layers of the problem that I feel are particularly important.

• First, if damage such as I have been listing is in danger of being done even in the West’s most sophisticated societies and oldest democracies, how much worse can things be in developing countries that have been encouraged by the USA and others to crack down harder on their local terrorists, often in open armed combats for which the West is pouring in new money and weapons? How are suspected terrorist detainees being treated
in places like Nepal, Colombia, Sri Lanka or the Philippines—if prisoners are being taken alive at all? We should note here the conclusions of a very serious group of Arab analysts commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who reported last autumn that the average trend in all Arab countries (whether pro- or anti-US) had been a reduction of social, intellectual and cultural freedoms for their citizens in the name of greater security against terrorism.\footnote{\textit{Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society}, UNDP, New York, 2003, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/arabstates/name,3204,en.html>.
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- Second, I would remind you here of the much debated contradiction between the claim of the US-led coalition to be fighting for democracy and hoping to promote even greater democracy in the Arab and Islamic world, and the perception held and now strengthened among many people in those regions that the USA acts oppressively and undemocratically both at home and abroad. Of course there are deeper and longer-standing reasons for such accusations and they are obviously far from being the whole truth. One of the interesting experiences of the G.W. Bush Administration has been the way that democratic criticism has grown and flourished within the USA itself—and note the way that the US Supreme Court in July 2004 condemned the Administration’s practices on detention of suspects! But the encouragement given to such views certainly makes things harder for those genuinely seeking reform within Arab and Islamic societies, and creates a challenging environment for other Western actors who attach importance to cooperating with the countries concerned. It is not a very attractive choice for any of us, either to risk being tarred with the American brush, or to be tempted to seek short-term advantage by denouncing our long-term American allies. (I will come back to this question of alliances at the end.)

**Burdens on Legitimate Trade**

Let’s look, however, at some more specific challenges that terrorism and counter-terrorism create for legitimate business. When the USA and the EU held their summit meeting in Ireland at the end of June 2004, the private-sector lobby group known as Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue tabled a set of demands to both sides that ended with an appeal not to let anti-terrorist measures interfere unnecessarily with trade. What exactly were they complaining about?

If we look back at the chain of events since 9/11, I would suggest that we can see business as a victim at four different levels. First, it was hit by the terrorists themselves—most of the casualties in the Twin Towers were private-sector employees and a single firm lost over 700 of its staff. In this specific case Al-Qaeda had chosen its target for ideological reasons, in part precisely as a symbol of Western capitalism: but businesses have fallen victim to many other kinds of terrorism in the past and are still suffering from it, normally in the forms of kidnapping and localized sabotage but also the kind of targeted executions now taking place in Iraq. Secondly, businesses all over the world were hit by the severe knock-on damage done by 9/11 to earnings especially in the tourist and travel sectors, and by the insurance costs both of the initial terrorist damage and of the resulting higher premiums, notably in the air transport industry. Thirdly, the general environment for doing business became more complicated and costly as a result of new rules and practices introduced in the name of safety into travel and
travel documentation, goods transport and especially shipping. Fourth and not least, business itself was called upon to collaborate in implementing new global or national regulations designed to dry up the flow of finance to terrorist groups and to make the trafficking of dangerous weapons and technologies more difficult. I will go into these last two categories more fully because it is here, if anywhere, that we ought to look out for the economic equivalent of the Baader–Meinhof syndrome—namely, the risk that capitalism’s enemies could goad us into taking measures that kill the golden goose of free trade itself.

Examples of changes in the general business environment are:

- stricter travel security checks leading to longer journey times and higher costs;
- in the USA, long delays in getting visas for foreign business visitors from a large range of countries considered to be of concern (and in bringing researchers and scientists from nations like China or India to the West for commercial research and development, as well as for academic purposes);
- the new Container Security Initiative (CSI) and ‘C-TPAT’ (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) systems enforced by US customs, which require major additional checks on container traffic in foreign ports before shipping on to the USA, and further checks on supply lines and the exact details of cargo. These US unilateral actions have now been supplemented by a much larger programme for harbour safety controls under the mantle of the International Maritime Organization.

A study by an expert of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in SIPRI’s recently published book Business and Security estimated that in the period 2001–2003 security-related process costs of this kind had added about a fifth of one per cent to the costs of sea-borne freight. Ironically, he commented that it had not been possible to trace the specific economic impact of this because of the much greater burdens placed on the economic and financial process by the sharp increase in direct military spending under the Bush Administration, and the dramatic federal budget and external trade deficits which this has contributed to. In any case, it is clear that identifiable financial costs don’t tell the whole story and that the achievements of the terrorists may be traced also in shifts of business practice and behaviour, such as reduced and more selective travel or re-location of business offices and staff: both of which could imply turning away from or not fully exploiting some prima facie interesting markets and partnerships.

The new demands being made on the private sector to help actively in countering the so-called ‘new threats’ have arisen in three main areas:

- demands to hand over to government authorities what was previously commercially privileged or protected information, e.g. extra personal data on airline passengers;
- new requirements based on UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) for the private financial sector to freeze and block the transfer of funds that may belong to or be

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going to terrorists, a task that is made harder because there is no single comprehensive and internationally agreed definition of who these terrorists are;

- the tightening of export controls and licensing requirements on both commercial products, and technologies—so-called ‘dangerous knowledge’—which have the potential to cause strategic problems. The range of items thought to fall into this category is constantly growing and now covers e.g. large parts of the bio-technology and missile technology sectors, while export limitations can be imposed not just by individual governments but by like-minded groups of countries and, increasingly, by institutions like the EU.

Now, I am not saying that business shouldn’t play a responsible and disciplined part and shouldn’t bear its fair share of the burden in combating terrorism and proliferation. Any small profit that any small part of business may draw from working with terrorists, or operating in what has been called the Wal-Mart of WMD proliferation, is far outweighed by what business as a whole stands to lose from the deterioration of safe trading conditions and the damage that growing security worries can do to what is already a pretty fragile state of global confidence. You could indeed argue that some of the stricter measures now being introduced were overdue and that they will improve the chances of detecting a much wider range of abuses than just terrorism such as illegal immigration, fraud and smuggling. You could draw a parallel between the initiatives that happened to be inspired by 9/11 and other quite independent new global rules that have been introduced at the same time, e.g. on corruption and on money laundering for criminal purposes.

When all this has been said, however, the fair complaint that does remain is that the private sector was never properly consulted on any of this last rash of measures and not enough attempt was made to draw on business’s own advice and expertise. Much of what Western governments are trying to do in the face of the new threats is essentially risk management, and all good entrepreneurs are surely experts in that. If the polls show that businesses generally give terrorism a much lower placing on their own lists of risks than governments have done lately, mightn’t they have some interesting reasons for that and wouldn’t it be interesting to ask them?

The argument for bringing the private sector into the security process not just as victim or burden-carrier, but as something more like an equal partner, becomes very much stronger again if we look beyond the 9/11 issues to other emerging areas of security concern, such as infrastructure security. A major collapse in our energy or water supply or food delivery systems, a major breakdown in hi-tech communications or the integrity of cyberspace could damage and perhaps even destroy human lives on a scale that might make 9/11 look small. Yet these systems are now overwhelmingly owned and made to function by the private sector itself. It is business that stands in the front line when it comes to assessing and defending against the risks of attack as well as accidental breakdown, and in setting up fail-safe and fall-back measures to deal with an actual emergency. It doesn’t make a lot of sense to me that governments should rely so much as private supplier companies, which these days are actually often foreign companies, to take the lead in these fields of modern human security while failing to consult with them or take any real account of their interests when developing anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation policies. Last but not least, if governments want to look beyond the security threats known at present to identify emerging new technologies which might
have dangerous applications in conflict or terrorism and to bring these technologies within the scope of export control and monitoring policies, I don’t see how this can be done without the help of the private sector R&D establishment, which is where many of the possibilities are being most energetically explored.

Who Should We Work With and How?

This brings me to my final summing-up, which is about a more general set of mistakes that the terrorists can force us into. One of the quickest ways that the ‘bad guys’ can win is to make us forget who our old friends are and divert our attention away from important new allies. We know that in the last couple of years the solidarity of the Western democratic family and the key institutions that represent it, like NATO and the European Union, has been badly battered because of policy splits over how to deal with one specific set of security challenges, notably in Iraq. The problem came most obviously from the extreme unilateral actions of one set of countries, but it is fair to look at the possibility that other countries also made things worse at the other extreme by not showing enough concern and seriousness about the basic threats, on a kind of ‘I’m all right Jack’ principle. More specifically and provocatively, I might ask whether the rather laid-back attitude of most Nordic governments took proper account of the real exposure to terrorism of their giant multinational companies when operating in other continents or of the risk that Norden’s hi-tech industries for instance in the information and communication technology (ICT) and bio-technology sectors might be contributing to the proliferation of so-called dangerous knowledge.

The real point is a simple one—that today’s threats are cross-border and transnational ones that profit from the international openness of modern trade and transport systems. So none of us, not even a country as powerful as the USA, is going to be able to get on top of them by purely national measures or with just a few followers picked out on political grounds. We need to use multilateral institutions, the widest and best-established ones we have, starting from the United Nations downwards, to develop joint defences against the new threats: and we can’t do this unless these institutions’ members are ready to listen to each other and respect each others’ interests and find the necessary compromises. Terrorists are always ‘zero-sum’ in their outlook; one of the clearest ways we can set ourselves apart from them is by showing that we prefer to find ‘everybody wins’ solutions.

As my final point: that ought to be true within our own countries as well. We should not let the terrorists win by turning governments against private business or vice versa. We should respond to them by building new, more open and more equal public–private sector partnerships to address the whole range of new threats to national and human security and—not least—to find the most clever ways of deploying our limited resources to minimize our exposure and our losses. And let us not forget the important third corner of this partnership, which is civil society, or in other words the whole population. If we frighten them, keep them in the dark and constantly chip away at their civil liberties it will increasingly be the terrorists who are dictating our entire lifestyle. If we respect the freedom and good sense of our populations and look for ways of actually mobilizing them against terrorist infiltration and to help with security emergencies, we may never fully win the war against terrorism: but we can never lose it either.
8 THE NEW (IN)SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF BUSINESS

Speaking Notes for a talk to the Business Council of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, 14
Stockholm, Sweden, 13 September 2006

What was the cost of the security crisis at British airports on 10 August 2006 and the following days? One airline alone (Ryanair) is now claiming damages of £3.3 million from the British Government for one week’s losses from cancelled and delayed flights in Europe. Independent sources have put the total cost to airlines as £250 million, including £50 million for British Airways alone; while the Spanish-owned BAA organization that runs most of Britain’s airports must have had enormous expenses itself for the extra security staff and facilities needed, not to mention the disruption of normal spending patterns at airport shops. It was always clear, though, that the biggest costs of all would be paid by the millions of unfortunate passengers who couldn’t use tickets they had paid for; faced extra waiting time estimated to be worth $2000 per person on transatlantic flights alone; had valuable personal items like cosmetics confiscated, had to pay for extra hotel stays and transport, or lost their baggage including house and car keys, and so on and on. All this is without starting to consider the longer-term economic penalties that may hit Britain’s air travel business as people living abroad, including myself, promise themselves never to transit through Heathrow Airport again and customers of all kinds turn away from air travel for both holiday and business purposes.

In Britain there has been a great deal of debate and recrimination about this episode, which I suspect will continue for a long time yet. But it also gives us a starting point to reflect in more general terms about security as a commodity. Very clearly, a price has to be paid for security and in this case as in most others it will end up being paid mostly by those who need and want security, namely the public and the transport operators. But who is the price being paid to, and is the price right, and is the cost sustainable? If we pursue that part of the argument further, we would soon find that we may be dealing with an inbuilt difference of approach to such calculations between government and business. Government is used to taking resources from the people and the private economy in order to give security back to them: this was all very simple, and very widely accepted, when what we were talking about was the state buying arms and maintaining armed forces to frighten or defeat traditional, military enemies. It is also not so different from what the state does when providing any other variety of security that people want, such as social security or ‘trygghet’ that in Norden is bought at the price of high taxes.

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14 On the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) see <http://www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se/>. 
The philosophy of the private business sector is, I assume, at its simplest level based on parallel ideas of giving and taking, selling and buying, supply and demand. But in the context of the free economic market, other concepts also become more important such as:

- value and comparative value, i.e. ‘is the price right?’;
- competition, which is usually the best way to keep the price right; and
- understanding and meeting the needs of the customer, which is the only way to ensure that the buying and selling relationship is sustainable for the longer term. While governments may have to wait five years for an election to find out if the customer is satisfied, most businesses can lose customers within a matter of seconds if the deal goes bad.

Now, in the case of the transport disruption at British airports, both the companies involved and the individual customers might argue that the price paid was too high for buying their freedom to travel in safety, if they did indeed manage to travel, during those few days of August. There is still no proof that a terrorist attack would have happened otherwise, and there is even more argument over whether the measures taken were designed as the necessary and efficient minimum. Secondly, there was no question of competition because, in effect, the government used its monopoly of authority in anti-terrorist matters to issue a ‘diktat’ that no one was allowed to negotiate over. The results are actually likely to damage the competitive standing of Britain’s airlines and its airports, for obvious reasons. Thirdly, the interests of the ultimate customer, the travelling public, were blatantly and almost cruelly disregarded, in a way which has many people to wonder if it is a worthwhile bargain to fly at all.

I’m sure you will be the first to remind me, however, that this example of security conflicting with business and consumer interests—or at least imposing too high a price upon them—is only one side of the story. The 9/11 terrorist attacks also imposed huge and cruel and unfair costs on the same people by the material losses involved and the long interruption of normal air traffic levels and, not least, the effects on insurance premiums for carriers that can probably never be reversed. The global SARS outbreak of early 2003 had almost equally grave effects on air travel, highlighting that security is a real requirement and worth paying for even in face of threats that are not of conscious human origin. Business can be the target of just about every kind of threat to mankind that exists in the world today—after all, most of those who died in the Twin Towers on 9/11 were commercial employees—just as business can be the victim and the economic loser from the wrong kind of measures taken against those threats.

A further massive dimension of complexity is added by the fact that most of today’s threats are not any longer classic military ones, where even if the whole civilian economy was paying the price there would only be a limited number of specialists—arms suppliers and armed forces—taking a direct part in the transactions concerned. Today, whether we think of terrorists and WMD smugglers hiding within our societies and exploiting the black and grey economic markets; whether we think of internal conflicts in weaker countries where businesses can find their peaceful operating environment threatened or can also be part of the conflict themselves as private military companies and allies of one side; whether we think of the direct business engagement in and responsibility for the security of our energy supplies and the proper functioning of critical national and
international infrastructures; or whether we remember that the only remedies against bird ‘flu are made in private laboratories and sold by private firms—across the whole board we will find the private business sector engaged more directly than ever before as a security provider and a security actor for good as ill, as well as being a likely victim of security deficits and the main payer to have those deficits corrected.

These generalities are all very well—and are certainly something I don’t think we hear enough about in the Swedish debate—but I would like to use the rest of my time here to bring the theme down to a more concrete level. First, I'd like to sketch out in more detail how all the different potential security roles of business can come into play in one particular context, namely, in relation to the so-called new threats of international terrorism and WMD proliferation. Secondly and last, I will offer some thoughts about how the now very complex relationship between business and the public authorities in the matter of security could be better understood and better managed for the best interests of both sides and ultimately in the best interests of the consumers who are our entire societies. Let me briefly note that I know there is a whole other debate that needs to be had here about the price that society may have to pay for new-style security also in terms of its civic freedoms and its human rights—which are also clearly very much at risk from wrong and disproportionate official policies. But for today, my argument is much more about business freedoms and economic rights, which are just as much a part of our free Western way of life even if it is not always ideologically fashionable in Norden to say so.

**Business and the ‘New Threats’**

To start with business and terrorism: the USA's National Security Strategy of September 2002\(^{15}\) has often been attacked, especially for its doctrine of ‘pre-emptive’ action, but it did contain one very true and striking sentence—namely, that the biggest threat to our societies today ‘lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology’. Terrorists can hurt us, and indeed the people provoking conflicts in weak developing states can cause unprecedented suffering, because the progress and wider distribution of technology give them the chance to choose among both simple and very complicated weapons for their purposes and, above all, creates a kind of single global communications and transport space, a global economy and society for them to work within, causing far wider repercussions than even the largest traditional wars of the past could have produced (so long as they did not use nuclear weapons!). Moreover, today’s genuinely ‘transnational’ terrorists of the Al-Qaeda type, or even many of those who fight for more specific political and geographical causes, operate for the great majority of their time within the new globalized dimension of the private, civilian economy. Their funds may come from private wealth, from donations channelled through private banks and the Islamic world’s more informal and personalized ‘Hawala’ system; from illicit trading for instance in diamonds and drugs and other forms of smuggling, or from human trafficking and prostitution; from robbing banks and other forms of theft, or from other proceeds of criminal activity like protection rackets.

Plain and simple economic corruption, notably in the form of bribes to individuals, is one of the most common ways by which terrorists obtain information and supplies, and manage to cover up their activities. Their weapons and other equipment can also be obtained through illicit trading deals by governments or non-governmental players, or simply be bought on the market given that bombs (for instance) can be put together from many everyday ingredients. The globalized transport space provides an ideal setting for terrorists to travel for consultations, fund-raising and training as well as for planning and carrying out their attacks. The large ‘black’ and grey’ economic markets that exist in many countries, and their connection with labour sources of equally fuzzy status like illegal immigrants and moonlighting workers, help to create the habitat in which terrorists can not only move from nation to nation but also ‘go underground’ within a particular society. Last and not least, the global IT networks that help terrorists to collect and exchange information, and the media establishments that they rely on to publicize their exploits, are today commercially owned if they are owned by anyone.

The possible use by terrorists of mass destruction technologies, which the European Union’s own European Security Strategy (ESS) document describes as the ultimate security nightmare, has also become a much more real and larger threat as a result of the same economic, social and technological trends. You may remember how the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, talked about a ‘Wal-Mart’ of nuclear smuggling when it was discovered of how Pakistani scientist A.Q.Khan had spread his nuclear secrets abroad: and the image of a shop was a good one also because of the mercenary nature of many of the motives involved. Even if Khan himself was an idealist, the middlemen he used in such varied locations as Dubai and Malaysia—and those who were discovered during the similar post-mortem on Libya’s nuclear ambitions after Qaddafi gave up Libya’s WMD programme—were part of a shady business establishment that is liable to be involved in many other kinds of illicit goods and money transfers, including the smuggling of what have been called the poor man’s weapons of mass destruction, namely, small arms.

But this link with the ‘black’ or ‘grey’ market is only the second most important interface between the private sector and the risks of WMD proliferation. A far greater challenge is that all the techniques involved in WMD development—the harnessing of the atom, synthetic chemical production and the human creation of biologically active organisms or substances—have their main and quite legitimate use in the sphere of the civilian economy. The processes that produce nuclear weapons and civil nuclear energy respectively go along different tracks in their later stages, but they both use the same fissile materials (uranium and plutonium) and start off with many of the same initial processes and equipment—which is precisely what makes the cases of Iran and North Korea so difficult. Besides, as we know, terrorists could also use relatively ‘innocent’ products, including medical isotopes, to set off so-called ‘dirty bombs’ (radiological weapons) that release radioactivity in a social setting and which are likely to be especially damaging in terms of economic losses caused.

In the fields of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) it is hard even to be sure what a ‘weapon’ is. Governments making chemical weapons have favoured certain

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limited combinations of chemicals since the early 20th century, and these substances are
certainly among those that terrorists might try to mix for themselves or to acquire through
the black market, as Aum Shinrikyo used Sarin gas for its attack in the Tokyo subway;
but many other everyday chemicals have explosive, corrosive, poisonous or otherwise
destructive effects that terrorists might equally well exploit with generally less danger
to themselves. Similarly, governmental experiments to develop biological weapons and
ways of delivering them are thought to have focussed on a relatively few historic diseases
including anthrax, small-pox and varieties of plague; but the range of bio-substances that
could cause massive human damage if used by terrorists is just as wide as or wider than
those that can hurt humans ‘naturally’ or by accident—any kind of disease organism, any
organic poison or contaminant, any pest affecting animals and crops or making water
undrinkable, and so on. And all this is without mentioning the mass destruction potential
of techniques that are still in the early stages of commercial development like genetic
manipulation and nanotechnology.

To complete the picture, the private sector involvement in and control of these
sensitive fields is growing all the time all over the world, at the basic scientific and
research and development (R&D) levels as well as in production, as a result not just of
the multi-use nature of most new technical breakthroughs but also of the organizational
trends towards privatization and the so-called public–private partnerships.

Now, governments themselves are hardly unaware of these connections between
their public security goals and business resources and activities. Since 9/11 in particular,
governments both in national settings and in international organizations have further
developed existing measures and introduced a range of new ones both to penalize wrong
actions in the field of terrorism support and technology exploitation, and to reduce the
risks of these potential threats breaking out. Just to mention the main lines of action,
we have seen measures of punishment that include economic sanctions and the blocking
of technology transfers, bans on certain airlines and various other forms of embargoes
on business with individual countries. The range of preventive and defensive measures has
become much wider especially since 9/11 and can include:

• new legal codes that create new security-related limitations and obligations for
  businesses and private citizens as well as states: the most ambitious examples are the
global prohibition of terrorist financing and the ban on unauthorized possession and
trading of WMD that were created by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001)
and 1549 (2004), respectively;
• more specific measures to limit the transfer, including through private business
  channels, of particularly sensitive items and technologies, and to make access to and
the theft of such things more difficult for terrorists as well as for other criminals and
for irresponsible states. Many steps to widen the range of controls on both WMD and
sensitive conventional items have been taken since 9/11 by the various multilateral export
control groups made up mainly of Western nations, but we could also add the new
efforts made in the G8 (Group of Eight industrialized Nations), the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) and elsewhere to control the management of civil nuclear fuel
cycles, to improve the physical security of civil nuclear and other sensitive installations,
and to speed up the destruction of surplus WMD-related materials;
• measures to forcibly stop the physical transfer of suspected items, namely the
Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the USA and France among others in 2003 and which has as its most dramatic feature the possible forceful interception of ships at sea;

- enhanced measures for aviation security and for the security of ports, harbours, container traffic and ships, which—as we have just seen in the UK—can involve losses quickly mounting into millions and billions of Euros for the affected companies as well as for individual users and travelers; and last but not least; and

- tighter controls on the issuing of visas and immigration procedures generally, which not only affect movement by terrorists but have seriously limited the possibilities for firms especially in the United States to employ foreign specialists and even entertain foreign customers from many countries.

Now, I’m not listing these measures in order to condemn them: most serious independent security analysts (including my own institute) have tended to see them as a rational line of response to a threat environment that is so much characterized and penetrated today by private actors. But it is, to my mind, a major weakness that the great majority of these official measures in the last five years have been made without any advance consultation with business—just as no-one in Britain last month seems to have thought of asking the airlines’ advice before imposing new measures on them. This leads me to my final question about how we could better organize our minds and our actions to handle the growing security interface between government and business more effectively in future.

Governance Solutions:
The Potential for Business as Partner

Above all, I would argue that the national and international authorities need to draw more on private expertise and competence at three different stages of policy making:

- First, in the analysis of threats and risks, especially in locations and sectors where business has deep experience of security dynamics and can maintain contacts that might be impossible for the corresponding governments. After all, some US experts have argued that Al-Qaeda works more than anything else like a ‘franchise’ of the McDonald’s type, and business people are arguably much better placed to understand what that means than the average bureaucrat! The same argument is particularly strong when it comes to charting the seriousness of various threats and contingencies in fields where business actually controls the assets under threat, such as the energy sector, critical infrastructure and medical supplies.

- Second, there should be consultation on the choice and preparation of all security-relevant policy instruments that deal directly with market operations, such as export controls, financial regulations, insurance, all aspects of transport security, and other measures that may have major economic impact such as those in the IT, nuclear, chemical, pharmaceuticals and bio-industries not to mention those affecting the defence production and defence services sectors as such.

- Third, practical measures should be set up to link the relevant public and private authorities for purposes of joint planning, ongoing monitoring of risk development...
and policy implementation, and rapid reaction to individual emergencies. (The apparent lack of such a coordinated plan has been seen by many as the reason why things went so wrong at the British airports.)

I must stress here that, just as no single government can effectively grip today's security challenges on its own, this interplay with business needs to take place not only at the national level but also at the regional and global level. Given the origins of many terrorist movements and given the rapid spread of even the highest technologies to developing countries, there is little point in recruiting just a ‘rich men’s club’ of big Western companies to help unless some way can be found of engaging also with the businesses of southern hemisphere regions and especially of the largest emerging markets. (The growth of ‘outsourcing’ to these countries, sometimes involving the delegation of functions and services that are quite important for security, is another strong argument for this.) The government of Dubai recently allocated $1 million for trying to improve its defences especially against the smuggling and transit of sensitive goods and has explicitly mentioned the need to reform business practices in this connection, which shows that the point can be well taken in at least some non-Western settings.

Last but not least, what should businesses do to make sure they give good value themselves in terms of producing and protecting security, and to organize themselves optimally for interacting with government so that they can provide the right supplement and corrective for government’s own instincts in these crucial matters? One idea I’d like to leave with you is whether some like-minded large companies could consider developing a doctrine of ‘Corporate Security Responsibility’ along the same lines as the existing Corporate Social Responsibility. Such a doctrine could start with emphasizing what businesses need to do and can do for their own security, before going on to measures they should take to avoid causing or conniving in security problems for others and to help the authorities keep the problems under control. The beauty of capitalism is that if a clear code of this sort could be created, and if the leading businesses were seen to get some official and consumer approval and some practical profits from following it, the market itself ought to work to make more and more others climb on the bandwagon!
Introduction

Tourism in Iceland is an essential contributor to the country’s income and has increased steadily in recent years. In the light of current events in the global economy and more specifically in Iceland, it is probably going to become an even more important part of the Icelandic economy and will perhaps help to restore in part the Icelandic reputation abroad.

There are several issues that are interesting to assess in the area of business and security. The world has become ‘smaller’ due to globalization and states are no longer the sole actor or security provider in the international system. Actors other than the state, such as individuals and businesses, can be viewed as a part of the problem and also part of the solution. The main focus in this research-based study will be on business and security, and more specifically, security in businesses that operate in Icelandic tourism.

Iceland is a peaceful nation that has no standing army, but at the same time it is connected to the outside world and the threats that all states are facing. Recent events in the international economic crisis underline the global ties that Iceland has to the outside world and the impact that this small state can have on the outside world. Not only are there uncertain times ahead which nobody can speculate on with any accuracy, but the lessons of the crisis have a direct link with security and how the notion of the concept has broadened and widened.

Business is a part of society and its actions can be dangerous for society, as has often happened both in failed states and functioning states. Well-known examples are the exploitation of diamond mines in failed states and environmental damage caused by industry in functioning states. In weak states and those states that are less developed, business exploitation can contribute to violence and oppression. In developed societies the range of possible problems lies in the area of environmental damage; resource depletion, along with economic crime and issues involving terrorist financing; and failure by business to maintain its own operations when these are crucial for national supplies.
and infrastructure. A solid state function, law and regulation are an important part of the structure to ensure that business does not cause harm by either its actions or its failures.

Business is also beneficial in several ways to society and can play an important part before, during and post-crisis in failed or fully functioning states. With regard to the Icelandic tourism industry, security is essential and private businesses carry a great responsibility in their operations. All of the businesses that were approached during the research for this thesis stated that safety and security is their number one concern. First of all, certain standards are demanded by the government, but businesses also know that one bad accident or failure could be a death sentence for their operation.

If security and safety issues are the top concern for the travel business, then it would be fair to stipulate that businesses should have a complete security guide of some sort, addressing a wide range of threats—not only those affecting safety for the customer and staff, but regarding survival of the business as well. This is one of the main recommendations that emerge from this report and it holds good not only for business in tourism but for business in general.

The author carried out a research survey in autumn 2008 by means of interviews with a number of Icelandic companies covering sea, air and land transport, excursions and ‘adventure tourism’ by land and sea, and tourist accommodation. The companies were asked about three aspects of their interaction with security: (i) security dangers that could affect their own operations, (ii) their security responsibility towards employees, customers and society at large, and (iii) security as a burden on their operations and balance sheets. The detailed description of survey results is omitted here.

**A Way Forward**

Overall, it is fair to state that all the businesses covered in this study operate fully under the laws and regulations that the authorities put before them. Furthermore, all of the companies interviewed have helped in emergencies that affected Icelandic society and they will continue to do so, even if it is not their legal responsibility. At the end of the day the companies are also providing jobs in the community and contributing to society. A pessimist could say that businesses are only concerned with making a profit, but it may equally be asked why anyone would go into business if the goal was not to make a profit. The more important question perhaps is the issue of how a business is making its profit.

There have been many international problems concerning business operations. The reality is often displayed in the news where, for example, a business seeking profits in the shady diamond industry in a failed state such as the Congo seems to show no consideration for human rights. The issues of failed states are not related to the Icelandic reality, but there are several aspects that do apply when it comes to business and security. It is a fact that Iceland is a part of the international community with all that it entails, and the global development of norms and standards regarding business and security is becoming more important. Some of the companies surveyed noted that the consumer has also become much more aware and demanding.

In the past, Iceland has relied on improvisation in several areas related to non-military security. Responses are often event-driven or created on a case-by-case basis. Many of the companies interviewed here stated that in many cases they would rely and have relied on
improvisation when reacting to threats. This attitude is further reflected in the fact that most of them do not have a business continuation plan, although many of them said they have ideas on how to respond. On the other hand and as also noted in other studies, Icelanders have done a very good job on improvisation with civil emergencies. The fact remains that the companies operating in such an open and transnational business as tourism are detecting pressure from foreign partners and the global society to be socially responsible. So what are the possible ways forward?

**Continued Cooperation between Business and Government**

It is logical to assume that, since there has been an extensive cooperation between businesses in the travel industry and the Icelandic Government, this will continue to develop. The question remains in what direction the development will go. From the business side the opinion has been voiced that it would be helpful if the government exercised stricter surveillance. Another view mentioned was that follow-up measures by the government seemed to be lacking to a certain degree. The government should offer more consultative support to the businesses that were trying to move ahead with the trend of global development.

According to the government representatives interviewed, however, there is no special need to look at security—in its broad definition—as it relates to the travel industry. The government seems confident that matters are in order, and currently the main focus is on helping businesses in the travel industry with their marketing strategy in response to the economic hardships that are facing Iceland. The marketing strategy is in its own way very much a matter of business security because it will hopefully result in more business, and that is an important feature of keeping the Icelandic private sector alive.

What could be improved within the business sector itself is to start with further groundwork on business continuation planning. As noted above, many of the representatives stated that a plan of this type is not formally in place within the companies. Even though some of the representatives claimed they had a strong idea on how to react in an emergency threatening their business, that may not be sufficient in the long run. A possible way forward with this could be somewhere along the lines of the British example. The British Cabinet Office has put guidelines up on an Internet site that contain advice for businesses on security and how to cope with emergencies. The site provides information to help businesses of all sizes to prepare for emergencies and, when something happens, to ensure that disruption is minimized and recovery is effective. This includes information about ways in which the government engages with business to prepare for emergencies, and regional sources of advice and local support for businesses. Furthermore there are tools a business can use to implement business continuation planning within the company. This is a good example of how the government can lay the groundwork for businesses to follow.

Another issue highlighted among the Icelandic businesses is that, when contacted, it was sometimes difficult for the staff to figure out who took care of security matters within the company. This can potentially be dangerous in case of a major threat and

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18 See also chapter 18 in this volume, on “Societal Security” and Iceland.
even when foreign business partners are asking for specific information. Since foreign partners or those seeking a business relationship are increasingly asking for details and evidence of company policies and broader security agendas, it would be a good step forward to have these affairs in order. A clearer chain of command can mean a more secure business profile. It goes without saying that transparency could be a key element in this regard.

On a more specific note, a further strengthening of dialogue and cooperation between government bodies and the Icelandic Travel Industry Association, on a broadened security agenda, is a possible way forward in these matters. Although a lot of good work has been done there seems to be more room for improvement especially over formulating and implementing a broader security agenda within the companies, and in relation to relevant aspects of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and global standards. This sort of work can possibly strengthen the travel industry in its image and competitiveness as well.

Even though there is room for improvement regarding the cooperation between business and government, there are many things revealed by this study that are positive and promise development along a good path. Some of this can be related to the Icelandic mentality where risks are dealt with case by case and when they do come up. The fact remains that there is global pressure on the businesses and the ‘case-by-case’ method may not be the best way to handle matters in the long term. Foreign partners and customers are asking for certain certifications and company policy on environmental issues and contributions to society.

The United Nations as a Leader: A Global Perspective

As some business representatives stated, there is a lot more to business than making a profit. The reality is that clients abroad are interested in how the business is doing business. Icelandic businesses have recently been asked if they have membership in global organizations; about their environmental policy; and even about their security policy. In such cases, the Icelandic companies have responded to the demand by considering new ways to update their operations, for instance by becoming members of a global ‘green’ policy movement and taking a stand on the company’s values and where it is headed. It is clear that business and even global business is becoming more concerned with the broader image of company operations. Are there any global guidelines that Icelandic companies could make better use of to get a quick start in this process?

With regard to businesses and their responsibility, there are two main UN frameworks that deserve mention. The first framework is the Global Compact, a voluntary strategic policy initiative for businesses that commit themselves to align their operations and strategies with 10 universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour rights, environment and anti-corruption. By following these principles the businesses, as the primary agent driving globalization, can help ensure that markets, commerce, technology and finance advance in ways that benefit economies and societies everywhere.\(^\text{20}\)

As mentioned by Páll Ásgeir Davíðsson, the leading Icelandic expert on CSR,\(^\text{21}\) the


\(^{21}\) Davíðsson is director of the recently created Ejikos, the Icelandic Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, at the Reykjavík University; it focuses on private sector legal and ethical issues. See
Global Compact is an essential building block when businesses start to incorporate CSR in their policies. According to the Global Compact documents, the objectives of the international community and the business world have never before been so aligned. There are common goals involved in this process, such as building markets, combating corruption and safeguarding the environment, and this has resulted in growing partnership and openness among businesses, government, civil society and the UN. Furthermore, many businesses recognize the need to collaborate with international actors in the current global context where there are both challenges and opportunities—as sketched in the above discussion. The Global Compact stands as the largest corporate citizenship and sustainability initiative in the world.

The Global Compact has two operating objectives. The first one is to mainstream the 10 principles in business activities globally. The principles are on human rights, labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption. As an example, principle 8, on the environment, reads as follows: ‘Businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility.’ The suggestions made for a business taking steps toward compliance with the Compact are to redefine the company’s vision, policy and strategies; and to work with suppliers to improve environmental performance and extend responsibility up the product chain and down the supply chain. Another step is to adopt voluntary charters, codes of conduct, internally and also through sectoral and international initiatives, so as to confirm acceptable behavior and performance, along with a variety of measurements that will strengthen implementation.

The second objective of the Compact is to catalyse actions in support of broader UN goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). In sum, the Global Compact is a tool to assist the private sector to manage the increasingly complex risks and opportunities facing it in the environmental, social and government dimensions, in a way that will in turn, as is stated, benefit all.

On 7 April 2008 the United Nations Human Rights Council issued a report on the Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. The reporting team was led by John Ruggie, who is a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The report presents a conceptual and policy framework to anchor the business and human rights debate and is also meant to help guide all relevant actors. The framework is centred on three core principles: the duty of the state to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies. All three principles form a complementary whole where each supports the other in achieving sustainable progress.

There are several reasons why this work has been found necessary. According to the report, the international community is still in the early stages of developing a human rights regime that provides more effective protection to individuals and communities against corporate-related human rights harm, and the framework now offered is

[http://www.ru.is/PageID=7271].

22 Global Compact (note 20 above).
23 Ibid.
24 This report is available on the UN website at [http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf].
intended to help achieve that goal. As business is the major source of investment and job creation, markets are a powerful force that can generate growth and wealth. But when history is taken into consideration, it is apparent that markets pose a great risk as well both to society and business when their scope and power far exceed the reach of the institutional underpinnings. The cause of the business and human rights problem lies in the governance gaps that have been created by globalization. These gaps have in turn provided an environment where companies can act in a harmful way. It is stated in the report that there is no single magic solution for the situation, but the proposed framework rests on a set of differentiated but complimentary public and private responsibilities as mentioned above.\textsuperscript{25}

The fact that an organ of the UN has found it necessary to create such a framework highlights the global challenge of business and security. The framework is designed not only to address the several complex issues that have arisen in failed states, but also to be considered by business in general. The issue of human rights and business also has a direct link with the broader and deeper notion of security emerging since cold war times.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
4. Conclusions

Pakistan is a poor and insecure state that has sustained itself with external support against the perceived existential threats in its immediate neighbourhood. Ever since Pakistan was created in the name of religion, generations of its leaders have tried to use Islamic ideology to persuade its diverse population to favour national unity and to counter external threats. In the process an uneducated Muslim population has persistently been duped and robbed of its rights in the name of a religious utopia. Flirtations by Pakistan’s leaders with Islam, especially the Islamization programme of Zia ul-Haq, eventually resulted in the religious radicalism which is at the core of Pakistani terrorism today and which, in various ways, threatens the stability of the country. Religious militancy and the terrorism associated with it have not only destabilized Pakistan internally but also placed it in an adverse position at the regional and international level. At times, the Pakistani Government has appeared unable to manage the militant Islamist forces even when these forces have been promoting certain of the government’s strategic objectives.

Under the leadership of President Musharraf an attempt has been made to reverse this policy. The process of Islamization has ceased at the level of the central government, and there have been attempts by the government to base laws on secular principles, although so far these attempts have been unsuccessful because religion remains a strong force. The current leadership of Pakistan, while trying to eradicate religious radicalism, is finding it difficult to cope with the confusion that it has created in the minds of many Pakistanis by simultaneously supporting the US action against Afghanistan, controlling infiltration into India-administered Kashmir, negotiating peace with India, cracking down on some extremist groups and striving to inculcate a modern outlook in its people. Overcoming this problem is crucially important as regard Pakistan’s armed forces, but progress on this matter has been slow. The inertia of outdated assumptions also helps to explain the mixed approach that the government itself has taken to the problem of religious radicalism and militancy. Not only is the government finding it difficult to

pursue an all-embracing approach in order to deal with the radical Islamic superstructure, but its extremely diverse treatment of various components of this structure has led to contradictions that affect Pakistan’s security. Rather than securing the vital security interests and internal harmony of the country, religious fervour has fuelled militancy and terrorism, creating external hostility and internal instability. Pakistan is not fighting someone else’s battle on its territory; the problems which exist are the country’s own.

Progress on and, ultimately, resolution of the dispute with India over Kashmir would contribute to changing the way of thinking in the country. The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan, which resumed in January 2004, addresses the Kashmir dispute as well as other disputed issues, and there is hope among Pakistanis that its outcome will be successful. Solving this dispute is essential but far from easy. The eventual solution may not completely satisfy India, Pakistan or even the Kashmiris; a solution will have to be based on compromise by all three parties. Achieving a settlement will take time, and meanwhile it is essential that the Composite Dialogue continues. Although not democratically elected, President Musharraf remains the Pakistani leader who is best suited to sustain this dialogue with a flexible perspective and a new vision. It will take him time, however, to sell his new vision to the military hardliners who have viewed India in zero-sum terms for their entire careers. The longer the dialogue can be sustained, and the more the people of Pakistan perceive dividends from the peace process, the less will be the support for Kashmiri insurgents among the military and the greater the support for peace, prosperity and tranquillity in the region.27

The unresponsiveness of the political leadership to popular needs and institutional stagnation, or perhaps degeneration, also requires continuous monitoring. The two trends have led Pakistanis to fend for themselves rather than rely on the government. Non-governmental actors of all sorts—including religious extremists—have filled the vacuum between the state and the individual in such critical social sectors as education and justice. This situation has created parallel allegiances along with those to the state, which at times work at cross purposes to state goals.28 This makes the government increasingly powerless to control the ‘hearts and minds’ as well as the actions of its people. Instead of attempting to regiment their lives, the Pakistani Government ought to demonstrate its utility to its people. In this context, Pakistan is in need of external support not only for its external security, but also for its internal institutional development in order to regain the confidence of its people.

In the past, Pakistan has aligned itself with external powers to acquire internal harmony and external security, although with incongruent expectations. It remains an ally of the USA in the war against terrorism, but again the alliance seems based on

27 However, one may be sceptical of the sincerity of a military ruler or of the military itself in seeking peace because of their institutional interests. It is possible that, even if there is peace with India, the military will find other ways to keep its presence felt. The military may not be completely dependent on the Indian confrontation. However, if it were, the irony is that even then there would be a need to work to alter this military mindset rather than to try to sideline the military forces—which is hardly possible in a country with a history like that of Pakistan.
28 Madrasas and jirgas (village councils of elders who deal with local issues and resolve disputes, thus providing a crude form of justice as an alternative to the protracted and expensive judicial system of the government) provide education and justice, respectively, almost completely independent of government control in many parts of the country.
dissimilar expectations. While Pakistan considers itself indisputably part of the campaign against al-Qaeda, the USA views it as part of the problem as much as of the solution. Nevertheless, for both its internal and external security, Pakistan needs the support of external powers to put its house in order.

At the operational level, the main law enforcement agencies in Pakistan lack the professionalism required to deal with the enormity of the challenges they face. Only a professional, modernized police force can ensure Pakistan's internal security and deal with the spillover effects of its problems. At the social level, Pakistan is in need of institutional development to build people's confidence in the utility of the nation state and to prevent them from being lured by extremist ideologies. At the political level, the leadership needs to be convinced about the suitability of a regional development paradigm based on complementarity rather than competition, and about the need for responsiveness to public needs. At the strategic level, Pakistan's military needs to be convinced of the futility rather than the undesirability of the jihadi forces. Development programmes based on institutional capacity building and support to sustain the Composite Dialogue with India are helping Pakistan significantly. An extended period of stable relations with India and internal economic and institutional development will help Pakistan develop a new understanding of the phenomena that are threatening not only the rest of the world but also Pakistan.

Pakistan is a developing country in which the institutions of political representation have not developed substantially and the army remains a powerful political force. Without exploring the causes for the involvement of the military in politics, it is sufficient to note that the army will continue to court the religious right for political purposes, as indeed do all other political actors in Pakistan. Dealing with the challenge of the military's political role is neither possible in the short term nor helpful for eradicating religious extremism. However, it is desirable in the short term that Pakistan's military sever its ties completely with the militant jihadi organizations that take part in the Kashmiri insurgency: this can only happen if there is progress in relations with India on the issue. Only after militancy is addressed can the problem of militarism in the politics of Pakistan be tackled. Attempting to deal with both together, without assurance of the durability and efficiency of the alternative political approach, would not only risk bringing the militants and the military closer but also create political instability that would be welcomed more by the terrorists than by anyone else.

Poverty, illiteracy, lack of democracy, the political problems of the Muslim communities around the world and the increasing sense of deprivation are important problems and should be dealt with as such, even if terrorism was not a factor. Only when Pakistan as a state is able to meet essential needs such as security, health, education and economic opportunity will it be able to stop hiding behind the ‘shield’ of Islam. Only then will the national political discourse shift from an ideological base to the utilitarian value of Pakistan. In a state where corruption is rampant, where people have no faith in their own police force, investors do not trust the courts to protect their property rights and two-thirds of the population live on less than $2 per day, there is every reason for the leadership as well as terrorists to attempt to use Islam as an instrument to rally the people.

As desirable as meeting these needs is, they rank second to the need for the change of the military outlook that would probably follow an extended period of peace with
India. It is not that such basic issues are less important, but the impact of improvements can be felt only in the longer term. In the short term, it is important that the religious militias are neutralized and reintegrated into society. As soon as the military leadership is reasonably convinced of the prospects of long-term peace with India, the energy that is currently devoted to militancy by extremist organizations can be diverted into social work in the name of Islam rather than of jihad. Here, too, the military may be instrumental in bringing about this change by rewarding organizations that choose social work over armed struggle.
PART III
EURO-ATLANTIC ISSUES
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN HISTORY: A EUROPEAN VIEW

A talk to the International Training Course of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.29
Geneva, Switzerland, 14 January 2008

Scene-setting and Introduction

As a person trained in history my first instinct is always to try to pin down which period of history we are supposed to be looking at. There is a joke about an Oxford college where the fellows were discussing where to invest some money they had been given, and the History Professor said ‘Land has been an excellent investment for the last 8000 years!’. Then the Professor of Ancient History woke up and said ‘Ah, but the last 8000 years have not been typical…’. In today’s case I guess we are not looking at the geological timescale of actual continental drift, but rather at the political history of US–European relations: and perhaps especially the background to the recent problems that have made many people speak of the continents drifting apart in a more political and philosophical sense.

Even in this context, however, my advice would be that the longer the perspective we can take, the better. For the modern generation, it is natural to look back on the cold war period as the ‘normal’ model for US–European relations and as a kind of ideal from which things have only gone downhill ever since. In fact, as a person who handled policy through at least the second half of the cold war I can assure you that relations within NATO went through many unpleasant and alarming crises during that period; and of course, most Central Europeans and Russians had very much worse relations with Washington than today.

But if we turn the clock back even further, we might realize that over the whole history of US–European interaction, distance and tension between the two sides of the Atlantic were actually more frequent and typical than periods of unity or even or harmony. I can think of at least one other period when, very much like today, one side accused the other of being much too powerful for a proper international balance, of using military force as its preferred instrument especially to overthrow governments in other regions, of preaching democracy without practising it, and of continuing to employ torture. These were all among the accusations that the founding fathers of the

29 On the Geneva Centre for Policy Study (GCSP) see <http://www.gcsp.ch>.
United States threw against the evil empire of old-world Europe when they took up arms to try to free themselves from it and to set up a more pure, peaceful and just political system at the end of the 18th century. It should not surprise us that relations between the new USA and the main European powers were pretty cool for most of the first 150 years that followed.

The creation of a transatlantic alliance based on permanent defence guarantees in 1949 was thus in historical terms a revolutionary experiment. It was driven by an equally unique security challenge at the end of World War II: the need for a strong Western bloc backed by the nuclear weapons of a superpower to hold back the Soviet Union from further expanding its Communist empire in Europe, combined with the need to recreate democracy and a functioning economy after the damage done by National Socialism within Western Europe itself. NATO served this second goal of what might be called internal regime change: (a) by preventing its European members from falling back into a nationalistic and competitive culture of defence, and (b) by providing a ‘shield’ under which West Europeans could rebuild their economy while spending far less on armaments than they would have needed to do if left alone. These multiple goals of NATO were wittily summed up by the British statesman Lord Ismay as ‘to keep America in, keep Russia out and keep Germany down’. Although most of us have heard that quotation already, what I’d like to point out here is its very practical and instrumentalist philosophy: NATO was certainly not viewed by its creators as some kind of mystical end in itself!

You might think I would go on from here to argue simply that the security conditions that made this tightest-ever transatlantic alliance a logical and even inescapable choice have changed notably with the falling away of the Soviet threat, so the reasons for Atlantic unity have gone also, and what we are seeing is the US-European relationship falling back into its longer term mode of difference and tension. I do, actually, believe that some of the problems of the first years of the 21st century have been a kind of delayed reaction to the fundamental transformations of 1989-90, but I also think the theory I just mentioned is too simple in several ways.

First, we are not going back to a old model but towards some future one that may be just as unique in its way as NATO was, because both the USA and Europe are now different creatures in a different world and are clearly in the process of evolving even further. Second, from a longer historical viewpoint, the present state of US-European interactions—with all its gaps and dark points—is still actually one of unusually close strategic alignment if we take account of everything that is going on and not just of the sensational headlines. Thirdly, I am suspicious of any explanation of what is happening that looks for answers purely in the internal dynamics of the Atlantic relationship—as if no other powers at all existed in the world, and as if their actions were not among the important forces pushing or guiding both the USA and Europe. All this is without mentioning some important secondary problems of analysis, such as whether it makes sense to talk of Europe as a single actor, what are we actually talking about when we talk of the USA, and so forth.

Clearly there isn’t time to offer you a full set of answers that avoids all these pitfalls and does justice to all these complications. I will talk rather about three aspects of the story that I think are important for Europeans and for how they see the evolving relationship from their side. The first is about the change since 1989/90 in the broader security agenda facing Europe, and how this evolution has affected the roles of various institutions (or the
roles that the Europeans see them playing) in channelling the transatlantic relationship. Inevitably this sketch will be simplified and will not do justice to some institutions’ roles, such as that of the OSCE. The second question is about the broader or deeper reasons that might explain why Europeans have responded to many of the new challenges with different preferences and priorities from the United States. Thirdly, I will offer my own theory about how and why the real-life transatlantic relationship has been going up and down since the start of this new century. Finally I hope I will have time for a few words about future scenarios, where I will try to bring other world powers back into the picture as well.

**Agendas and Institutions**

NATO’s role in the cold war was shaped by the fact that the Soviet/Communist threat in Europe was the single largest challenge, even for the USA—it was rightly said at that time that Washington’s own ‘strategic frontier’ lay on the mid-European dividing line. The Alliance responded in two effective ways (at least from the late 1960s): with strong defence and deterrence on the one hand, and ‘detente’—i.e. engagement with the other side to reduce the levels of confrontation and risks of war—on the other. Note, however, that both of these joint Western policies were strictly limited to Europe. Direct and ‘proxy’ struggles between the Eastern and Western camps continued in other regions and all Allies were not obliged to support each other in them. The EU in this period was strictly outside the security business, in practice sheltering under NATO’s umbrella but also playing a part in Atlantic relations by its (from a very early stage) collective handling of trade issues and some other economic and functional ones. It is interesting to recall that in this context, from the very beginning, Europeans felt free to challenge and compete with Washington on sensitive trade matters and found it natural to cite collective European interests differing from the USA’s as the rationale for this!

Since 1989/90 this pattern has been replaced or transformed by at least three new security agendas—relevant to both sides of the Atlantic, including Russia—that have been laid on top of it.

- First came the characteristic 1990s agenda of Crisis Management + Enlargement, where the latter included the related challenges of handling Russia (and other non-applicants to NATO and the EU). NATO’s successful adaptation to these tasks is striking, including its political achievement in building transatlantic consensus on solutions despite some very difficult passages, for instance over the handling of the Balkan conflict in the mid-1990s. At the same time, the division of labour between NATO and the EU in defending Europe’s security interests started gradually to shift and became more complicated. The EU also engaged in enlargement and building new relations with Russia and, because of the nature of the integration process, the transition to EU membership actually involved deeper transformations and new relationships for new members than in the NATO case. In NATO, the USA had a part (often a leading one) in creating new members and neighbours in Europe, but its own people did not actually have to live alongside them—or open their doors and potentially jobs to them! And as we know, at the end of the period the EU decided to launch its own military crisis management capacity in direct reaction to various frustrations linked with experience of NATO operations driven by the USA.
More broadly over this decade, the fading of a shared military threat in Europe started to make Europe less of a defence priority for the USA, while military and defence affairs became less of a priority overall for Europe: so the relative part that NATO played in the thinking of each side gradually becomes less dominant. It should also be noted that the West’s crisis management tasks outside Europe during this phase were met without using NATO, although the EU was involved in some of the related crises with mediation, aid, sanctions and so forth.

- The second agenda was sharply defined on 11 September 2001: focusing on the Global New Threats of terrorism, WMD proliferation and related issues like financial crime, travel safety, controls on technology transfer and trade. The key points about institutional implications might be symbolized by Washington’s failure to take up NATO’s invocation on 12 September 2001 of the collective defence provisions in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (for the USA’s sake). First, this hinted that the NATO forum might no longer be central to US–Europe interactions. Second, it reflected a more general truth that the instruments NATO could offer—while turning out to be highly relevant e.g. for pursuing operations in Afghanistan after the USA’s initial coalition attack—have remained are essentially military and operational ones growing out of its long-term defence role and assets. To put it the other way round, NATO does not have the resources or legal competences to handle the wide range of non-military actions needed for combating terrorism on all fronts, such as police and justice cooperation, other internal (‘homeland’) security measures and travel security; or similar actions needed for non-proliferation like controls on technology transfer and exports or the design of complex sticks and carrots solutions for problems like North Korea and Iran. Even less does it seem suited to be the main channel for the Western community to interact with other world powers and groupings affected by the new agenda— as with Russia and China over Iran, or other regional organizations over generic anti-terrorism and -proliferation measures.

The EU as a multi-functional, legislative entity, with a longstanding global economic personality, did at least in principle have all these possibilities and it started to develop them after 2001—both for the purpose of negotiation and cooperation with the USA, and to protect its own security interests. As a result of this plus the fact that the action now largely moved outside Europe, we witnessed the main flow of US–European policy interactions (whether negative or positive) on the global response to ‘new threats’ being channelled through USA–EU contacts—in the process highlighting that those mechanisms were and are still not properly designed or adequate for the purpose!—or through forums with wider participation by world powers, namely, the UN Security Council and the G8.

In political terms, the story of this phase became overshadowed by the major splits of 2002–2003 both among Europeans and between the USA and Europeans in general, over various aspects of the Iraq affair and especially the US-led invasion of March 2003. In retrospect we can probably judge that these rifts created greater and more lasting political challenges for NATO than the EU, mainly because (i) the USA’s new preference to use ‘coalitions of the willing’ for the most urgent military tasks was taking potential work away from NATO, not the EU; and (ii) the EU just had so much other business going on—where Europeans had to keep working together—that was not dependent on Atlantic relations nor linked to the new-threats agenda. As we will see later, the EU also made much more far-reaching efforts to pull itself together and potentially to change its whole nature as a security actor in reaction to the crisis.
At the same time, we should note that the West went on handling the *enlargement* agenda, including the Russian angles, in a quite smooth and united way over these first years of the century: and looking back, we may now also theorize that this was a positive side-effect of the shock of the 9/11 crisis. The new transnational threats created a much stronger logic for uniting as much of Europe as possible under a single framework that would apply common policies and combine assets to tackle all types of security threat, internal and non-state as well as traditional. Meanwhile and at least temporarily, identifying terrorism as a common enemy gave Russia a rationale for continuing to work with the West despite its objections to enlargement.

- In the third new layer of the agenda, since 2004 in particular, new or renewed attention has been drawn to threats to human security that may be not, or only partly, man-made but have great and widespread destructive power. These include epidemics like AIDS, SARS and (potentially) avian influenza, natural disasters (tsunami, hurricanes, earthquakes), larger climate change processes, problems with supply of energy and other strategic commodities, and possible infrastructure breakdowns. We might add here a gradual turning of attention back to the problems of ‘autonomous’ non-European conflict and their linkages with underdevelopment, ‘weak state’ phenomena, and so on—the Congo, Darfur and Somalia being classic cases. For this agenda, the institutional story can be told very quickly because it is clear that NATO does not have a role other than providing military assets where relevant, e.g. for earthquake relief or the indirect support of regional peacekeeping. It is also clear that such problems, arising essentially in the economic, social and ecological spheres, fall right in the middle of the EU agenda, and that all pressures are pushing the EU to treat them more consciously as security issues and develop more effective joint positions on them—however difficult this may be!

On the military front, the renewed focus on non-European conflicts has also led the EU to make more, and more different types of, crisis interventions outside its own security zone—in Aceh, the Palestinian territories, and now Georgia. The EU has also taken over most peace missions nearer home in the Western Balkans, except the military role in Kosovo, as NATO strove to free up all possible resources for Afghanistan. Lastly, the logic and pressure for the USA and Europeans to cooperate on this whole ‘human security’ agenda should be overwhelming, not least because the good answers very often involve the principles of good governance that both sides share. But while sometimes their approaches coincide very closely, at other times they have to negotiate from clearly different starting positions: for instance on the Kyoto process or birth control, or on the role that arms control and disarmament may play.

The final question I want to raise on this story is whether one big omission from it is actually justified: am I right in implying that the direct defence of Europe itself has simply dropped out of the picture? What seems clear is that NATO is not actively planning for or engaging in it any more and that, as a result, the new members of NATO (and any others still to join) are having nothing like the original NATO experience of direct and permanent multilateral military integration—including the Americans and Canadians—on Europe’s own soil. The recent crisis over proposed US national bases in Central Europe highlights this change in a rather brutal way, because the bases have been planned through purely bilateral negotiations, with no fully agreed NATO backing, and their original rationale was the advanced defence of the US homeland rather than
anything that would make Poland or the Czech Republic safer. The political promise of collective defence still stands there in Article 5 of NATO’s treaty: but if some had reason to doubt even in the cold war whether Washington would always and automatically risk the USA to save Europe from any kind of attack, the reasons for questioning that are surely much greater now!

None of this would matter if we were sure that the European homeland will never again face a direct or indirect attack from state enemies, and also that European countries need no more education in how to keep their defence cooperative and denationalized. But a lot of Europeans, notably in the East and North, don’t actually feel anything like certain that the history of military security in Europe has come to an end yet, and Russia has been doing its best lately to keep their doubts alive and their nerves on edge. One question this raises for me is whether the EU might eventually be driven to fill the gap by evolving into the role of a direct, military defender of its own territories—followed by the very big question of whether it could ever play that role credibly, and if so how (including the issue of European nuclear deterrence)!

European Attitudes

I must move on, however, to talk as promised about deeper and broader trends that could explain why the Europeans have done the various things and made the judgements reflected in the last story. In particular, why have they progressively shifted the focus of their security and defence policies away from NATO as the centre and from military methods in general? Why do they seem to think it is OK to go on cutting their own defence forces? Why are they increasingly seeing and using the exclusively European EU as the vehicle of their security-related cooperation and protection, and of their action in the wider world? Why have all of them or groups of them thought it OK to disagree openly with, or even campaign against, the USA on some of the most sensitive security issues of recent years; and why do majorities in all European countries now openly accept that some of their security-related beliefs and values as well as interests are different from those of the USA? All these points are not just guesses on my part but emerge from the study of reputable opinion polls, including ones carried out by US experts.

I am, perhaps unusually, not going to talk this through in terms of bad things the USA has done or how it has ‘moved away from us’, but rather in terms of Europe’s own basic characteristics and the way they have evolved under 55 years of EU integration. What I’d like to suggest to you is that—contrary to what many Americans assume—the Europeans do a lot of things not because they want to be different from America but because they want to be like themselves; and because their most basic and difficult task (which no American can solve for them) is working out what ‘being like themselves’ actually means.

We may divide the possible answers into (a) objective characteristics of the European experience, and (b) secondary characteristics of political culture bred by the ways that Europeans have chosen to respond, including their creation of a Union with uniquely supranational features. To start with history, Europe’s imperial past—including the often bloody process of decolonization—and its responsibility for triggering two world wars have created long-term bonds with non-Europe regions on the one hand, and qualms
about the use of force for national self-assertion on the other. In geographical terms, Europe has no indisputable natural borders, and the rise and fall of empires, migrations and trading patterns since Greek and Roman times have accustomed it to conditions of interpenetration and interdependence with the ‘other’. In economic terms, the European economy depends much more than the US one on external trade, which also creates a preference for an orderly international environment allowing security of supply and payment. Finally, it is obvious that ‘Europe’ as a political entity is a collection of separate sovereignties, which is still far from and probably will never become a unitary state. This obviously makes for divided purposes, wastage of resources and a weaker resultant ‘will’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But these features, and the relative lack or ambiguity of a collective ‘identity’, also make it less likely that Europe would ever behave as if its own interests and values had an automatic self-legitimating quality, or as if it enjoyed an automatic right to impose them on others. The temptation seems to be much greater for the United States to confuse ‘might’ with ‘right’.

The secondary or emergent features of the European way of regional governance also start with some very practical points: collective decision making is likely to waste time, to rule out a certain range of extreme or risky options, and to favour consensus or compromise solutions defined in shades of grey rather than black or white. However, in the areas where the Europeans have surrendered operational control to the Commission, and even to some extent in intergovernmental policy-making areas where the range of different interests is not extreme, sovereignty has de facto been modified and there is potential for a common interest that is more than just the sum of separate interests to emerge. One strong driver towards true common policies is the experience of shared vulnerability arising in a space that has abolished internal frontiers, and where many of the most important economic actors have become transnational. Finally, the Union has not yet been able to agree on where its final frontiers lie: the Big Bang enlargement of 2004 has already transformed it in ways that are still working themselves out, and at least some further accessions (from the Balkans) seem inevitable, and the EU’s engagement with its near neighbourhood is also more multiform and involves more intimate engagement than NATO’s. The result—contrary to some US experts’ assumption—is that Europe is by nature the opposite of a status quo power, being subject to organic and dynamic growth and change without any ‘finality’ that it can agree upon or, probably, dictate for itself. Of course Europeans are afraid of change, but this is because they are being asked to absorb more change per year and per person than most parts of the world are already.

It is not for me to underline what is different on the US side, but I will just end this part with a remark about the likelihood of the USA’s misunderstanding what the EU is about—which of course can become a major practical problem in the Atlantic dialogue. Robert Kagan’s ‘Mars and Venus’ theory\textsuperscript{30} is correct in grasping that Europe is different in kind, not just a smaller and weaker version of the US superpower; but I’m not sure he is right in arguing that the EU behaves as it does because it is ‘not interested in power’ any more. In the first place, the EU does exercise power in many non-military ways and is more consciously interested today than ever before in increasing its impact. But more crucially, I think Europeans are highly aware of other people’s greater power and of how exposed their own continent is to be hurt directly or indirectly by other people’s violence,

\textsuperscript{30} Kagan wrote that ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’ in his book \textit{Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order}, Knopf Publishing Group, 2004.
including the American kind. They are perfectly correct in understanding that they cannot
drive away and defeat such threats by military means: and whatever problems they may
be having in working out an effective alternative, I think they are right in assuming it will
have to be a new solution of their own: one that maximizes whatever strengths they do
have, but if necessary also dodges out of the way of violence and uses whatever means
they can to make it somebody else’s problem. (More on the implications later.)

A Story about What has been Happening since September 2001

Let me now go back to the well-known excitements of transatlantic relations since 9/11
and try to retell the story from the point of view of the evolution of a united Europe:

- The events of 9/11 wake the USA up to new danger, and wake Europe up to the
  need to reinvent and operationalize solidarity with the USA in new dimensions, as well as
  urgently exploring new parts of its own security potential;
- From mid-2002, US actions against non-European opponents and with ‘non-
  European methods’ split Europe and destabilize US–European relations in both NATO
  and the EU, actually encouraged by some US leaders who seem more interested in pulling
  the so-called newer half of Europe over to their side. But as early as March/April 2003
  the EU makes a major effort to pull itself together, realizing that neither the anti-US
  nor the pro-US camp have had any real impact on the problem. Typically, EU leaders
  try to seize back the initiative by ‘fleeing forward’ in ways that build up Europe as a
  united security actor—creating new security policies (the first ever European Security
  Strategy, WMD strategy, etc.) and new capacities (the European Defence Agency, the
  EU Battlegroups) and undertaking new actions (the Congo operation of mid-2004), plus
  further steps in homeland security after the Madrid and London bombings. EU leaders
  also, more broadly and perhaps surprisingly, achieve complete inter-state agreement—
  including the Central European applicant countries—on a new draft Constitution that
  strengthens top-level collective leadership notably in the foreign/security sphere.
- EU governments then, belatedly, give their peoples a chance to express an opinion
  (through the referendums on the Constitution in spring 2005), and the people of two
  of the Union’s founder members (France and the Netherlands) say ‘No’. They make
  clear that they are unhappy with major parts of the new leap forward, notably relating to
  enlargement and increased powers for Brussels—both of which are seen as undermining
  national identities and cultures; and with other problems that have remained unsolved
  or got worse meanwhile, such as unemployment and failing welfare systems. This is not
  just a crisis for the EU but also for a whole generation of EU political leaders, who find
  that the trust in their leadership and judgement simply is not there at the grass roots: and
  this applies not just to older members but to several of the new ones that go through
  turbulent government changes—often including anti-European reactions—around the
  same time.
- The leaders themselves are more shaken—and indeed, disunited—by this than
  one would expect if they had really known what they were doing, and really agreed on
  it. They go formally into ‘reflection’ mode, and in practice into a drastic lowering of
  expectations where the aim is just to push through the most basic joint EU decisions like
  annual budgets and those further enlargements that can no longer be avoided. During
  this period up to about spring 2007, the signs are that Washington also starts to realize
that a weak, divided and demoralized Europe is not particularly helpful for its own interests, obviously in security terms but also in terms of coping with new challenges to global economic stability. Of course, the US Administration is by this time on a bit of a downhill slope itself with the growing problems in Iraq and the ever clearer division of internal opinion as reflected in Congress. These stresses have led the president of his own choice to remove a number of the figures who earlier most alienated the Europeans as well—such as John Bolton, Donald Rumsfeld, and most recently Alberto Gonzalez—and to try to find a way of closing down Guantánamo Bay.

The overall result has been that transatlantic relations have actually been rather quiet in these last 2–3 years, not because of great new successes in joint policies—several NATO initiatives suggested by Washington have actually failed during this time—but rather because neither side has had an interest in highlighting Atlantic differences or failures for fear of aggravating its own problems, exposing its own weaknesses and only encouraging third parties who have an interest in a divided West. I am actually surprised by how little open political debate there has been in Europe over, for instance, the missile bases story and its consequences for European arms control; and I am sure that a strong reason must be that everyone knows it is far more risky for the Allies to let Vladimir Putin see them divided over a European issue than it was to attack distant Iraq with only part of Europe on board.

**Present and Future**

This brings us to the present and the chance to look ahead to the future. If I am right in suggesting that the USA and Europe have been enjoying a kind of political ceasefire based on fatigue and reduced expectations, can we expect that truce to continue in the light of the latest and ongoing national political changes and new agendas? And is a ceasefire a strong enough basis anyway for the Atlantic allies to play the role that they need to play in the rest of this century, for the sake of their own interests and the world as a whole?

I don’t know if I will surprise you by saying that I see certain reasons for optimism. The more obvious but also perhaps less reliable ones are to do with politics and personalities. The arrival of a new French president who wants to succeed in Atlantic relations, at a time when both British and German leadership is relatively weak, is an interesting development because if France can find something to agree on with Washington, it is hard to imagine anyone else in the EU not being willing to go along. The EU has also pulled its feet out of the mud of recent years by managing to agree on a new reform treaty and on a way of ratifying it that minimizes the risks of yet another political disaster, though it has to be said that some such risks do still exist.31 If a Democrat president or even a distinctly different kind of Republican wins the next US presidential election, as expected, the political conditions might still be right to allow a burst of new transatlantic activity and creation—using both NATO itself and the official USA–EU channel. Many US thinkers have also talked about the possibility of creating some new Atlantic institutional framework, though personally I must say I find it hard to see how this would add value in practice. The important thing is to use the new president’s

31 Some months after this speech was given, the Irish people indeed rejected the new ‘Lisbon Treaty’ in a referendum.
honeymoon period to cut through quickly to results on some substantive issues, and there is no shortage of existing frameworks to do this—including the G8, which would be all the more more useful if it included China.

But what about the actual issues? Does the agenda that is now taking shape for the next few years provide a good potential base for Atlantic solidarity, and will the two sides actually recognize that base and make the effort to build something lasting upon it? The last years of nothing else have taught us that these are two different questions: on 11 September 2001 it would have seemed hard to think of a new agenda with a more uniting effect than terrorism, but we all know what happened next.

As things stand now, I would suggest there has been some convergence across the Atlantic on the seriousness of terrorism—helped by a series of major attacks in Europe itself—and from the US side on the size of the environmental and climate change challenge, even if the preferred methods for dealing with it are still hard to reconcile. Both sides have, I believe, learned or rather re-learned some lessons about the challenges of crisis management in weak or damaged states and about the limitations of sheer military force in that context: with effects that include most obviously a greater reluctance in Washington to start yet another crisis with another invasion, but also a stronger motive to work together in finding a non-violent solution for Kosovo and a converging approach to various as it were ‘independent’ crises like Darfur and perhaps now Pakistan. Most obvious of all is this field is the joint liability that Americans and Europeans have taken on in Afghanistan, where I am afraid the future credibility of NATO will be measured not so much by whether it ‘wins’ the peace there as whether it can keep a united and dignified front while reducing its ambitions to some more plausible end-state, and while admitting that even that result may depend more on other processes and institutional inputs than its own strengths. I would argue that even in such a recently sensitive field as arms control, the negotiations on North Korea have brought the kind of US success that Europeans can sincerely admire, while many useful joint programmes have been quietly built up across the Atlantic in fields like export control, biosafety, control of MANPADS and so forth.

The trouble is that all these are issues where we have had six years and more to try to rebuild Atlantic solidarity, while we can be pretty sure that the next six years will be dominated by at least a few quite different challenges and the new concepts and issues of principle that go with them. Will Russia’s new aggressive self-assertion help bind the NATO powers back together as we would have expected in the old days, and will it force the EU to complete the painful track towards a common energy policy? Or could it split Europe along another old/new dividing line, and is a new US regime likely to be more aggressive towards Moscow than the Europeans want or perhaps to go the other way with a strategic deal over European heads? Will the still deepening economic crisis lead to Western solidarity or to mutual blame, new protectionism and the equivalent of a separate peace with other actors such as Russia and China? In more general terms, can the West collectively emerge from the troubles of recent years with enough energy and determination to meet any and all new challenges as strongly as they need to be met, and to maintain the global political initiative in the way that the West has grown used to holding it since 1990? Some people are already worried about the scenario of what could be called a phase of minimalism in US policy, while the EU’s new start is still quite fragile and many of its leaders either damaged or untried. It is not so hard to think of some
known issues that could bring destructive crises of confidence in both NATO and the EU, perhaps involving Iraq and Turkey or events on former Soviet soil or new violence in the Middle East—and this is without starting to think about the ‘unknown unknowns’.

But all this still feels to me like a very limited and localized analysis. I am really not convinced that the mutual problems between the USA and Europe are the biggest and most interesting ones facing us today. We could even argue that they have a certain self-correcting factor, because if integrated Europe manages to grow stronger despite all its obvious problems it will have to learn to act tougher—in a more American style, as it were—as it come to understand better what power means and what responsibilities it brings. On the other side, the rise of globalized threats that cannot be stopped at national borders or fought with military forces must logically sooner or later introduce elements to US policy that are based on more acceptance of the fact of interdependence and of the more European-style disciplines, restraints and give-and-take policy solutions that go with that fact.

We can only end the story in such simple and optimistic terms, however, if we leave the rest of the world out of account. Both sides of the Atlantic face challenges on the one hand from individual rising powers like China and India, and on the other from the risks of further collapse in the world’s most chaotic and poorer areas, some of which remain important for strategic commodities and trade routes. Traditional Western assumptions of superiority and global leadership will be challenged both by the success of the better organized regions in building institutions to fight for their own interests, like ASEAN, and by the regions with the most primitive security conditions where new local wars and breakout by new WMD proliferators are still on the cards.

If we can roughly sum up these trends as meaning a more ‘multi-polar’ dynamic in world security, it seems to me a very open question whether the overall effect of these challenges will be to push the USA and Europe (perhaps even Russia) back together as a single ‘Western pole’, or whether the existing level of US and European differences will lead each side of the Atlantic to look for different solutions with different partners. Up to now, the USA has consistently aimed to block and control the rise of other great powers, i.a. by enlisting smaller powers in their respective regions against them; it still seems to see the military balance of power as most crucial in this respect, while not worrying as much as it probably should over the changing economic pattern. The Europeans, for all the reasons I set out earlier, are more inclined to try to live with rising powers, to make friends with them, or at least make profits out of them—not minding if other continents have clear leaders so long as the results can combine stability with a certain degree of openness. They take a more complex view of power, influence and motivation, and do not assume (for instance) that economic interdependence necessarily hurts them more than it helps to restrain the new powers involved. Another way to explain these differences is that the USA sees itself as a unique power that should have no equal competitors and, as a matter of fact, does not have any real imitators: while Europe sees the majority of world regions trying to follow its own example of local cooperation and gradual integration, and tends to assume for this reason also that troublemakers like Cuba or North Korea or Iran will gradually be tamed and converted. Which side of the Atlantic will prove right about this? It’s hard to answer the question because each of them has such a different vision that they would also define success very differently. But to me, the task of permanent military dominance that the USA has set itself looks
harder, and ultimately less realistic, than the Europeans’ admittedly more confused and modest ambitions.

To sum up, looking back through history again, we could think of the USA and Europe spending their first 150 years of coexistence on largely separate paths, followed by the cold war period when they came together like a bundle of sticks—impossible to break, where each side would have been more vulnerable on its own. For today and the future my chosen image would be something more like the strands of the double helix shape of human DNA. These interlaced strands cross each other frequently but they also spend quite a lot of time at the micro-level moving apart from each other. They are eternally connected, but it is the difference and complementarity of the strands that makes them capable together of creating new living things. Let us hope that the Atlantic community can manage to remain equally creative for the future, because the world certainly needs it!
There must have been tens of thousands of speeches given about NATO–EU relations, and I have given quite a few of them myself. But it was only a few months ago that it suddenly struck me how strange it is to talk about NATO and the EU as independent and contrasting institutions that may have bad relations or compete or even conflict with each other. It is a bit like talking about your own arm conflicting with your leg. Because the fact is that—with some very important exceptions that I’ll return to in a moment—NATO and the EU are owned by the same nations: we now have a total of 21 states belonging to both, which is the great majority of members on both sides. Moreover, these are democratic nations that freely chose to set up both institutions to serve their own purposes, and they have kept a lot of political control over what they do—less perhaps in the case of the partly supranational EU, but even there the diplomatic and strategic aspects are still basically steered by instructions from capitals. As a result, the instructions that are sent to both headquarters in Brussels are written often within the walls of the same ministry. Why should the two sets of instructions ever conflict, and why would we find a British or Italian or Hungarian official at one end of Brussels talking angrily and impatiently about the institution at the other end of Brussels which his or a fellow official from Britain, Italy or Hungary is deeply attached to and is working hard to defend? Yes, the two institutions have different cultures arising from their different histories, rules and experiences, and we should never underestimate the power of esprit de corps over impressionable human beings. But difference as such should not be the problem because a single country that owns two different tools, or institutions in this case, should logically try its best to use them in a distinct and complementary way rather than letting them duplicate and cut across each other. We do not usually let our fork fight with our knife.

The Political Story

Now, of course the differences that do exist in membership and in general design of the two organizations do provide some of the answer. They give us political explanations that account for a lot of what goes on in the short term and on the surface. It isn’t hard to
see why Europeans working with the USA and Canada in NATO find themselves in a different political atmosphere and power game from Europeans trying to solve problems just among themselves in the EU. Not only the issues but also the roles nations play can be different, and there can be different factors of public opinion back home which is not to be underestimated as a driving force. Also very important is the fact that NATO consists of the nations plus a powerful and partly collectivized military, while the EU consists of a supranational European Commission and Court of Justice, its nations, and only a very small military staff which (as I see it) is still far from being fully at home within the machine. The most distinct and unusual parts of each institution, namely the NATO collective military command and the European Commission, not surprisingly often have the greatest difficulties in finding a common language.

It isn’t surprising either that countries that are central to one institution but have no role in the other are a source of tension. It is well known that the USA has had its periods of being concerned and doubtful about the EU’s efforts to develop a military role. I believe that is less of a problem today and I will come back to talk about it towards the end of the speech. But for the moment I’d like to point out that the USA has a good chance to build trust with the EU also because it interacts very closely with it outside NATO on issues that clearly belong to the EU’s competence, like transport security and export controls in the fight against terrorism. Washington and the Commission also work together in world trade negotiations and have to respect each other as partners even if they don’t always agree.

The problems that have proved more stubborn, and that have caused the biggest hold-ups in practical NATO–EU cooperation, are those involving countries that do not feel themselves treated as they should be by the institution they don’t belong to, and are tempted to leverage the institution that they do belong to in order to make their point. Interestingly, this has never been a problem with most of the EU’s neutral countries, which have in fact often been among the keenest on EU–NATO cooperation because it brings them many benefits from NATO through the back door. But Turkey in NATO and Cyprus in the EU are the obvious cases, and I hope I can make my point by suggesting that if Turkey was already in the EU today, and Cyprus was allowed to be in NATO, we would not have seen the particular set of institutional hold-ups that we have. The issues among these states and Greece might still exist, but they would have no reason to hold up communication between the two sides of Brussels over them. It is, of course, another question whether using either institution in this way actually improves the chances of any state eventually getting the full honours of membership that it hopes for…

Institutions and Identity

However, as I said, these are political stories that are probably too obvious and straightforward to be the whole answer. I would like to suggest a somewhat deeper level of explanation which lies in the fact that nations do not just create and use institutions for practical purposes: they also associate them with values, ideals and factors of identity. To probe into this we need to ask a different kind of question, like: what was it about NATO’s aim and concept that made the Europeans insist on having the USA in it, and what about the EU that made it natural the USA should stay out? What is it about NATO’s identity that stops Sweden joining while Norway does, and what about the EU’s
identity that stops Turkey joining while Bulgaria does? It would be wrong to hurry to give
very clear answers, because my lifetime’s experience has convinced me that politicians
and citizens rarely focus on such questions too clearly themselves. They are not just
practical judgements but also psychological and emotional. Indeed, psychology might be
of some help to us here because it suggests that each individual has different sides to his
personality and identity, whether we name them in technical terms like ego or superego,
or whether we note more simply that a single person can be a lawyer, a lover, a father, a
socialist, an amateur football player and so on.

Now, one theory I’d like to offer you is that, for member countries, the separate
identities of the EU and NATO play the same kind of roles that the different aspects of
personality and identity play for an individual. In this case we may speak of nations using
the two organs in different ways to express their hard versus their soft side, the protective
versus the profit-making side, the power-based side versus the law-based side or—to
borrow from oriental psychology—a kind of yin and yang of Western democratic politics,
with the darker, more passive and complicated female principle of the yin corresponding
to the EU and the shiny activist masculine principle of the yang to NATO. For 60 years
since the end of the Second World War, the West Europeans have found it actually very
useful to be able to play these two different roles and project these two different images,
sometimes in a seemingly incoherent way, to reflect the fact that their own hopes and
purposes are also extremely complicated, never yet fully matured and often unclear or
contradictory. The question is whether in the radically new environment created after
1989, and then again after 2001, this kind of policy schizophrenia—leading two powerful
institutions to be handled sometimes as if the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand
is doing or even fights the left hand—is actually appropriate or sustainable any more.

In logical terms we might see three alternative ways of organizing the relationship that
ought to be more sensible and productive:

• first, to make the yin and yang division clear and explicit and have a firm dividing line
  between the different things that NATO and the EU would be used for;
• second, to deliberately shift the balance of defence and security policy overall in one
direction or the other, more towards the yin or the yang, thereby making clearer which
institution is actually the more important; or
• third and most radical, to combine the necessary yin and yang elements of European
  security policy both within the same institution, or a newly invented institution, in
  future.

I promise to offer some comment on the feasibility of these options at the end of my
talk when we look to the future. But to get there on a firm basis, I’d like to go back to
yet another analytical approach, the historical one, to help us understand better how this
yin and yang system was first designed and how it has become more complicated since,
especially since the end of the cold war.

The Original Bargain

For a short while in the 1950s when a European Defence Union was proposed, it looked
as if we would actually have two NATO s based on collective defence—the transatlantic
one and a purely European, more integrated military force. But the European scheme was vetoed by the French National Assembly and the only relic of the separate European defence idea became the very weak, non-operational Western European Union. With this, a role division emerged between NATO and a now purely civilian EU that was not only very clear, but left no need for the two institutions to have any direct contact or even understand each other. NATO looked after military defence and deterrence and fought to get its nations to sustain permanently high defence spending, in a way unique in history, to keep up with the constantly evolving threat. The EU worked for economic growth and efficiency, social welfare and the gradual equalization of conditions among its members, hoping to take away both the motive and the practical possibility for any states to break away and fight each other ever again.

The two institutions, as noted, had very different governance structures—with NATO working by ad hoc agreements among its nations, which in practice allowed them to keep very varied national roles, while the EU set out to equalize standards and set up central bodies that could test and if necessary override national decisions. The outside relations of the two were also very different, with much of NATO’s rationale deriving from the fact that it had an opposite number and enemy in the shape of the Warsaw Pact, while the Communist economic organization CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON) meant nothing like the same sort of challenge for the EU and in practice the European integration experiment had neither any obvious enemies nor parallels elsewhere in the world. The creation of a Common Commercial Policy for dealing with all non-EU states also made the EU from the first potentially a world actor, although only within some specific areas of Commission competence. NATO had a very wide and strong grip over its members’ security-related policies, including internal defence arrangements and infrastructure and also arms control and disarmament policy, within the geographical area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty: but it made no claim to control anything beyond that—either the major wars fought against Communism in other regions of the world, or the turbulent decolonization processes of several of the European Allies.

And yet, the complementarity and deeper unity of purpose between the two institutions was also quite easy to see, perhaps for as long as their first 50 years. If we can start with Lord Ismay’s notorious joke about NATO being designed to ‘to keep America in, keep Russia out and keep Germany down’, we can certainly agree that the EU did its part as much as NATO to integrate Germany in the embrace of supranational integration, mutual dependence and common interest. As for keeping Russia out, NATO created the protective shield for European recovery; but the EU’s success in reconstructing and relaunching European growth and global competitiveness, and in gradually equalizing economic and social standards in Western Europe, surely helped also to keep the West robust and united in the face of Communist pressure. You might even argue that it was the appeal of West European wealth, rather than envy of the NATO experience as such, which really undermined the East German and other Central European regimes and opened the floodgates to the eventual Communist collapse. More specifically, of course, the ability of the West European economy to create the funds needed for defence spending were what allowed NATO to maintain its permanent high levels of readiness, even if some nations were a lot less ready than others. As for keeping America in, Washington for most of this period officially approved of European integration and it
did so partly because this was seen as promoting the West’s common ideological agenda of free market capitalism. Of course at the broader level of historical development it can be argued that the EU’s emerging ambitions to play a role as a world power were bound to cause eventual turbulence in the Atlantic relationship, and this issue is still very much with us today.

**Post-Cold War Role Exchange and Convergence**

Now we have to fast-forward to the 18 years since the end of the cold war, and I surely don’t have to remind you of the crucial changes the Euro-Atlantic space has gone through over that time: the collapse of the Communist threat and emergence of the USA as the single superpower, the impact of the Balkans wars on the security agenda, the decision of the EU to create its own military capabilities for crisis management, and NATO’s decision to move into and even concentrate on the global operations business, and the rather rapid enlargement of both institutions culminating in the parallel ‘Big Bangs’ of 2004. What is interesting for our present topic is the way the roles of EU and NATO changed in consequence: and here I would like to offer you a complex analysis looking at possible *parallelism* between the institutions, the possible *borrowing* and mutual influences between them, and then the *shifts and migrations of roles* that have occurred in at least one direction. This will bring us on to the questions of not just whether, but why, we find cases of useful *convergence*, or problematic *overlap*, between NATO’s and the EU’s roles as they stand today.

The most obvious parallel is that both institutions managed to survive the radical changes of 1989/90 and even make themselves indispensable for the new security purposes, which was by no means obvious when the Berlin Wall first came down. Both the EU and NATO found parallel solutions by expanding their memberships and expanding or adapting their profiles and competences, although only the EU attempted any significant ‘deepening’ in the sense of further pooling of national sovereignty and creation of major new competences. It is true that NATO’s structures, especially the command structure, have been quite radically reformed over the whole period but I would still argue that there is no NATO constitutional parallel for the launching of EMU (the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union), the governance changes of the Amsterdam Treaty and the new Lisbon Treaty, or even the Schengen system of common border control. Of course, the reason why NATO could not move away from traditional inter-governmental decision taking, even if it wanted to, is also a political one connected with the presence of the very sovereignty-minded United States.

Mutual *borrowing* between the EU and NATO can of course happen through competition and imitation as well as by working together. Although I have seen little research on this topic, I am inclined to think it has been more important at the micro than the macro level. For instance, the EU copied NATO in quite a lot of detail when it set up its own Military Committee and Military Staff and when it defined their operational planning tasks and the doctrine on ad hoc command structures. It seems pretty clear that experience of the NATO Secretary-General’s role had something to do with the successive upgradings of Javier Solana’s executive position after he moved into the EU. But this has not led, as some people thought, to any more general importation of military discipline or traditional strategic thinking into EU policy: the EU’s European Security
Strategy (ESS) of 2003 was a quite different animal from anything that NATO would have produced, and defence experts have queried whether it really deserves to be called a strategy at all.

Perhaps one of the few more significant and far-reaching cases of osmosis in the other direction was the impact of the initial headline goals and force planning philosophy of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on NATO from 2000 onwards. It is no coincidence that, by the time of the Prague Summit decisions at end-2002, NATO had also decided to drop the attempt to dictate every aspect of its members’ defence decisions and started to concentrate instead on harmonized goals in areas directly relevant to overseas intervention capability. Even if the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the EU’s Battlegroups scheme still have enough technical differences to keep a certain set of experts in a state of anxiety, both of them represent a quite different line of development from NATO’s original Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept of the mid-1990s, and I am not sure if NATO could have made such a clear fresh start without the example as well as the rivalry of ESDP to inspire it. Finally, I think there has been a two-way flow between the institutions in trying to grapple with the realities of civil–military cooperation in operational mode and with multi-functional peacebuilding, although neither side—and indeed, no other institution in the world—has found a really convincing model yet.

I would like to look in more detail at the deliberate or unconscious migration of roles between NATO and the EU because I suspect that this is where many of our present concerns and uncertainties spring from. I would argue first—and no doubt most provocatively—that the task of protecting European territory on a practical day-to-day basis has in the last 18 years been slipping steadily towards the EU. It’s clear that NATO still keeps the sole competence for defence against military attack, and the EU is still a long way politically from becoming a guaranteed military community, if it ever does. We still look first to Evere and Mons when a military shadow falls over us. But the fact is that for many years now we have been turning a blind eye to the dimension of state-to-state military risk in the security of mainstream Europe. Up to very recently, even our main continuing security challenge in the East has been expressed more through Russian rhetoric, political pressure, economic warfare and probably cyber-warfare, and we have not seen NATO taking a very open and active lead in quarrels of that kind even when they involved such sensitive allies as the Baltic states. Looking from the other side, the EU is clearly in the lead—although not necessarily well-equipped and competent!—for all those other risks and threats that can actually kill and hurt people in today’s Europe, ranging from internal terrorist attacks or sabotage through natural disasters, accidents, infrastructure collapse or energy cut-offs to disease, climate change and even major social unrest. The EU’s solidarity declaration against terrorism and natural disasters that was adopted in March 2004 made this point also conceptually quite clear. The only doubt I would accept is that certain kinds of civil emergencies might invoke NATO action mainly because there is NATO special expertise in the dimensions where they occur, as I believe happened to a limited degree with the recent cyber-attacks on Estonia.

Secondly and more briefly, I would argue that NATO has virtually ceased to be active on arms control since it ducked out of having a real political debate over missile defence in the 1990s, and the freezing of the CFE Treaty has pretty well exposed the bankruptcy of its policy in that area: leaving no real institutional energy in Europe devoted to actual
cutting and destruction of weapons unless we count the EU’s policies against small arms. The EU is, however, hugely active in new fields of arms control work such as export and technology controls and various methods of non-proliferation, including the very high-profile European role on the issue of Iran. The EU has also taken over the lead on defence industry matters through the European Defence Agency and has the power to join up this issue with general technology and industrial collaboration policy in a way that NATO could never have managed. Looking to the future, finally, I would see the vacuum on a credible European policy for energy security being filled mainly by the EU, although NATO does have an ongoing study and may have special niches to fill on dealing with physical blockage of supply routes or certain infrastructure issues.

Let’s look now at the resulting pattern of convergence and overlap between the institutions here and now. Here I have deliberately put the question of competition over operations to the last because it is already talked about too much. It is equally timely today to start with the roles of the EU and NATO in embracing Central Europe and in future the Balkans through enlargement—which is the part that has gone relatively well for both—and their comparatively confused and uncertain roles regarding neighbours beyond the membership line. While setting aside the Middle East and North Africa for lack of time, we can see that in dealing with Russia both institutions have gone through similar motions of seeking to engage Russia in institutionalized cooperation frameworks without considering its full integration. In the light of latest events, however, it seems clear that neither NATO nor the EU has faced up to such fundamental questions as these:

• How far Russia is still a threat to ourselves and how to deal with that?
• How far is it our job, and is it possible, for us to stop it being a threat to its post-Soviet neighbours?
• Are those neighbours actually any easier to integrate with ourselves than Russia is?
• If we cannot simply spread our own integrated model over the whole post-Soviet area in any near future, what sort of security structure and role should that great region have, bearing in mind that some quite tricky customers like China, Iran and Afghanistan lie beyond it?

There isn’t time for me to try to answer those questions even if I could, but for our present subject the point is that there has been a deficit in the total Russia policies of NATO and the EU put together up to now, which has been aggravated by the lack of open debate and coordination between them. This has made it easy for Russia to deliberately play a right-hand–left-hand game when that suited Moscow, and we may well see it trying to steer events a similar way now so that the EU persists in working for a new cooperation agreement even while NATO withdraws cooperation in the hard security field. I’m not saying that that may not be the right policy answer for us, too, but we would surely have a better chance of keeping some control of the process if we could consciously combine and exploit both our institutions within a single Eastern strategy.

Should we blame ourselves for a similar overall deficit in handling transatlantic relations? In fact, as we look back, both NATO and the EU have played a role in maintaining partnership across the Atlantic even at moments when political relations with Washington were most strained and the Europeans themselves most divided, as they were in the early part of the Iraq war. Both institutions kept a common purpose with Washington over the
Big Bang enlargement and both developed new joint activities, with NATO extending its role in Afghanistan and the EU working closely on a number of functional security issues and individual challenges like Iran or Kosovo. However, I think it was not wrong for people to worry that NATO might be gradually losing out as what used to be the central channel of Atlantic strategic cooperation, compared with both the EU and other arenas for tackling more global problems such as the G8 and even the UN.

It was not NATO that mediated with Russia for a Georgian ceasefire or that is trying to take stewardship over the future Kosovo. It is not NATO that must tackle together with Washington the conundrum of future energy relations with Russia or the link between energy and climate change policy worldwide—not to mention all the security implications of the current world financial crisis. Having said this, however, I would stress that NATO’s loss is not simply the EU’s gain. The EU may have some tools for tackling such non-military threats that NATO can never have, such as a huge budget and the ability to make directly binding laws. But even if the EU was capable of understanding and correctly applying its own potential in the first place, EU experts all know that its way of working with Washington on the same issues—including the stiff and restricted machinery of the US–EU summits—is still pretty immature and unfitted for purpose. Even such limited improvements as we had hoped to gain through the EU’s Lisbon Treaty in creating a single external voice and single phone number for the Americans to work with have now once more been delayed and thrown into doubt. For this and other reasons, I sense that pragmatic people in both institutions may be rather hoping that recent changes in French policies and the natural interests of a new US president might help us find a formula in 2009 where NATO and the EU can be seen by all sides as more complementary and compatible institutions, both of which we desperately need to tackle the burdens and risks facing the Western community of states just now. Transatlantic relations in the modern age are both too critical and too difficult to allow us to waste time and emotion trying to trip up one of the two main legs they stand on!

A general easing of EU–NATO relations would help us get the question of operations in better perspective, too. The facts are that, on the one hand, NATO and the EU now have a bigger overlap in the potential actions they can undertake from quite robust peace interventions through to humanitarian tasks and indirect support like that given to the African Union in Darfur. On the other hand, there are major differences in the type, scale and location of the jobs they actually undertake. I would suggest thinking about the pattern in three, somewhat overlapping phases:

- From 2002–2004, the EU’s takeover of former NATO missions in the Western Balkans actually kept the amount of direct parallels and mirror-imaging between their tasks unusually high.
- From 2003, when the EU did its first independent overseas operation in the Congo, the EU has been free to experiment with new forms of missions that NATO would never have considered because they are purely civilian, too small or in odd places like Aceh; this has led to a whole kaleidoscope of minor and unconventional missions that some people are starting to think is not particularly easy to administer or useful for the EU’s image and military growth in the longer run.
- In the present phase, NATO is also starting to explore into the softer and smaller part of the operational range, such as humanitarian tasks and the incorporation of
civilians, partly because it could not really take on another large and hard military
task in addition to Afghanistan. This NATO exploration has not yet bumped into an EU
exploration coming the other way, i.e. an EU attempt at some large and militarily robust
mission, partly because the EU is still too committed in the Balkans. But the trend of
EU planning—especially for the Battlegroups—suggests that this could happen sooner
rather than later, perhaps especially when more European coalition members have been
able to pull their troops out of Iraq.

How excited should we actually be about the resulting confusion and the risk of
further role shifts and exchanges between the EU and NATO? Personally, I would worry
less about this than about making sure that (i) the right number and kind of operations
actually get done with the involvement of European troops; that (ii) the bitter lessons
of Iraq and Afghanistan are properly learned by everybody (including those who were
not to blame); and that (iii) something is done to get European nations spending more
consistently on defence and converging in their national defence models—something that
NATO could not manage for nearly 60 years but which the EU might still have a faint
chance of. I also think that a certain division between the NATO and EU operational
pattern will always remain as long as both institutions exist, for the simple reason that
the EU will not do missions with US troops in them and the US presence is needed for
the very toughest tasks, while NATO will not be able to do civilian or aid missions that
require major financial capacity and deep functional expertise in the non-military fields
concerned. The rest could be left to a kind of Darwinian competition: but I would just
add that the risks of operational failure seem to me much higher for NATO not just
because the Afghan operation is much larger and riskier, but also because the Alliance
has not got so much else left as a raison d'être to fall back on compared with the huge
non-military majority of the EU’s daily business. A military disaster could set back the
progress of ESDP by years but it would not destroy a single one of the EU’s 90,000
pages of common laws.

That perhaps makes a good bridge back to the questions I started out with, about
where this institutional relationship will or should go in future. First, let me say that the
idea of some new universal agreement that would draw a clear and lasting dividing line
between EU and NATO activities seems to me quite unrealistic. Things are evolving too
fast for that; and some processes do actually need to be repeated or carried out in parallel
both in the purely European and in the US–European families; and I believe in any case
that the record of EU–NATO competition has been useful in prompting progress and
reform on both sides more often than not.

As for the idea that Western security policy could shift decisively towards either the yin or the
yang end of the spectrum: my best guess is that the centre of gravity in Europe’s security
picture—of course not necessarily for the world as a whole—must shift in the longer
term towards the yin end of the scale, i.e. towards non-military threats linked especially
with dwindling global resources and social vulnerabilities. But this process will be held up
and complicated, and the military dimension of our own partnerships will therefore stay
important, for a considerable medium term—first as we face the continuing forceful and
old-fashioned elements in Russian strategy, and then possibly as we face whatever China
is going to become in 10–15 years’ time. For at least as long as that, Europeans will need
to stay in touch with the tougher aspects of their own nature; and it is still a very open
question whether they can do that in any sense—strategic, financial or psychological—without having the USA on their team.

Finally, could we imagine making NATO and the EU not just complementary but combined in a single institutional framework? For a couple of years now there has been growing debate about having a single ‘league of democracies’ for the whole new global agenda, which would of course have to stretch wider than Europe; or failing that some kind of superior NATO–EU Council that would guide the strategic aspects of both institutions’ work; or at the very least a joint pool of resources for peace operations. This is nearly always suggested from the American side, because I think it reflects some basic misunderstandings about what the EU is and how fundamentally it differs from NATO in the nature of its collective property and the financial and legal foundations of its work. You could indeed buy or borrow assets from the EU under agreements negotiated as a partner, but you simply could not take them over under a new political umbrella including non-members.

NATO, on the other hand, is an intergovernmental and political body that remains much more dependent on all its members still believing in its identity and its necessity day by day, and being willing to put in the resources for every joint task ad hoc. I believe it could be in much more danger than the EU from the league-of-democracies type of idea that would distract attention from it, devalue its uniqueness and probably aggravate the lack of serious attention to European security as such that we have already been suffering for several years. Personally, I hope the next US president will not try to build such new castles in the air but will be willing to work—with us in Europe—on patching up the old Atlantic building that we surely need to shelter us from the rough weather for some time yet.
COHERENCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY THROUGH ‘BRUSSELIZATION’

Remarks at the seminar on ‘An EU Foreign and Security Policy with Global Reach?’
organized by the ‘New Faces’ programme of the Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and the Volkswagen Foundation, Brussels, Belgium, 16 September 2006

Introduction and Generalities

I have thought a lot about the title of this session and decided that I like it first and foremost because of its bravery. It is brave to suggest that ‘Brusselization’ is inherently a good thing and that it can be good for reasons of both principle and practice. Saying this would be enough to instantly alienate a number of political movements, and even current governments, throughout the EU that argue that, if anything, more rights and roles need to be taken back to the nations from Brussels. It also opens the way for various kinds of intellectual challenge and mockery, starting with the fact that the word ‘Brusselization’ just sounds so funny (at least in English) and including more substantial points like who or what is ‘Brussels’ and can we really claim that it represents anything coherent or unitary in itself, especially in the context of European external policies?

And yet … sometimes there are bits of evidence that give us a chance instead to laugh at the cynics. On 26 July this year The Financial Times cited a recent Eurobarometer poll that showed that 9% of all Polish citizens have faith in their own political parties, 12% in their own parliament, and fully 56% in the European Parliament. These things do not just happen, either, in new EU countries that could be accused of ignorance and innocence. The previous week The Financial Times had reported reliable opinion poll evidence showing the growth of positive attitudes to the EU throughout the British public.

Now, it’s true that both Poland and the UK are countries with governments that have been going through, shall we say, a bumpy time. Since the earliest days of the European integration experiment, one of the strongest forces boosting popular support for Brussels and everything its stands for has been people’s alienation from the past deeds of their own national governments, often coupled with lack of confidence in their own leaders’ present actions and future plans. This pattern of seeking ‘legitimacy through denationalization’, to give it a shorthand name, can be tracked time and again from the case of post-World War II Germany and Italy, through the various Mediterranean countries’
emergence from periods of right-wing dictatorship, through to the ‘new Europeans’ emerging from Communism in the last 15 years and the hopes of the Western Balkans today. Of course, the politicians themselves are often all too aware of this dynamic and see it as a zero-sum contest for legitimacy between Brussels and themselves, with all the resulting bad behaviour that we know so well. But it doesn’t have to be that way: it is also possible to see common action through Brussels as a legitimizing framework that also allows nations and their leaders to remain themselves, and perhaps to gain even greater freedom and range of action than before, purified as it were from dubious elements in their own background and inspired to consider new roles that don’t have to build directly on their specific national base. EU common approaches can also be seen as a way to balance and share national comparative advantages, the stronger nations gaining more in terms of legitimacy and the smaller ones more in terms of access to power. Under such visions, Brussels is becoming something like the superego that coexists with a lot of national egos, and whose whole raison d’être is to bridle their baser instincts while harnessing their energies for good. (I leave you to work out what would be the European equivalent of the Id.)

This image could, again, be easily mocked but it may help us to home in on another important definitional point. Just as no individual could live with a superego alone, what is superior in terms of legitimacy is by no means always superior in effectiveness. This debate is familiar ad nauseam from current debates on security policy. Can nations better protect their people through respecting international legal and institutional constraints or by defying them when necessary? What are the respective merits of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ responses to security challenges, Venus vs. Mars and all that …? More precisely, since no Bush supporter or Israeli army officer is going to accept that their actions are ‘illegitimate’, the contest is between different notions of what constitutes legitimacy: one side arguing that it springs directly from effectiveness in the defence of legitimate interests and the promotion of what is intrinsically right; the other side associating legitimacy more closely with legality, and with formal, published principles and procedures that should hold good above the level of partial interests and subjective conceptions of right.

Broadly speaking, I hope we can agree that the ‘European idea’ in general and the Brussels notion of legitimacy in particular are linked with the latter conception. It does not give any one country or person the power to decide between right and wrong, but leaves such judgements when necessary to its most supranational institutions (like the European Court of Justice). Specific European common policies in security-related and diplomacy-related fields are typically designed, not just to recognize the relevant international legal frameworks, but to reinforce or enforce them; and I doubt if we could find any CFSP or ESDP document that positively prescribes action against the law. Nor does any European policy that I know of make practical effectiveness its sole or even main measure of ‘rightness’; although the European idea can certainly be linked with ‘coherence’ (also in our title) in the sense that it is supposed to harmonize as well as combine different national approaches, and to be consistent and even-handed in dealing with different parties and cases at all times.

From here we could go on in several directions: we could pursue the abstract argument about whether this style of legitimacy is positively opposed to effectiveness or at least makes it harder to achieve under certain conditions; or we could apply the analysis to some of the most concrete test cases that come to mind in the field of collective
European external policies, namely, ESDP missions and the use of other EU instruments for crisis handling. It is indeed tempting to explore the argument that collective European interventions can be seen as relatively legitimate (by publics as well as politicians) and relatively non-threatening by outsiders—thus making it possible for the Europeans to undertake even very sensitive missions, like in the Middle East—precisely because the EU is not too effective in the sense of using coercive power, and indeed is not commonly seen as having a ‘power’ agenda of its own in such cases. However, there is an obvious counter-argument that Europe can only afford to behave in this ‘legitimacy-first’ manner, without putting its own territories at risk, because other world powers—including sometimes Europe’s own individual nations—are willing to do the dirty work by acting on different, tougher principles when necessary. And if that is true, perhaps the scope for common policies must be permanently limited because the larger states in particular will always want to conserve some room for what I have called ego-led behaviour.

However, I am not going to pursue the example of ESDP missions today, partly because others here are likely to know much more about it, and partly because the degree of true ‘Brusselization’ in ESDP is so limited and likely to remain so at least for some time. Instead, I would like to explore some examples that fall more around the fringes of classic defence and security policy, but which involve non-governmental constituencies within Europe much more directly; because I think it is in the three-way relationship between Brussels, governments and the governed that the legitimacy question becomes really interesting. I have one example where I believe effectiveness and legitimacy can be fully combined through Brussels, and one other in which there seem to be more serious contradictions.

Strategic Export Controls

Since 1998 the EU has had a common Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that has governed the export of conventional armaments by any member of the Union. It is at present a politically binding document but there is an ongoing discussion about making it legally binding, and in the meantime quite a lot is done to coordinate and monitor national implementation. Originally, the measure could be seen as linking up with the EU’s diplomatic and strategic interests, including European support for world order and conflict reduction, but since 9/11 it can also be classed as part of the EU’s anti-terrorism strategy to the extent that it should prevent exports to states that support or accommodate terrorism and block transfers that might be diverted to non-state recipients, including terrorists. Finally, I would argue that the common code complements the goals of ESDP and particularly of the new European Defence Agency, in that it should create more of a level playing field for European enterprises, help solve the longstanding conundrum over what export rules to apply to products of European multilateral ventures, and potentially even start steering Europe’s defence output and technology cooperation towards countries that share the specific values behind ESDP and away from ones that do not.

In all these different contexts, the argument that common rules for export control are more coherent and effective seems to me quite easy to make. The effectiveness of one nation banning exports to country X is zero if any other Union member decides to go on exporting to it; and in the case of dual-use goods and civil techniques having military impact, these items can circulate freely in the single market looking as it were for the
easiest way out. Having universally applicable European rules helps with these problems and should also help companies to withstand pressures and temptations for them to make deals that violate the principles. Information exchange among Union members and, in particular, the publication of their annual reports on implementation allow inconsistencies and problem areas to be spotted both by the official authorities and by parliaments and the wider public, who are usually in support of stricter rules. Again, the fact that the same guidelines are applied to all customer countries—other than those where the EU imposes a total ad hoc embargo—helps to deal with the complexities of the present international market where you might think that one customer is respectable enough but then find it breaking its end-user agreement to sell the weapons on elsewhere, or using its new military strength to collaborate with some more dubious power. By the way, that last argument adds to my own belief that the EU should abandon its longstanding defence sales embargo on China and have China covered by the universal code instead, notably because the latter is so much more specific and enforceable and can be made even more so in future.

But can the common code also be called legitimate? For Europeans themselves I would again answer ‘Yes’, because the rules represent a reasonable balance of national interests, are consistent with various broader European values and principles, and—in terms of ‘process’—are transparent and relatively easy for people to monitor, although there is certainly room for further progress on that front. A particular company and its employees might feel that it is not legitimate for a set of rules laid down in Brussels to prevent them from gaining a large profit by some particular export. But other citizens of the country concerned are likely to take a wider view, and other firms should be grateful precisely that the code makes life harder for their most unprincipled competitors. In the outside world, there are probably quite a lot of nations that resent the way that the code constrains their imports from Europe, and some of them might question its legitimacy by arguing that it reflects selfish and unreasonable European interests as much as any true security motives—such as a reluctance to share certain high technologies or export certain key components in case this creates new competitors for Europe’s own industries. However, the USA would like us further to strengthen the code and it is welcomed by a number of other Western-oriented states and rules-based international organizations: these being the constituencies that the EU presumably wants first and foremost to approve of its actions.

Overall, then, I would argue that this is a case where a collective European approach has combined both effectiveness and legitimacy. But how far is it truly ‘Brusselized’? I have already mentioned the Code of Conduct’s lack of legal status which, inter alia, poses obvious limits to the role of the Commission and also bars the ECJ from considering cases regarding its implementation. Perhaps equally serious in the bigger picture is the lack of ‘joining-up’ between the code and other EU instruments and policies that it ought to complement. For historical and technical reasons the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in the Council framework, while the responsibility for regulating exports of dual-use goods (i.e. those with both military and civilian applications, a very rapidly expanding class) lies in the Commission with the Directorate-General (DG) for trade. All this makes it harder to implement and develop the restrictions in a way that takes full account of CFSP considerations and of developments in EU anti-terrorism and non-proliferation policies, but also arguably weakens the way that the code is presented and
promoted in the EU’s strategic relationships with outside partners. EU offices abroad, for instance, are in SIPRI’s experience unsighted on the issue so that its importance does not always get across to countries negotiating with the Commission for EU accession or various kinds of partnership. There are other risks of non-coherence because the Commission’s policies on encouraging and organizing European armaments production are made in the DG for industry, and the new European Defence Agency (EDA) does not have a mandate to take part in or even take account of the development of export control policies.

Such confusion is dangerous for legitimacy because it leads to the possibility of the EU sending out double or even triple messages, and it adds to the problems of monitoring and enforcing the code in a truly strict and even-handed way; but it also poses very obvious efficiency problems. Here I am tempted to formulate a general point that what could be called ‘half-way Brusselization’ is often less than half-way effective.

Anti-terrorist Measures

However, let me turn to another fast-developing field of external policy where the issues seem to me much trickier. Since 9/11 the EU has taken a growing collective role in handling the issues of terrorism and of protection against it, both in relation to its own citizens’ needs and for the purpose of cooperation with the USA and other external partners. The related actions cover a very wide span, from negotiating with the USA on aviation safety standards, passports and visas, and measures to harmonize EU member states’ legal and executive handling of terrorism issues and to coordinate intelligence on threats, through to the political commitment made in March 2004 for member states to intervene to help each other against the effects of terrorist attack (which has potential implications for defence planning), and numerous adjustments and new initiatives in the CFSP field. Here again it is not hard to make the case for the effectiveness and coherence through a common approach, the two most obvious arguments being that terrorists could otherwise move freely and exploit possible weak points within the EU space, and that a single contact point in Brussels is likely to allow much more effective negotiation with partners like the USA—not least in cases where Europe wants to withstand pressure for tougher action. Rather as with export controls, the efficiency argument also seems to push towards further centralization of information and resources, including particularly intelligence and the specialized capacities needed to deal e.g. with WMD attacks: although it might be a very long time indeed before the Commission could gain such authority for collective responses as it already enjoys, for instance, in the context of responses to animal disease.

But does the Brusselization of these issues, even at this early stage when authorities and resources are not fully collectivized, help in any way with legitimacy? The problems are pretty obvious, and they start with the concern that is felt in many EU countries over excessively strict anti-terrorism measures encroaching upon human rights and civil liberties. If people doubt whether their own government has the right to discipline them in certain ways in the name of security, they will be even more doubtful whether Brussels has. If they fear that certain minorities in their population may be discriminated against or, conversely, are not being watched closely enough, they will question whether Brussels has the necessary understanding of specific national circumstances to get the solutions
right. People will be worried—probably correctly—that decision making in Brussels, even or perhaps particularly when it is done in an intergovernmental mode, reduces public transparency and limits democratic control by parliaments.

Conversely, people in the countries facing the greatest threat will doubt whether Brussels can ever react fast enough and strongly enough to protect them against actual atrocities, or even to provide substantial aid for clearing up the consequences: all of which increases the pressure on national governments to make their own judgements, at the risk of further intra-EU splits. This points to the real underlying problem, namely, that the 25 states of the Union vary very widely in their hands-on experience of terrorism and hence in their natural inclination to regard it as a real threat and a really high priority. In countries with an apparently lower threat like the Nordic ones where I currently live, people can easily start blaming Brussels for legal changes that affect their liberties and practical changes to their lifestyle, such as the greater difficulty of travel. They can easily suspect that the EU is being exploited by a few powerful, terrorism-obsessed nations to impose a common front on other states whose larger security interests may in fact not be served by being herded into the anti-terrorist camp.

As a British citizen I cannot personally share those last views, but the need to acknowledge their existence leads me to some final general thoughts about Brusselization in the context of what may loosely be called the new strategic agenda. When the EU’s security-related and diplomatic policies involve action abroad, such as peace missions or the more traditional work of CFSP, ordinary citizens are relatively unlikely to find their own lifestyles and interests affected—although business entities may be more closely involved—and this in practice eases the possible legitimacy deficit. The syndrome can more easily operate whereby a solution actually appears more legitimate when decided in Brussels than when undertaken by a specific nation.

But in the newer parts of the security agenda, where the threat both comes from and strikes within the non-governmental domain, with far more intimate social and economic effects, establishing the necessary trust between people and government is intrinsically far more difficult and is often made harder instead of easier by having Brussels involved. A government which its people see as being either too soft or too hard on terrorism is most unlikely to improve things at all by claiming that it is only following Brussels’ orders. Yet these categories of risk are precisely the ones where the causes and effects are most plainly transnational and where the efficiency discourse, as time goes on, is likely to point more and more firmly towards policy making at the highest multinational level possible. I have no time to talk about the possible ways out of this conundrum but would offer it as an intriguing topic for the new generation of European researchers, as so effectively represented in this Brusselized setting today, to work on in future!
Across Northern Europe in general, it has not been popular, at least until very recently, to talk of the EU in terms of an actual or potential 'empire'. Nordic states have suffered from empires more recently, and often for longer historical periods, than they have enjoyed leading them. Since joining the EU, Finland and more especially Sweden have tried to avoid the EU becoming too 'militarized' or even adopting a too hard-edged strategic philosophy: not just for the obvious reason that turning the EU into a defence union would conflict with national policies of non-alliance, but also for more general reasons of philosophy and values that are themselves linked with history. Denmark, as we know, has an opt-out from all EU defence-related activity. All the Nordics, even the non-EU members, are also instinctively opposed to the idea of the Union being led by an inner group of larger states: and it is naturally assumed that the more the EU behaves like a ‘power’ on the world stage, the more its image and actions must be dominated in practice by the nations that have both some intrinsic globally significant power in themselves, and a tradition of imperial rule.

All these feelings, perceptions and attitudes are however in a sense beside the point. Perhaps under the Westphalian system empires existed only when they were consciously created by human will; but in today’s conditions we need much more open and up-to-date definitions of what an empire is—or perhaps most correctly, what the equivalent of an empire is—and under what conditions one may rise and develop. It is perfectly possible for an entity that talks about itself as an empire not to be one in fact, and vice versa. For example, to my mind at least, an empire needs to be more than a single nation-state and should have some lasting means of direct or indirect, coercive or voluntary control over a further range of territories linked by at least some elements of common governance. That being so, it strikes me as rather peculiar that US writers have revived a debate recently about what kind of empire the USA should be, just at the time when the Bush Administration has been working to minimize the USA’s permanent defence and political commitments everywhere abroad. At the same time, the USA’s alternative soft-power tools for controlling other territories, for instance by mutual loyalty and by shared elements of identity and values, have been measurably weakened by a few specific US actions designed essentially for the temporary as well as forceful conquest of ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. I guess it is relatively easy for most of us to agree that this is not the way to go about building a sustainable empire, but even more basically, I don’t think it is how an existing empire behaves. (Superpower yes, Empire no.)
However, my focus today is meant to be on Europe and I will readily admit that I am using the language of empire as a device to explore a set of issues that are important in themselves but perhaps can best be conceptually linked on this basis. What I’d like to talk through is:

- whether the EU is being drawn, even unconsciously, into the role of an empire (whatever that may mean in the 21st century context), and how far it already acts as one;
- what kind of an actual or potential empire it is, and notably whether it should be and is an ‘evil empire’ or a force for good in the world; and
- perhaps a few practical issues that arise for Europe in general or for Norden and Finland in particular.

**Unconscious Empire, Reluctant Empire?**

The EU had an inward-looking security role from its first beginnings in the 1950s: expressed through the collective management of strategic industries (as NATO sought to manage armies), through the opening of internal borders to ease ethnic/territorial tensions, and the removal of the whole rationale for war through rapidly growing interdependence. The new European peace also had an immediate impact on global security conditions: there were no more fights between European colonial powers, and decolonization conflicts became basically a national business; while in the non-military dimension, the Common Commercial Policy and Single Market brought a new kind of collective European entity into the global game. Over the decades up to 1989/90, there was a gradual movement towards more conscious ‘security’ roles for the EU, e.g. in international arms control, mediation, support for other ‘regionalization’ processes, and the tying of collective aid policies to good governance and security norms among others. However, the most obvious strategic features of an Empire were conspicuously absent:

- There was no European defence union (after the failure of the 1953–54 EDC, European Defence Community, initiative).
- (As the real reason for this) Europe had no hope of strategic self-sufficiency vis-à-vis Russia, and its ‘self-defence’ only became possible through dependence on the USA.
- There was no room for Europe’s concrete strategic expansion due to the Iron Curtain and the Brezhnev Doctrine—although there was certainly some ‘soft power’ leakage towards the East, which ultimately helped to undermine and convert the Communist system in East Germany and Eastern Europe.
- It is worth recalling that even NATO was an Atlantic ‘empire’ only: it didn’t have a collective role on the world stage and most Europeans ‘opted out’ of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

It may be a cliché to say that these conditions were revolutionized by the events of 1989/90, but it is interesting to re-analyse the results of the cold war’s end in terms of how far the new environment both permitted and drove the EU to bring any potential ‘imperial’ characteristics into the open. First and most obviously came the new scope and demand for enlargement, a process in which new members were far more thoroughly transformed and made into ‘European possessions’ by the EU’s membership conditions...
than they could be by NATO. NATO actually extended the *de facto* differences of status and standard among its members by its measures of self-restraint, which prevented any Allied presence or nuclear stationing on the new members’ territory in peacetime, while the EU tolerated fewer special solutions (e.g. on Schengen membership) among the new members than the old.

At the same time, the gradual turning away of US strategic attention from Europe to focus on out-of-area challenges had a double ‘forcing’ effect on the EU. It created both a potential gap to fill in the continent’s own security, and a demand for Europeans to play new roles in conflict settings in the Balkans and elsewhere: first as an adjunct to the USA, and then also (with the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy) as an independent alternative. The broadening and shift of Western security agendas first towards multifunctional crisis management—for which the EU had all along had far more non-military competence than NATO—and then to the 9/11 agenda, and the ‘human security’ agenda, played further into EU hands. Most recently, we have seen the ‘securitization’ of some further economic or functional issues such as the energy economy and climate change, for which the EU is the only credible European policy coordinator and interlocutor with other regions. In broad terms, these agenda shifts, and general awareness of the implications of globalization, have led to new or more variable concepts of internal security cooperation generally; the ESDP, creation of the EDA, adoption of the European Security Strategy and sub-strategies; the debate now starting about an energy strategy that combines strategic with economic and environmental goals; the changes in top-level strategic leadership in Brussels that were to have been brought by a new Constitution and are still being worked for by other means, and so on and so forth. It is also interesting, however, to consider whether the EU in the process has *de facto* overcome any of its earlier limitations and started to exhibit more truly ‘imperial’ impacts and behaviour. In these terms, compared with the 1950s:

- The EU is now a more explicit and self-steering, even if not fully self-sufficient, *security community*: note especially the March 2004 solidarity commitment against terrorist attacks and natural disasters. It is now only a small step away from a full ‘defence union’, even if that step looks huge and still unfeasible in political terms—not least because of the dilemma of handling the ‘imperial’ attribute of French/British nuclear weapons.
- Enlargement has brought a huge territorial expansion, but even more significant is the evidence of an inherently *expansionist* dynamic driven both by Europe’s concern to buffer its existing territory and control security conditions beyond its frontiers, and by its ‘magnetism’ effect on parts of its hinterland now plainly extending as far as the Caucasus. One of the most typical diagnostic signs of an empire throughout history is the way it eats up its borderlands! However, the unconscious/reluctant nature of the EU ‘empire’ has been especially clear here, as expressed not only in ‘enlargement fatigue’—which partly reflects an alternative ‘fortress’ concept of security—but also in a differential ‘integration urge’ on the EU’s different fronts. Even the magnetism effect has been notably weak in the Levant and on the Southern front, where not only are the prospective entrants more remote in political and security culture, but there are no prospective ‘buffering’ benefits for the Europe side against a greater power;
- The EU has always intrinsically been ‘global’ as an economic power (although NB its historic effect has been to increase the proportion of total trade that Europeans
conduct with themselves). Now it is more explicitly global, in its strategic philosophy (the ESS says that ‘the first line of defence will often be abroad’); in its ideas of shared global ‘responsibility’ and dependence on ordered global governance and conflict reduction; in the practical steps taken with such motives such as ESDP out-of-area missions, and efforts to solve the Iran nuclear challenge; and in the importance of EU inputs on global ‘new threats’ such as terrorism, proliferation, pandemics or climate control.

For all this, what stands out—apart from the still very limited scale of Europeans’ (collective) strategic resources and investment—is European reluctance and weakness of engagement at precisely that level of traditional ‘hard’ power play which has defined the action and interaction of empires in the past. The EU has thus far been unwilling even to face up seriously to the closest ‘problem neighbour’ of its own imperial homeland, namely, Russia. It has persistently avoided its natural share of responsibility for solving regional security confrontations of the Middle East and South and East Asia, and has engaged in a rather lukewarm way even with other like-minded regional organizations. This looks, at best, like imperial behaviour ‘à la carte’; and there is of course the other ‘à la carte’ phenomenon whereby some Europeans ally with the US superpower for its own hard power play in Iraq and Afghanistan (just like Korea and Vietnam in the past), and others don’t.

An alternative reading could call upon the theory that divides past empires into land-based ones like Russia and China (growing contiguously, with a tendency to be conservative/defensive), and maritime ones like British and Dutch, which preferentially acquire remote possessions and can be more flexible and adventurous i.a. because of a lesser risk of direct backlash against their homelands. The EU fits rather well with the land-based pattern, given the nature of its expansive power, which works through direct osmosis and the voluntary self-transformation of neighbours. The EU can neither work a similar trick with remote players nor acquire them by force, hence is more likely to deal with them on a pragmatic interest-based and status quo basis while relying on those regions’ own dynamics (plus perhaps, now, globalization impacts) to ensure eventual change. What of the observation that land-based empires were typically illiberal in ideology and governance? The EU could be said to diverge here because of its voluntary nature as well as democratic culture, but NB the notorious ‘democracy deficit’ in the EU’s own handling of its strategic affairs—and its frequent reluctance, in contrast to the USA, to be seen promoting democracy by the most direct means abroad.

Evil Empire or Force for Good?

We may briefly identify paradoxes in the EU’s ‘moral’ nature at two levels.

• First, in its actual impact on the world: ESDP military actions so far have been more ‘peaceful’ and altruistic, while the Union’s net non-military impact is more ‘offensive’ or at least mixed. Main examples of the latter are the EU’s robustly self-interested approach to trade (including the conditional legitimation of the arms trade) and growing strength of its currency; its ever-tougher immigration policies; and more subtle ‘offences’ (on top of old-style imperialism/neo-colonialism) relating to cultural dominance, the handling
of multi-ethnic societies, certain impacts on neighbours, etc. Even the EU’s dedication to a rule-based international order may not cut much ice with those who point out that the West wrote the original rules of this order and remains free to re-write them for its own convenience! Thus while the EU is still relatively short of strategic ‘enemies’ (and NB that that word does not even appear in the European Security Strategy), there can be much more hostility and unease about the European role in world than we Europeans like to think about, perhaps above all in the context of further EU widening and strengthening—you only have to look as far as Moscow! The picture is further complicated by the fact that some actors both within and outside Europe would favour the EU’s further strategic rise if it had the effect of balancing and/or providing a better alternative to US power—thus sealing a global trend towards multipolarity—while other schools of thought, also within the EU, reject precisely that scenario.

• Second, there is a more basic underlying uncertainty about whether the EU’s aim is to ‘be good’ or to ‘do good’. The two can be positively linked, in the sense that a good image and intentions secure more scope and acceptance for European actions in the world; but they can also drive in different directions, in several practical ways. If the aim is to defend our own ‘goodness’, which implies avoiding any risk to Europe’s own basic peace order as well as welfare, it becomes more natural to block further expansion; to find a modus vivendi with, rather than the transformation of or true reconciliation with, Russia (and China); to continue with a ‘limited liability’/low-risk approach to hard power issues elsewhere in world; and even to accept the use of ‘bad’ or ‘rough’ methods (conflicting with internal European values and practices) to defend our own intrinsically ‘good’ interests in a wider arena (a thesis put forward by Robert Cooper).\(^\text{33}\) Such an approach also makes it easier to live with the imperfect integration and coherence of European nations’ strategic policies and actions—it can make sense for them to do bad things nationally so as to spare or protect the good European collectivity: thus Europe holds back from more collective power in order to avoid the moral as well as practical risks involved in exercising it. (It is arguable that even the EU’s apparently altruistic choices in ESDP follow this pattern—bigger investments have been made for the EU’s own interests in the Balkans, ‘lighter’ ones in the rest of world, while really tough cases like Somalia or Darfur have been avoided—making clear that the Union is happier to carry the moral risk of inaction than of action. More generally, we may note the persistent EU refusal to define clearly why it does ESDP operations, for what strategic goals, within what limits: while, even if just by historical accident, the EU’s current activity profile is rather strikingly ‘militarized’ compared with its lower and confused profile on disarmament or even mediation.)

**Issues Arising from this Analysis**

If the goal is defined as utilizing and developing the EU’s global role more effectively, it is a commonplace to point out the importance of overcoming national divides (including the need to avoid further divide-and-rule Iraq-type episodes with the USA), and of coordinating/harnessing the EU’s own various strategic instruments more tightly. While the latter problem has thus far been addressed mainly within Pillar Two (hence the

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constitution proposals e.g. for merging the different external affairs staffs and funds), it is actually much more important and tougher to consider questions of coherence and hierarchy between all three pillars. Is it proper to harness the EU’s security instruments to its economic/functional goals, or vice versa, or to make different choices about which aspect of policy should predominate on different issues/situations?—and how to achieve any such kind of consistency under the present EU system of governance? The same issue comes up rather clearly at micro-level in deciding how to handle the Union’s bilateral dialogues with US, Russia, and China, or how the EU should play its hand in the G8. This is far from being just an institutional issue, linked with the distribution of powers between the European Commission, Council, and member states. Rather, it is a very substantial and essentially post-modern question about what multifunctionality means for a modern multi-state entity, and—as such—potentially an equal headache for other 21st century regional ventures such as ASEAN, the African Union and others.

Even deeper and more intriguing issues arise, however, over what the very concepts of security, interest, and responsibility mean for such a mixed-up quasi-imperial entity as the EU in the 21st century:

- We know that the EU’s, and Europeans’, security must be conceived in both external and internal, both military and functional dimensions: but we don’t seem to have a clear understanding of which issues are to be ‘securitized’ and which not, let alone what the hierarchy is between them. Just look at the current backlash in France and elsewhere in defence of national economic assets and the call for security/protection against globalization generally; the ideological divides over whether the private economy is our friend or a threat to social and cultural security; the confusion over whether enlargement is a security policy and should be decided by a security rationale, etc etc;
- All the analysis above suggests a deep confusion over whether the EU’s external policies are designed to protect simply Europe’s direct interests, or Europe’s indirect interest in an orderly and peaceful world, or some higher and more altruistic values. It is not then surprising that there is major secondary confusion and disagreement about which other actors we European should protect these things against, or work in partnership with;
- Meanwhile, we hear all too little discourse in terms of Europe’s responsibility, even starting with the responsibility to fill emerging gaps in security for its own territory or for European assets and travellers abroad. In fact, we should also be debating our historical responsibility e.g. for wars and colonialism and dispersion of European cultures, our co-responsibility for the current globalized system, our share of ‘responsibility to protect’ in specific overseas crises or against overseas abuses, and many more.

To come full circle from my opening remarks: it is clear that these are also problems, deficits and challenges that confront the Nordic states (and not just the EU members among them), but are there any special Nordic angles to the ‘imperial’ question? First, it is hard to speak in such terms because the Nordics don’t in practice act as a group in the EU or make a sustained effort to push the EU’s external evolution in any special direction, even if they can make very significant inputs on specific issues such as ESDP structures and missions, arms control, or aid and environmental policies. The lack of a clear Nordic voice is rather striking even on the Russian question!
In general, however, we may say that:

- Nordic values, and interests, both favour an outward-looking Union, including openness to possible further enlargement.
- Nordics are at ease with the idea of a pragmatic and interest-driven European handling of all other large strategic actors—the USA as well as Russia or China.
- but
- Norden’s history and world view steer it towards the softer, purer and more altruistic versions of a European role in the world, and we are certainly not likely to find Norden urging the EU to play the game in a harder way (including the possibility of becoming a hard defence community).

If all these three points are correct, then the Nordic influence is actually part of what keeps the EU stuck in a mixed and contradictory mode as a reluctant empire, a confused power player, and an only small and occasional Good Samaritan. A debate is needed in Norden, as well as elsewhere, on whether that is actually the right way to pursue the European Security Strategy’s goal of ‘a secure Europe in a better world’.
I. Introduction

The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was adopted by a European Union (EU) Framework Decision in June 2002 and is part of a package of measures through which the EU has sought to respond to the global threats of terrorism and cross-border crime in the period following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Replacing the previous system of extradition between EU member states, with effect from 1 January 2004, the EAW aims to simplify and speed up the arrest and surrender, within the territory of the EU, of those convicted or suspected of involvement in serious crime and terrorism.

The new system has not been devoid of difficulties in its first few years of operation. The greatest challenge has concerned the practical application of the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions, which underpins the entire system. The principle requires member states’ judicial authorities to recognize and enforce judicial decisions reached in other EU member states on the basis that, although national legal systems may differ, their effects should be recognized as equivalent throughout the ‘single European judicial space’. When applied to the EAW, the mutual recognition principle requires a warrant—issued by a judicial authority for the arrest and surrender of a suspect (or convicted criminal who has yet to serve his or her sentence) who is located on the territory of another member state—to be recognized and enforced by the judicial authorities of that state.

The recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions reached in another member state require a high degree of trust in the legal system of that state. This is especially so

34 This text was originally published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in September 2007 as a Euro-Atlantic Security Programme Project Paper; the full text is available at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/eurosec.html#anchor421180>.


in the context of decisions reached by criminal justice authorities, since criminal law and procedure represent the very essence of state sovereignty. How a state chooses to define what constitutes criminal behaviour and how it deals with suspected offenders—including the safeguards that it extends to suspects for the protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms—are part of the very ‘fabric’ of how a state defines itself.

At the time the Framework Decision on the EAW was adopted, there appears to have been an assumption that the requisite degree of mutual trust between judicial authorities in the EU, vital for the successful operation of the system, already existed. Given the sensitive nature of criminal justice as one of the core areas of state sovereignty, member states eschewed (both at that time and previously) introducing any form of harmonization of criminal procedural rules across the EU, apparently confident that standards of criminal justice would be sufficiently comparable in all member states. However, it has become clear that national judicial authorities—who often have little detailed knowledge of the criminal justice systems of other member states—are concerned about differing standards of justice, especially when it comes to surrendering their own citizens to other member states. Experience indicates that the mistrust engendered by these differing standards, whether real or perceived, has the potential to seriously hamper the effectiveness of the EAW scheme. In order for the EAW to fulfil its full potential in terms of enhancing EU internal security, all member states need to feel a mutual trust in their respective procedural standards. This, in turn, requires some minimal form of harmonization of criminal procedure, incorporating EU-wide minimum procedural safeguards for the defendant, to allow national judicial authorities to feel confident that—when they surrender a suspect to another member state—they can expect certain minimum standards to apply during that person’s questioning and detention, as well as at any subsequent trial. To put the issue in more normative terms, the EAW system will not be fully effective until there is a common realization throughout the EU that ‘there can be no security without human rights’.  

II. The Wider Context

The Challenge of Cross-border Crime

The increase in cross-border crime has been an unwelcome consequence of the implementation of the EU’s single market project, which entailed the removal of national trade and travel barriers between member states. Criminal networks carrying out a variety of activities—including the trafficking of drugs, arms and people, and the running of counterfeiting and money-laundering rackets—have been able to operate across internal borders, unhindered by frontier checks.


37 This was part of the drive to implement the ‘four basic freedoms’ set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital). The practical realization of the free movement of persons began with the establishment of the Schengen area (by the 1985 Schengen Agreement that was initially signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), which abolished internal border controls between participating states. At the same time, a number of ‘compensatory’ measures were agreed with the aim of enhancing control of the Schengen area’s common external borders.

Criminal networks have proliferated with the purpose of either assisting willing illegal migrants to gain entry into the EU in return for financial gain (people smuggling), or of trafficking in human beings and driving unsuspecting victims into forced labour or prostitution as soon as they enter the EU. The members of such networks have been able to take advantage of open borders to travel freely to commit crimes (such as theft, fraud or burglaries—the latter often involving the stealing of passports for forging), to increase their illegitimate profits and to escape punishment. Such networks, which often have links with organized crime and drugs syndicates, perpetuate a form of modern slavery that fuels a continuous cycle of crime and brings untold misery to its victims. The threat to internal security posed by such activities is increasing, as organized gangs take advantage of the expansion of the EU and the new markets for people, drugs and stolen property.

Terrorists have also been able to take advantage of Europe’s porous borders, open societies and populations, and highly concentrated economic assets in order to travel to recruit members; obtain funds; and carry out atrocities, as dramatically illustrated by the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 and the London bombings of 7 July 2005.

Europe today is part of ‘a world made up of flows and networks rather than boundaries and fixed points’, in which improvements in transport and communications have allowed criminal and terrorist networks to become increasingly mobile. With the permeability of national boundaries, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies need to work ever more closely together with their counterparts in other states to catch and bring to justice suspects of crime and terrorism who may have moved beyond the national frontier.

The challenges posed by cross-border crime and terrorism have increasingly preoccupied politicians, the press and the public. Public opinion surveys indicate that EU citizens expect effective action at the European level for the purpose of tackling...
terrorism and globalized crime. According to the May 2006 issue of the EU’s official Eurobarometer opinion poll, the vast majority of those surveyed believe that the EU is necessarily more efficient at fighting the ‘new threats’ than individual member states alone. This poll also found that citizens regard the ‘intensification of the fight against terrorism/organized crime’ and ‘further facilitating extradition procedures’ as priorities for the European Union.

Extradition as a Means of Fighting Cross-border Crime

Extradition is the oldest and most highly developed system of inter-state cooperation in criminal matters. It operates globally and is governed by a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements between states. Extradition plays an important role in enhancing a state’s internal security, since it ensures that suspects who are wanted for an offence carried out in a state but who are no longer located there are transferred back to the scene of their crime. It also applies to criminals who have already been sentenced but who have absconded to another state. Extradition thus enables victims to see justice and criminal networks to be dismantled.

Prior to the coming into force of the EAW, a multilateral system of extradition existed in Europe, based essentially on the 1957 European Convention on Extradition (a Council of Europe instrument) and its attached protocols. As European integration gathered pace and crime became increasingly internationalized, however, the traditional system of extradition as a means of fighting cross-border crime began to look increasingly ineffective on three main grounds.

First, there was the issue of the time taken by national authorities to decide on extradition requests, which could seriously undermine the effectiveness of the system. In the typically slow-turning wheels of the extradition machinery, national courts examined the extradition request and advised the government of the requested state on the admissibility of the extradition in legal terms. The executive then had the final say on whether to grant extradition: a decision that tended to be dominated by political considerations, especially in high profile cases. This ‘political phase’ of extradition often significantly delayed and—as in the case of the former president of Chile, General

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49 Polt (note14, above), p. 3.
51 The ‘requested state’ is the state being asked to extradite, while the ‘requesting state’ is the one requesting the extradition. Plachta, M., ‘European Arrest Warrant: revolution in extradition?’, vol.11, no.2 (May 2003), *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, p.184.
Augusto Pinochet, whom Spain tried to extradite from the United Kingdom for crimes against humanity—could thwart entirely the handover of suspects.52

Second, the traditional state prerogatives that are a feature of international extradition law also undermined the effectiveness of the extradition system, adding to the delay and complexity of decision-making procedures. The most important of these prerogatives are the ‘dual criminality’ rule and the rule against the surrender of a state’s own nationals. Under the dual criminality rule, the state on whose territory the suspect is located (the requested state) examines whether the offence for which extradition is sought—invariably an offence under the law of the state requesting the handover of the suspect, the requesting state—also constitutes a criminal act under the requested state’s own domestic law.53 This requires, in cases where the crime does not carry the same name in both states, an examination of whether there is ‘substantial similarity’ between the offences as defined in both cases.54 This often requires detailed consideration by the requested state’s courts of the constituent elements of the offence under the domestic law of the requesting state, and comparison with its own domestic law, a frequently cumbersome and time-consuming undertaking. If negative, the findings can frustrate extradition entirely.55 Likewise, the principle of non-surrender of nationals, which is part of the long-standing legal traditions of civil law states and is enshrined in the constitutions of countries like Austria, Germany and Poland, may prove an impediment to the extradition of suspects.

Such prerogatives, which highlight the perceived ‘alienness’ of other states’ legal orders, have come to seem increasingly outdated in a Europe that is becoming ever more closely integrated. No longer does it seem appropriate, as the dual criminality rule requires, to conduct in every case ‘a new examination of whether the requested person [should] be considered a fugitive from justice in the first place’.56 Similarly, the bar on the extradition of nationals—the underlying rationale of which was concern about whether the requesting state’s criminal justice system could be trusted to be fair, especially in its treatment of foreigners57—seems outmoded in a European Union whose members are

53 The rationale is that it is unrealistic to expect a state to be willing to hand over a person to be tried for an act that does not constitute a criminal offence under its own law. Polt (note 14, above), p. 4.
56 Wagner (note 12 above), p. 703.
57 Deen-Racsmány, Z. and Blekxtoon, R., ‘The decline of the nationality exception in European extradition? The impact of the regulation of (non-)surrender of nationals and dual criminality under
considered to have shared values and common legal traditions (and whose populations share a common EU citizenship).

Third, the convoluted web of instruments that governed extradition between member states of the EU prior to the EAW also reduced the effectiveness of the system. The 1957 European Convention on Extradition had through the years been supplemented by a number of bilateral facilitating agreements, which in turn were accompanied by various ad hoc declarations and reservations. This made for an extremely complicated web, necessitating in every extradition case an examination of which rules were applicable between the state parties at hand. Two conventions were concluded in the 1990s that attempted to modernize and simplify the system: the 1995 Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedures between Member States of the European Union; and the 1996 Convention relating to Extradition between Member States of the European Union. However, neither of these conventions entered into force due to the low number of ratifications by member states.

As a result of all these factors, the entire process of extradition could until recently take several months and sometimes even years. The European Commission estimated in a 2006 report that, where the requested person contested the request, the average time taken to reach a decision in cases of extradition between EU member states was nine months.

V. Lessons Learned: Common Minimum Procedural Standards

_Losing Sight of the ‘Shield Function’ of Criminal Law Post-9/11?_

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001, a number of EU measures were adopted with the aim of combating terrorism and cross-border crime. However, less attention seems to have been paid in the process to the objective of ‘the judicial protection of individual rights’, as originally adumbrated at the Tampere European Council. Measures such as the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which adopted a common definition of terrorism, and the Framework Decision on the freezing of assets and evidence (providing for the mutual recognition throughout the EU of freezing orders issued in any member state) were adopted at unprecedented
speed. Both these measures extended what might be referred to as the ‘sword function’ of penal law (i.e. reinforcing criminal control and enforcement and protecting individuals against crime). However, the ‘shield function’ of penal law—entailing the protection of individuals against the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence by securing individual rights of defence and due process—seems to have taken a back seat.  

In contrast with the record time within which the Framework Decision on the EAW—and the other measures just mentioned—were adopted, the Commission’s draft Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the EU is still awaiting adoption, even though the European Council had asked that it be adopted by the end of 2005. Instead, more proposals have been agreed extending the ‘sword function’, such as a Framework Decision applying mutual recognition to financial penalties, a Council Decision on the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record, and agreement on the introduction of a European Evidence Warrant. It does, therefore, appear that there has been a certain ‘imbalance between the adoption of measures that emphasise criminal control and enforcement and those that seek to secure the individual rights of defence and due process’.

This imbalance is regrettable, and not only because the protection of individual rights is a necessary counterbalance to judicial cooperation measures that enhance the

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64 The original Commission proposal (in preparation since the Tampere European Council) was issued on 19 Sep. 2001. Three months later, the Laeken European Council sealed the deal from a political point of view, and the Framework Decision was eventually adopted by the Council of Ministers on 13 June 2002. Verbruggen (note 69), pp. 332–33.


powers of prosecutors, courts and investigating officers. As argued above, the lack of proportionate safeguards also perpetuates or aggravates mistrust between national judicial authorities that are already inclined to view each others’ rules and practices as alien and inadequate. The repercussions of the ruling of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court show how damaging the results of such perceptions can be for the entire EAW scheme.

Commission Initiatives

The European Commission indicated as early as 1998 that it recognized the importance of comparable procedural safeguards for giving citizens ‘a common sense of justice throughout the Union’. In its 2003 Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants, the Commission noted that there were ‘discrepancies in the levels of safeguards in operation in the different Member States’ and admitted that ‘divergent practices run the risk of hindering mutual trust and confidence which is the basis of mutual recognition.’ It also conceded that ‘such discrepancies may prevent the process of mutual recognition to be fully developed in practice’.

Following the consultation exercise carried out pursuant to the Green Paper, the Commission proposed a Framework Decision on five procedural rights, arguing that the ‘discrepancies in the levels of safeguards in operation in the different Member States . . . would be remedied by the adoption of common minimum standards’. The areas where the Commission proposes common minimum standards are:

- access to legal advice, both before the trial and at trial;
- access to free interpretation and translation;
- ensuring that vulnerable people who cannot understand or follow proceedings receive appropriate attention;
- the right to communicate with family members and consular staff; and
- notifying suspects of their rights (by handing them a written Letter of Rights).

These are areas that the Commission believes ‘are of particular importance in the context of mutual recognition, since they have a transnational element which is not a feature of other fair trial rights, apart from the right to bail. The latter will be the

72 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: towards an area of freedom, security and justice, COM (1998) 459, Brussels, 14 July 1998, not on the EU’s website but available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/1263/01/freedon_area_COM_98_459.pdf>, p. 8. It was important not only that ‘serious criminal conduct receives an equivalent response’, but that ‘procedural guarantees are comparable throughout the Union’ (p. 9).
75 European Commission proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural
subject of a separate Green Paper and work has continued in other areas of procedural rights, such as the presumption of innocence, which was recently the subject of yet another Green Paper.  

Detailed consideration of the rights in the proposed Framework Decision on certain procedural rights is outside the scope of this paper. However, adopting across the EU the minimum procedural standards suggested by the Commission would help to ensure not only that standards become more comparable EU-wide but—also highly important—that they are perceived to be such by judicial authorities and other actors in the criminal process. There has hitherto been a widespread lack of mutual awareness of criminal laws and procedures among different nations’ authorities, so that to some extent the EAW scheme has been ‘a journey into the unknown’ in which national judges have been ‘required to have more or less absolute faith in the criminal justice systems of other Member States’. Adopting common minimum procedural standards, backed up by appropriate monitoring mechanisms, would provide reassurance that those transferred to a ‘foreign’ legal system can expect to be treated in accordance with certain minimum standards that are equivalent throughout the EU, and to which national judges and prosecutors attach high importance. Of course, to this end it will be important that any Framework Decision on minimum procedural standards is correctly implemented by the member states (if the EAW Framework Decision is anything to go by, this might prove to be quite a challenge). Nevertheless, possible difficulties surrounding implementation should be no reason to baulk at the adoption of minimum procedural standards, which are vital to ensuring that the EU’s ‘security’ agenda is complemented by one of ‘freedom and justice’ as defined in the Union’s current aims.

References:


77 In this respect, it is encouraging that the Brussels European Council in June 2007 called for ‘work on procedural rights to be continued as soon as possible in order to contribute to increasing confidence in the legal systems of other Member States and thus facilitate the mutual recognition of judicial decisions’. See Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21–22 June 2007, <http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/Press_Releases/June/0621ER-Ankundigung.html>, para. 27.


VI. Conclusions

The EAW is part of a set of measures through which the EU has sought to respond to the growing threats to internal security posed by terrorism and cross-border crime. The challenge of responding to such threats has been steadily increasing as the free movement of persons within the EU has become a reality, easing the mobility across national frontiers not only of those seeking to conduct legitimate business, but also of members of criminal networks and terrorist organizations. External concerns and pressures especially since 11 September 2001 have also been a spur to action.

The EAW scheme puts innovative mechanisms in place for simplifying and speeding up the surrender of suspects within the single European judicial area. However, the existence of such mechanisms is not in and of itself sufficient to enhance internal security: the system depends for its smooth operation on the mutual recognition principle, which requires mutual trust between judicial authorities. The existence of mutual trust appears to have been taken for granted at the time the Framework Decision on the EAW was concluded. However, the introduction of the EAW scheme was not accompanied by a change in the existing EU rules protecting the human rights of suspected criminals. In particular, there was no harmonization of procedural safeguards across the EU. While the EAW represents the first concrete measure enabling the free flow of judicial decisions in criminal matters, it has not been complemented by any measure enabling the free movement of individual rights across the ‘single judicial space’: ‘The free market in security is not being matched by one in freedom and justice—resulting in an unbalanced agenda which favours the free movement of investigations and prosecutions over the rights of suspects and defendants’.

As was illustrated by the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its repercussions, the mistrust of other member states’ criminal justice systems has huge implications for the practical operation of the EAW scheme. In order for the system to live up to its full potential in terms of enhancing internal security within the EU, a lot more work needs to be done to increase mutual trust. The adoption of the minimum procedural standards proposed by the European Commission would go a long way towards building mutual trust by giving judicial authorities reassurance that they can expect certain basic standards to apply across all countries of the EU. However politically sensitive or difficult such measures may be to negotiate, member states will have to accept that greater convergence of procedural standards must be achieved if mutual recognition is to work. The constant march of judicial cooperation in criminal matters must be matched by adequate protections for individuals who find themselves facing cross-border justice.

The EU must act not only to stay true to the central element of its philosophy that the safeguarding of fundamental rights and freedoms represents, but also for the practical reason that—without minimum procedural standards that protect fundamental rights and individual freedoms in a comparable way throughout the EU—the effectiveness of the EAW scheme is likely to be severely hampered. In this respect, as no doubt in many others, there really can be ‘no security without human rights’.

PART IV
NORTHERN EUROPE AND ICELAND
History itself does not lie to us—didn’t Shakespeare say that ‘Truth is the daughter of Time’?—but it can play games with us, particularly if we take it too seriously or too lightly. Here in Northern Europe we are surrounded by some of the oldest rocks and by some of the youngest nation-states in Europe, and also (no accident, I think) by some of the best preserved or most painstakingly recreated historical cities. It is quite natural for communities that have reached modern nationhood, or have radically reinvented themselves, as recently as the last 15, or 50 or 150 years to keep history very much present in their minds, with both its lighter and its darker images: the moment of independence or of unity or renewal, but also the long periods of national suppression that went before; the things that other nations did to them, and perhaps also certain things that other nations failed to do. The problem for modern popular thinking and public policy-making arises when history is clutched so closely to people’s hearts that it becomes distorted, selective, wish-fulfilling and partial; or when it colours visions of the future as well, to a point where people and communities condemn themselves to tramping around the same vicious circle unnecessarily. On the other hand, as a historian myself by training, I would be the first to say that forgetting history or failing to learn its lessons can be equally dangerous: and perhaps especially for states whose potential future is much longer than their past, so that they really need to extract the maximum lessons from what experience they have.

The quality of North and Central European history that I want to focus on in my own short remarks here is its irony. Many classic British historians at least from Edward Gibbon onwards have had a special taste for irony, but I am aware that it is not always equally popular in this part of Europe, especially when it is interpreted as implying disrespect or belittling the tragic seriousness of the events and emotions it is applied to. I have no wish to do either of those things myself, but would like simply to explore whether a reading of the last 60 years based on paradox and contradiction might help us to illuminate a few last corners of today’s historical reality—after all, the most important points have been set out so much more adequately by other speakers at this event.

The events of 1945 themselves were pretty rich in contradictions. Germany had been

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89 On the Danish Foreign Policy Society see <http://www.udenrigs.dk/purpose.htm>.
defeated, yet the notorious pact which its defeated leaders had made with the Soviet Union before Moscow joined the Allies was still respected by Moscow and indeed forcibly imposed on its neighbours. One reason for this was the further paradox that the Soviet Union had won the war, but could not feel secure in victory except by taking half of Germany and all the intervening territories as a great strategic cushion against its own Western allies. A third paradox was that the Western Allies had won the war, and regarded it as a struggle fought for freedom against tyranny, but were still unable or unwilling to prevent half of Germany and Central Europe falling under Soviet domination. Through the stimulus that this division of Europe (and the Communist takeovers of subsequent years) gave to the creation of NATO, Moscow’s actions helped to ensure that the West European democracies would enjoy both stability and freedom for the next 45 years, while Central and Eastern Europe lost freedom without even enjoying real stability—as shown by a whole series of internal uprisings and brutal responses within Warsaw Pact and Soviet territory over these decades. A final irony, which comes out more clearly if Europe is compared with the political history of other world regions in the second half of the 20th century, is that a war fought by traditional nation-states and interstate alliances to defend themselves against what we would now call the insidious transnational menace of National Socialism resulted in both halves of our continent living their post-war lives in a distinctly non-Westphalian structure. Permanent transnational defence collectives of an unprecedented kind were built upon both sides, and an even more innovative, truly supranational economic community was created in the West by the European Communities and subsequent European Union—even if the CMEA (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON) was a very imperfect attempt at matching it.

These remarks could already have been made in the late 1960s, when I first studied history myself, and when I learned something of the brutal contradictions of the cold war order in Europe by witnessing at close quarters the Soviet invasion of Prague (and the total lack of a Western military response). What seems worth focusing on now, however, are the further and different ironies that might come to light from looking at the full sweep of the six decades separating 1945 from the present, including the first 15 years’ experience of post-cold war conditions.

Here it could be argued that the prolonged post-war division of Germany and the fact that its eastern part was under a quite different form of governance for 45 years—requiring an extremely difficult process of conversion and rehabilitation of the Eastern Länder after reunification (which we all know is very far from complete yet)—would have much reduced the danger of Germany’s ever dominating Northern Europe again, even if the Federal Republic’s 40 years of post-Westphalian European integration had not removed the motivation and the very context for such behaviour. The forcible shifting westwards of Poland’s territory in 1945, through lands added on the West and taken away by the Soviets in the East, prepared the way for Poland to enter more smoothly into the EU and NATO communities based on Western political and cultural traditions, while at the same time making it easier for Warsaw to reach historic reconciliations in the 1990s with Vilnius and with Kyiv.

The three Nordic states on the north of the Baltic Sea, meanwhile, were frozen for the 45 years of the cold war in a two-way strategic split between NATO Allies and neutrals, and were left outside the pattern of dual NATO and EU membership that spread to
most West European nations over that period (and did extend to Denmark, but with the equivalent of ‘footnotes’ on both fronts\textsuperscript{90}). These characteristics of the ‘Nordic peace’ need not be seen as a bad thing for the Nordics themselves; but their legacy has ensured and seems likely to ensure for some time yet that the Nordic states do not cohere as a strategic bloc, are still having trouble with their own transition to a post-Westphalian way of being, and are certainly in no position to dominate anyone else in the North or even to offer anyone their strategic protection.\textsuperscript{91}

The net result of all these facts, all of them flowing in some way—directly or indirectly—from the Soviet Union’s own post-cold war choices, was that when the three Baltic states regained their independence in late 20\textsuperscript{th}-century Europe they no longer needed to fear getting drawn into a relationship of subordination and exploitation by either Germany or Poland, as they might have done throughout much of earlier European history. Nor, however, could they hope to find a sufficient guarantee of their future integrity from any purely national sponsor (=counter-power to Russia) in the region, whether German, Polish or Nordic. The only remaining alternative, if the lands between Germany and Russia were not to relapse into just the kind of strategic ‘grey zone’ that made the tragedies of the 1940s possible, was for the Baltic states like all other Central Europeans to seek their destiny in the transnational, post-Westphalian and pan-European communities of the European Union and NATO. Who can say how different their alternatives and calculations would have been by the early 1990s if Soviet power had stopped short at the Soviet Union’s own lawful frontier in 1945, and if the Western extension of the Soviet empire had not—in its own flawed and unacceptably brutal way—helped to turn the Eastern part of Europe also into a potentially post-Westphalian space?

Of course, seeing the irony does not make the consequences any easier to live with, especially for the Russian Federation itself. The Russian people not only changed history for half of Europe after 1945 but fatally over-extended themselves in doing so, and thus magnified the pain of their eventual imperial crash and their post-imperial predicament. The spread of the Western-style integration process up to Russia’s own borders in North-East Europe is easily seen as a threat in Moscow’s terms, and not only when it is interpreted in the old strategic language as destroying buffers and completing Western encirclement in the way that Hitler’s Germany in the end was never able to do. The problem also arises at the post-Westphalian level because Russia has not been invited to and is objectively not prepared to take part in the integration process itself, remaining in many significant ways what Habermas would call a ‘modern’ rather than a ‘post-modern’ state;\textsuperscript{92} and because it sees the Western version of the process as a rival to its own

\textsuperscript{90} The reference is to the footnotes that Denmark appended to various NATO statements to mark its disagreement (mainly on nuclear issues) in the 1980s, and to the four opt-outs that Denmark obtained from new areas of European integration (including defence) at the time of the EU’s Maastricht Treaty.

\textsuperscript{91} These realities brought to nothing the speculations in the mid-1990s, for instance by some US authors, that Nordic protection for the Baltic states might be an alternative to the latter’s NATO entry.

\textsuperscript{92} Apart from economic–technical standards and issues of law and governance, one main thing that would make it hard for Russia to enter the EU or NATO is its attachment to traditional ideas of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The same factor also seems to contribute, interestingly enough, to some of the Nordic states’ hang-ups about the same institutions, whereas the Baltics and Poland appear to have understood the need to ‘give away independence to save it’.
persistent if increasingly counterproductive efforts at multilateral integration among the
Soviet successor nations.

However, thinking in a somewhat longer historical perspective might help put the
present challenge in proportion for Moscow, too. This would seem to be the first time
in history that Russia’s western neighbour has not been an enemy; a strategic grey zone;
or a potential partner in ultimately unprofitable crime (as with the partition of Poland
or the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact). Both the EU and today’s NATO are stable, post-
modern, non-aggressive communities that act, among other things, as restraints upon any
excessively nationalistic or provocative behaviours among their own members. They try
to help and modernize their neighbourhoods rather than shutting off or imperialistically
exploiting them.

A moment’s reflection on the comparison with conditions on Russia’s southern and
eastern frontiers will help underline that the challenge from the western neighbour today
is not a strategic or existential one for Russia. At most—but this is precisely what makes
it painful and difficult—it is a political and moral one: a question that is posed not about
surviving, winning or losing, but about modes of being and belonging. The community
that the Baltic states now belong to cannot be defeated by Russia—and it would be better
if none of its members behaved as if it could. Nor can it seek to defeat Russia, while
remaining true to its own values—and it would be better if none of its members behaved
as if it should. Europe can be changed by Russia only to the extent that Russia is willing
to change itself, by becoming in whatever form and over whatever time-scale an ‘insider’
in post-Westphalian politics and hence in the wider Eurasian integration process. The last
irony is that both Russia itself and the Baltic states may have a better chance of grasping
and adapting to these unique new realities if they can accept that history, while its own
truth is unchanging, does very profoundly change the world.
THE CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR NORDIC/BALTIC SECURITY

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Introduction: What Challenges?

I will start by looking at longer-term or imminent challenges before devoting the main part of this presentation to present-day ones—because those are the ones on which policy choices are still to be made and where we ourselves could in principle make a difference. And while we need to realize that many other powers could have interests at stake in the Nordic/Baltic space, the logic of this course makes it right for us to try to see things from the viewpoint of the five Nordic and three Baltic states. All of these have relatively small populations (none over 8 million), and four of them are among Europe’s smallest: so this approach should keep us closely in touch with the broader questions of small states, security and integration.

I need to tell you in advance, though, that as I see it there are several peculiarities of the Nordic states’ attitudes to security and integration—less so with the Baltic states—that would pose immediate problems for any theory asserting that all small states react to certain challenges the same way. What I think is easier to argue is that all such states have certain typical (and perhaps typically limited) choices, among which they may choose differently for a number of reasons that are also possible for us to try to analyse. In general I will suggest that many Nordic responses to security challenges have been, and remain, non-typical compared with the European or global ‘mainstream’: and the big question for the future is how far they can afford to remain that way.

Basic Challenges

To keep it short, we can break these down into three sets of factors: geo-strategic, geopolitical, and those of attitude and identity.

In geo-strategic terms, at least since the 18th century, the position of this North European region could be summed up as a periphery under pressure. Being geographically ‘on the edge’ does not make its strategic situation relaxed in the way that Ireland or even Portugal can be relaxed. In early modern times the main tensions were North–South ones, with the
powers of the European continent competing with Sweden and Denmark to control the Baltic Sea, Sweden frequently invading the European continent, and Sweden and Denmark of course competing with each other. Since the time of Peter the Great of Russia, the dynamic has shifted to an East–West one that was clearest of all in the recent cold war period. The great landmass and military power of Russia in its various historical forms overshadows and potentially threatens the Nordic/Baltic region itself from the east, but also sees the Baltic Sea and the High North as its two alternative breakout routes to the west. Concern about Russia in turn draws Atlantic powers like the USA and the UK to take a strategic interest in the North, while large continental powers like Germany and Poland may see the Baltic region for at least some of the time as an important front for handling their own relations with the eastern giant—whether those are enemy relations or periodic attempts at partnership and collaboration.

From the North and Baltic states’ own point of view, the one big and simple strategic headache is that they are not powerful enough themselves to push any of these strategic competitors out of their region or stop them from exploiting it in different ways. Since the 18th century, the Nordic or Baltic states have never really made their own strategic history but, for good or ill, had to focus on adapting to and influencing the strategic behaviour of other people competing through their region.

Before we get to the modern form of this problem we should also note the geo-political facts that are a permanent part of the region’s predicament, namely:

- The total Nordic/Baltic population of 31.5 million, which is not much more than half of Britain’s population, is divided into eight different states (plus several territories with a high degree of autonomy like Greenland, the Faeroes, Åland, etc.).
- Six of these states (all except Sweden and Denmark) are—in their present form—barely a century old: Norway got its independence as a modern nation-state in 1905 and all the others later than that.
- The North and West Nordic states all have large, thinly populated territories exposed to climatic extremes, making them very dependent on communications and energy supply; this is obviously less true of Denmark and the Baltic States.

Elsewhere in the world, when groups of smallish states were facing shared strategic challenges, they have often tried to club together in some way as a security bloc or to attach themselves as a single group to some larger protecting power. The present set of Nordic/Baltic states have not done this up to now, and the reasons why probably have to do with both objective differences among them and factors of identity and attitude.

Objectively, various dividing lines could be drawn:

- between the ‘Northern tier’, and states that are more part of the mainland European ‘continental system’: thus Germany is strategically more important for Denmark than for the others, Poland ditto for the Baltic states;
- between the Western or ‘Atlantic’ Nordics and Eastern or ‘Baltic’ Nordics;
- between medium-sized and really small powers;
- between metropolitan territories and islands with special status; and
- between those whose languages are, and are not, mutually intelligible.
Subjective and identity factors include the effects of concrete differences in historical experience—different roles in the two world wars, the Baltics’ fate in the Soviet Union—but also things that are hard to measure and sensitive to discuss, such as the six newer states’ especially strong attachment to their national independence; an underlying wish not to fall back under Swedish leadership (and most Swedes’ wish to avoid such leadership); and the lingering hostility between Swedes and Danes after so many centuries of wars. Now, if we come back to the big strategic picture we could say it’s easy to explain why the Nordics never banded together, because no other power wanted them to and the other powers had the strength to stop them if necessary. But that still doesn’t explain why the Nordics themselves have hardly ever even discussed the option of a local alliance, except for a short time after World War II; and why the Nordics were so shocked when some British and US thinkers suggested in the mid-1990s that they ought to look after the Baltic states’ security through a purely local arrangement; and why it is only today, nearly 20 years after the end of the cold war, that a really serious debate seems to be starting again about defence and security cooperation among the Nordic states only (which we’ll come back to later).

Security ‘Fixes’ from the Cold War to the Present

This paradox—that the Nordic states seem to feel safest when they are most divided from each other—was of course seen at its clearest in the cold war period, when the Baltic states were temporarily robbed of the power of choice. As we know, Norway, Iceland and Denmark went into NATO (after briefly considering neutrality) while Finland and Sweden remained neutral. This created the so-called ‘Nordic balance’, which succeeded in keeping the worst effects of East–West competition out of the region (or rather pushing it upwards, with the US–Soviet strategic nuclear confrontation in the High North), thereby also giving all Nordics more room for manoeuvre i.a. to maintain selective cooperation with Moscow. There are four things to note about this cold war solution which (with hindsight) were especially important for its impact on Nordic attitudes:

• The situation was *sui generis*, with nothing similar elsewhere on the East–West front, leading to a sense that Norden was (and is) ‘special’ and perhaps even ‘superior’.
• The system worked more by what Nordics didn’t do than what they did. It was not just that Sweden and Finland refrained from Alliance membership, or Finland refrained from provoking Russia. Norway and Denmark also refused to have foreign forces/nuclear items on their territory, Norway allowed no NATO exercises too close to the Soviet border, Iceland never created an army, and so on. Observation of this pattern led some Nordic thinkers in the late cold war period to develop the theory of ‘de-securitization’ as a strategy for dealing with unpleasant strategic realities—a response that was also pretty unique in Europe at the time, but which does fit the thesis that smaller states lean more than might be expected towards neutrality/free-riding solutions (compared with bonding/bandwaggoning ones).
• Despite different alliance statuses, Norway, Sweden and Finland actually had very similar models of national (territorial, conscript, ‘North-loaded’) defence.
• All Nordics balanced the ‘troll’ by the ‘missionary’ element in their identities, notably by active engagement in UN peacekeeping and other mediation, arms control and peacemaking work, and high levels of development aid. This fits with the view of smaller states as potential ‘norm exporters’, and one could of course make a material as well as psychological linkage with Norden’s own local conditions inasmuch as local ‘de-securitization’ — with the outsourcing of the toughest tasks to the USA and NATO — released some extra resources for the global effort.

After 1990 the Baltic States came back into the picture as free players and helped to underline some singularities of the Nordic approach by their own different choices. As small states, all three rapidly decided that their safety lay (a) in the fastest possible integration into both NATO and the EU, and (b) in having strong and simple good relations with US as a means of political deterrence. By contrast, all the Nordic states’ relations with the USA became if anything more mixed and ambiguous over this period as US ‘sole superpower’ assertiveness, use of force, and readiness to trade considerations of legality and civil rights for anti-terrorism successes grated on collective Nordic values.

However, there continued to be a strong area of overlap in Nordic/Baltic concerns in the shape of continuing high sensitivity towards Russia, which stood out as a regional trait, while the rest of Europe after 1990 gradually moved away from seeing Russia as a military challenge to seeing it more as an economic (including energy-related) and governance one. The Nordics and Balts quite early agreed upon one recipe for living with Russia, which could be called ‘local multilateralism’ — the creation of wider regional networks including Russia such as the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, as well as smaller initiatives in tri-Baltic, Finland/Estonia/Russia and other formats. All these were designed to allow ‘soft security’ cooperation and development work with North-West Russia while balancing Moscow with a large Western group — also backed by the EU and larger powers acting as ‘observers’ — thereby i.a. making Moscow’s typical ‘divide and rule’ tactics more difficult. In some ways, this ‘inclusive’ method, with its soft-security focus, could also be seen as a continuation of the indirect, ‘de-securitization’ method of handling an asymmetrical threat. However, while for the Baltics this element could and can only ever be a supplement to firm double integration in NATO and the EU, many Nordics seem happy to live with the subregional networks precisely because they are not too binding.

In their own policies after the cold war and during the period of NATO/EU enlargement, the Nordic states gave evidence of a certain ‘return to history’, i.e. to ideas of freedom through national self-determination and limited engagement. They consistently sought to maximize practical cooperation with the rest of Europe while minimizing formal integrative commitments, especially of the security or defence kind. Hence, although Sweden and Finland did take a historic step by joining the EU (as a non-military organization) in 1995,

• Norway again rejected EU membership at that time;
• Denmark won four ‘opt-outs’ from EU integration in 1992, including European defence;

94 These two terms have been used to describe a duality in the Norwegian soul.
the Swedish population rejected EMU in a referendum; and

Sweden and Finland did not seek NATO membership and have retained strong majorities in public opinion against it.

On the other side, the Nordics made a speciality of fully exploiting all the statuses of partnership, association and ad hoc cooperation (all-but-membership or membership ‘lite’) that the integrated organizations offered during this time, even when not originally designed with their needs in view. Examples are:

- Sweden and Finland’s active role in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), which they have used to coordinate their export of military assistance but also for their own planning, modernization and interoperability needs, notably in the framework of the defence planning cooperation option (known as the Planning and Review Process, PARP);
- Norway and Iceland’s membership in the EU’s European Economic Area (EEA) and in Schengen;
- Sweden’s and Finland’s participation in NATO operations, including more forceful ones like those in Kosovo and Afghanistan;
- Norway’s opting-in to several ESDP operations after 1999 (including Op Althea, the successor to NATO’s Stabilisation Force, SFOR); and
- Iceland’s creation of an international civilian response unit that has taken part notably in NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but also in a couple of ESDP operations.

We should briefly observe that—as also pointed out earlier—the resulting pattern of incomplete, or at best ‘fuzzy’ and ‘soft’, integration that spreads across the whole Nordic region is quite exceptional in Europe in terms both of scale (contrast the isolated cases of Ireland and Austria) and of complexity.

The Current Challenges

The first problem here is that the 5+3 states in question do not all objectively experience or subjectively recognize the same security challenges, let alone prioritize them in the same way. This is because of the long-term factors of difference mentioned earlier, but also because of recent and current politics. Thus we should note right away that Denmark, under its current government, has adopted a sui generis course of extreme defence modernization and pro-US orientation (vide its role in Iraq), closer to the model of the UK than anything else—although we can’t say it has ‘turned its back’ on region because it is still probably the most sympathetic of all the Nordics towards the Baltic states. Iceland is also a sui generis case, currently still wrestling with the implications of unilateral US force withdrawal, but also facing unique challenges of rapid but bumpy economic growth, unusual financial exposure, and a permanent array of natural threats (cf. the recent speculative attack on its currency and the Selfoss earthquake!). These two states don’t really fit much of what I will say in the rest of this talk—they are West Nordic ‘odd men out’, which we may have to come back to in the later discussion.
Conversely, there are two sets of security issues that are much more prominent at the eastern end of the Baltic Sea than elsewhere:

• the political/security implications of Russian ethnic minorities (it is true that (non-European) immigrants are also a big issue in Denmark and potentially in Sweden, but hardly in a military security context); and
• energy security: namely, the problem of reliance on Russian oil and gas supplies, which links them more with a different set of Central European states.

I will deliberately leave these hazards on one side in my main argument about pan-Nordic challenges and responses, which will touch on four issues: the big strategic picture, integration policy, military policy, and the non-military security agenda.

1. The Big Strategic Picture

The essential challenge for the Nordics here is, rather cruelly put, that there is ‘no more free lunch’. It is much harder in the first place to interest other powers in providing direct strategic protection against whatever threat remains from the East; nothing is to be got any more by doing nothing (practising ‘restraint’ and ‘avoidance’) as in the old days; and nothing is to be had for free. As seen from the rest of Europe, Russia is no longer a military threat in this area; in particular, the Baltic is now a Western sea as the result precisely of the Baltics’ and other Central Europeans’ double-integration policy. Of course other Europeans and the USA have had to wake up lately to the fact that Russia still wants to cause mischief in Europe and has more ways than we realized of doing so, but:

• These powers typically see the military/violent aspects of the challenge as lying much further to the south, i.e. in Chechnya and Russia’s relations to post-Soviet states like Moldova and Georgia (while the USA, the UK and France are also increasingly committed in Afghanistan/Central Asia).
• In the big strategic picture, larger Western powers like the UK and France may still feel less directly concerned by these Russian actions/threats than they are e.g. by how Russia behaves over high-strategy global and regional issues like Iran.
• They are of course concerned about Russia’s use of energy as a weapon and its increasingly open blocking of Western commercial competition at home, but they differ a lot on how to deal with this—some still putting their trust in ever greater interdependence and mutual profit, vide Germany’s position on the gas pipeline issue.
• Europe’s largest powers and the EU institutions don’t see the road to Moscow on any of these issues as lying through the North, even if its only remaining direct borders with the West are there: partly because most of the current issues are non-European or non-territorial threats, but also frankly because the Nordics/Baltics are seen as relatively weak and secondary actors/instruments for influencing Russia (and sometimes as troublesome ones!). Hence the tendency to strengthen and prioritize the direct Brussels–Moscow dialogue, plus big-power bilateral relations and the use of joint forums like the UN Security Council, the G8, etc.
Combining this with the threats and needs perceived by Washington in other regions, we can see why NATO has rapidly moved away from being an eastward-facing territorial defence organization, in the north or anywhere else, and is even starting to cut back further in the Balkans to make its main efforts in faraway operations like Afghanistan. Thus, NATO’s former regional commands in the north have reverted to national or multilateral rather than full NATO status. (It is true that NATO agreed to set up special air defence arrangement for the Baltics, but it didn’t rush to help when a Russian plane crashed in Lithuania, and the NATO Secretary General at first described the recent Estonia–Russia crisis as an ‘internal issue’!)

Similarly, the USA as a nation is now much less interested in the North, or only interested in dealing with Russia itself—note the clear switch in that direction in the new US regional cooperation scheme (e-PINE, the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe) that was introduced in October 2003 to replace the more inclusive Northern Europe Initiative (NEI). The traditional US military effort and presence in Europe is generally being cut right back, and new bases, as we have seen lately in Poland, are put where they make most physical sense for the USA’s global intervention plans and missile defence system—apparently without much thought being given to either how Moscow would react or how to protect local states from such reactions.

Anyway, the net result is that no one else in the West is going to be concerned about or sympathetic to the Nordics now just because they are ‘on the edge’ of an old strategic frontline. There has been more obvious sympathy for the Baltics, but I have the impression that that is also now fading—it is easy for states far away from the region to assume that double membership has solved the Baltics’ problems and, if it hasn’t, that their own failure to change their attitudes could be partly to blame. As a result, any state in the region that still feels a need to be protected from the East cannot be sure it is safe simply by joining every available institution. It must also go on ‘paying’, so to speak, in terms of a special national effort to contribute to operations, and/or special efforts to win the national favour of the USA: which explains a lot about Denmark’s and the Baltic states’ keenness to be in Iraq.

You may be asking yourselves, but what about the new strategic competition that may be starting in the High North, for the energy resources and transport routes of the Arctic now that the ice is melting even faster than expected? Of course the USA and others have been watching Russian provocative behaviour there, and there is also a potential Chinese interest if the Northeast Passage is opened for commercial sea transport. NATO and the EU are starting to show clear interest, but the question is what kind of large-power presence and interest will be drawn back to the High North under this new agenda. If other powers either fight each other or gang up with each other to exploit all the commercial benefits, the Nordics may gain little except new risks, pollution and more maritime accidents on their front door. The best scenario for the Nordics would be an orderly and environment-conscious exploitation within the existing frameworks of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council, but the USA is not yet even in the UNCLOS regime, and the Arctic Council has hitherto looked like a rather weak and divided construction. Clearly, there will be no ‘free lunch’ that the Nordics could win by just sitting on their hands in this field either.
2. Integration Policy

My starting point here is that, with the growing exception of Denmark, all Nordic/Baltic states still see defence/security in largely national and territorial terms: their mental map of what has to be defended doesn't go much beyond their own territorial waters. It is logical that such states will only want to ‘integrate’ in the defence/security field if what they gain in (concrete) national protection seems to outweigh what they lose in national independence. In these terms (leaving aside the Baltics for the moment, because they are already doubly integrated), we can quite simply define Nordic problems in relation to NATO, the EU now, and the EU of the future as the following.

- **NATO**: while even the Nordic non-members (Sweden, Finland) are in practice closer to it than ever, it offers less than ever of direct support for national defence. Even Norway is plainly now aware of and suffering from this, as shown by its latest national decisions to reinvest more of its own defence resources back in the North. Thus, deciding to join the Alliance now would gain less for the non-members than before; it would be more of a strictly political gesture, showing where Sweden and/or Finland stands in values and allegiance, than a way of escaping from the exposure and asymmetry of their position as Russia's neighbours. It could also of course cause considerable short-term turbulence, especially in economic relations with Russia, with Moscow in its present mood.

- **Today’s EU** cannot give the direct territorial defence assurances that would fit Nordic, including Icelandic, national needs. It can give security coverage/support in many areas of internal security, but only at a price of standardization and intrusion upon sovereignty which is much greater than anything NATO ever imposed, and which may still seem too high for many Nordic citizens given the rather low level of threats they perceive in their own area from terrorism, organized crime and other internal violence. The EU is making extraordinarily slow progress on the one dimension (i.e. energy) that all the region's states would give high priority to, let alone having any clear approach to the specific High North issues. And finally, it sometimes takes a more directly anti-US or non-US stance than all the Nordics can be happy with.

- **The future EU** is more likely than not to evolve towards full military guarantees, as a result both of its own dynamics and of pressure to fill gaps left by NATO. There are hints of this even today in the fact that ESDP advances are one of the few areas least affected by the latest stalling of the Lisbon Treaty, and are a specific high priority in the incoming French Presidency. Any more concrete EU move in this direction will be hard for Finland and Sweden to block, but will force them to make unwelcome choices for which the Swedish public in particular is not prepared, while most security elites are more concerned to avoid opting-out with its concomitant risks of banishment from the EU’s ‘hard core’ and general marginalization. The situation may in theory be somewhat different for Iceland, where some parts at least of the elite might welcome the renewal of defence cover from a European direction (cf. the current air policing aid from France and the latest talks on bilateral cooperation with the UK and Germany). For the pro-Atlantic Baltics, all would depend on whether there was a political need to ‘choose between’ the EU and the USA.
3. Military Policy

The problem here is that all the Nordic/Baltic states that have military forces are already committing themselves so fully to both NATO-led and EU-led operations (as well as new-style UN ones) that they in effect have to obey all the military standards and defence planning directives of both institutions. These standards/pressures have pushed all concerned towards prioritizing combat-capable long-range intervention capacities, which on one hand make tougher demands than previous typical UN ‘peacekeeping’ contributions, and on other hand are very different from the typical requirements of home defence. Because such capacities are costly in terms of both cash and highly trained manpower, and no Nordic country can get its parliament or people to accept a higher defence budget, ‘something has to give’ elsewhere and it is typically the conscript-based home defence system. Sweden is an extreme case because it finds itself pulled three rather than two ways: it also has to sustain a very costly equipment procurement programme, designed i.a. to support domestic aircraft and vehicle producers. Large cuts in personnel and home bases have been the chosen solution so that Sweden already has smaller armed forces than Finland, despite nearly twice the population, calls up only 18% of eligible men for national service, and by this year should have only around 9000 actual military personnel in service—of whom at least one in three will serve on missions abroad. Perhaps it’s little wonder that a Swedish defence minister has recently resigned and Chief of Defence has declared that he cannot guarantee to defend all of Sweden’s territory any longer!

Finland has chosen a different path of still calling up 82% of potential conscripts, but giving territorial forces relatively simple equipment and giving double training to all individuals serving overseas—a formula also quite common among Central European countries. Norway lies somewhere in the middle but has lately been turning back to domestic priorities, while cutting funds yet again. The obvious problems here for the whole region are that the speed of change puts strain on force structures and morale; what is left for territorial defence may not be enough strategically, and certainly is not enough to support the economy of remote provinces as it used to; the system of conscription and the principle of only using volunteers for missions abroad are now under great strain everywhere except perhaps Finland, but strong political and mental obstacles still stand in the way of purely professional armies; while the latest operational structures like EU Battlegroups (plus cost problems) force all participants into greater and greater specialization of roles. This last trend raises the question of what would happen for Sweden and Finland if they are attacked and no longer have the full range of skills needed to defend themselves, but (as non-allies) have no guarantee of anyone coming to help them either.

It’s against this background that we need to see the recent surge of interest in Nordic defence cooperation. At first it was driven largely by ideas of joint equipment purchase between Norway and Sweden or Sweden and Finland (Denmark is definitely not involved!) which clearly have mainly cost-cutting motives, although there could also be benefits in terms of smoother operation together on peace missions. The initiative becomes more interesting in policy terms when it moves into talk of joint training, perhaps sharing tasks of surveillance and intelligence gathering, or even air defence. Although this still implies nothing for actual Nordic defence commitments to each other, or even overall policy
convergence, it does enter a more sensitive zone as being directly related to territorial
defence—and is certainly further than Sweden has ever contemplated going before.
The latest important step was taken on 16 June this year, when ministers of all the five
Nordic states commissioned an independent study of the potential for Nordic security
cooperation from former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg.\footnote{Stoltenberg
presented his report to the Nordic foreign ministers in 2009. See Thorvald
Stoltenberg, Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy: Proposals presented to the extraordinary meeting
of Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009, text published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
The chosen
procedure will also cover Denmark and Iceland on a more equal basis than before—or is it just a tactic to dampen their criticisms?? In any case, since neither of those countries is likely to join purely military projects, the key to getting some real dynamism going in this
dimension might lie in widening the focus of the Nordic security discussion to areas of
functional and internal (or, in common Nordic parlance, ‘societal’) security.

4. Non-Military Security

Like anywhere in Europe and despite its older strategic concerns, the Nordic/Baltic
region also shares in the generally rising Western awareness of two main sets of non-
traditional and non-military threats:

- the ‘9/11’ agenda of terrorism and WMD proliferation, linked with international
crime and smuggling; and
- the ‘human security’ or ‘soft security’ agenda consisting (in a northern hemisphere
context) of natural disasters, environmental pollution and climate change, human and
animal disease, law and order, illegal migration and trafficking, security of energy supply,
and other challenges of ‘infrastructure security’ (e.g. other vital supplies, transport and
communications, defence against cyber-terrorism).

Now, Nordic thinkers have long been interested in non-military security and indeed
helped to shape some of its concepts and focuses, perhaps above all in the environmental
sphere and the sphere of social security and social rights. In cold war times, stressing
these agendas rather than the hard military realities of the region fitted perfectly with
the ‘de-securitized’, indirect approach to security management; and it was no coincidence
that these were also among the topics of all subregional cooperation schemes set up in
Northern Europe in the mid-1990s. In the same spirit, the Nordics have argued especially
in the EU but also in NATO and the UN for paying attention to non-military intervention
capacities (police, justice, institution-building, etc.). This is all well and good, but since
non-military agendas have more recently been captured by Washington and others they
are tending to push collective European policies in directions not necessarily so obvious
or comfortable for the Nordics and Baltics. There are at least two interlocking problems
here:

- For this region, many non-military dangers as well as older threats are seen as
coming from the East—I have already mentioned energy problems and Russian minority
problems, but we could also say the same of illegal migration, crime, prostitution/trafficking, drugs, pollution, the risk of new Chernobyl or massive ship disasters, etc. In other words, a functional change of agenda does not easily liberate the Nordics from their regional focus or from the difficulties of getting others to give priority to that region.

- Some of the new challenges that are most urgent/sex for other Europeans, and which the EU is working hardest to deal with, are almost completely lacking from Northern experience. This is true notably of terrorism, and also most aspects of internal conflict and disorder (including any substantial experience of the ‘clash of civilizations’ or clash of religions factor, except for Denmark’s Islamic problems in the last few years).

The net result is that while these types of problems are in principle more universal and less territorial than before, in practice the Nordics/Baltics find it hard to get Southerners to take their particular threat pattern seriously and vice versa. In general terms we may see this as another reason why the Nordics can’t necessarily have faith in, or assume they will profit from, collective solutions in the form of NATO or EU policies: but it also creates more specific headaches for Nordic policymakers within their own political systems. Tackling complex new emergencies like an overseas tsunami, local natural disasters, or potentially avian flu calls for strong central government coordination, whereas the tradition in Sweden (and to a lesser extent elsewhere) has been deliberately to decentralize power horizontally among various central agencies and/or vertically to local authorities. Thus Nordic central government structures, information and communications networks, and general security awareness in non-state sectors (including private business) are often inadequate; and where new structures for civil protection/readiness have been created, they follow different patterns from one country to another.

Secondly, there is a strong concern in all Nordic societies to protect citizens’ civil rights, especially privacy, free speech and free movement. While a good thing in itself, this can get in the way of some necessary precautions, and of the recognition that individuals also have security responsibilities. At the extreme, some societies may have become over-individualistic and lost earlier habits of solidarity and self-help through the processes of 20th-century urbanization and dependence on the welfare state. (Denmark again is a rather different case because of the strong role of and reliance on commercial contracts plus voluntary organizations for at least smaller-scale emergency handling.) A third factor, especially in Sweden, is a deeply felt political resistance to allowing the military to play any substantial role in internal catastrophes especially in functions of law and order. Put together, all these points stand in the way of close and effective coordination for tackling non-military threats even among the Nordics and Baltics themselves—let alone between this region and the rest of Europe.

Of course, other partners, including the USA itself, are busy trying to ‘educate’ Swedish and other Nordic elites on these matters, in case Northern Europe might become a kind of amateurish ‘soft underbelly’ for terrorists and others to exploit. Personally I share some of that concern. But at the same time I would warn that such outside pressure is unlikely to improve things unless the Nordic states can find solutions really adapted to their own circumstances; unless Nordic elites can also get the message across to their own populations; and also unless the different Nordic and Baltic elites intensify their efforts to work with each other on the many kinds of non-military challenges that might hit the whole region at once. My earlier analysis has underlined just how much a breach
this could mean from earlier Nordic security traditions. But it is arguable that it could
be the only way for the Nordics to keep at least minimal control over their own security
environment—with all its more intangible identity and value connotations—in an era
when most of the things that other people want to do on this periphery of Europe will
be far less naturally compatible with the region’s own interests than before.
1. ‘Societal Security’: What’s in a Name?

The names given to security concepts can be as important as their content for determining their mobilizing power and the attitudes they evoke, among both the people they are designed to protect and others. Such labels can convey a more cooperative or a more hostile colouring; a more ‘old-style’ or ‘new-style’ impression; a more ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ message about who owns the policy and who takes part in it—to mention only a few key variables. These effects are becoming more important as the process of national strategy making and implementation becomes not only broader in functional terms, embracing more and more aspects in addition to military defence, but also more open and ‘democratized’ at every stage. Parliaments expect, at the least, to be informed of policy developments and in a language they can understand. Official agents of policy like armed forces or civilian security cooperatives often have to use their own initiative and need an internalized grasp of the guidelines. Clear coordinating concepts are needed for the always widening range of specialized ministries and agencies whose work is seen as affecting security, from immigration, border, crime and export controls through to the strategic management of finance and credit, energy, food, environment policy and health. The private business sector holds a constantly expanding and diversifying role, often in the frontline against risks arising in financial, economic, technical and functional fields; while non-governmental organizations, charities and individual volunteers may fill crucial gaps in both emergency response at home and the export of human security abroad. For these last kinds of actors in particular, there can be no idea of applying simple command procedures as within the military or in a Communist society. Policy definitions, together with framework-setting laws and regulations and the active promotion of sectoral and popular understanding, become ‘invisible strings’ pulling into action those who cannot

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96 This article was derived from a research programme carried out on behalf of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish National Defence College; it was originally published in Stjörnmál og Stjörnsýsla [Politics and Government], Institute of Social Sciences, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, summer 2008, and is available at <http://www.stjornmalogstjornsysla.is/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=368>. 

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be manipulated like puppets by more tangible controls.97

This article is about one particular policy label, ‘societal security’, which has gained wide currency in the larger Nordic states since the late 20th century and through which Nordic elites have tried to meet at least some of the needs indicated above—the modernization of security agendas, the coordination of diverse state actors, and the motivation and mobilization of non-state ones.

After briefly recalling how and why this concept has developed and what place it holds in other nations’ practice, the main part of the text explores its possible relevance for the future of security policy in Iceland. Although ‘societal security’ has not yet been used as a policy definer in this country and perhaps never will be, bringing it into contact with Iceland’s realities—two years after the unilateral US force withdrawal—offers a laboratory-style opportunity not only to test the concept but to learn more about Iceland itself. In that spirit, the base for this study was provided by a detailed elite opinion survey of 38 Icelandic respondents, the results of which provide the hard core of the analysis and conclusions below.

1.1 A New Security Concept for a New Environment

In the highly developed European context and perhaps above all in the Nordic region, the threats of external war and of internal violent conflict are among the least probable risk factors for the general population—Nordics can expect to encounter them only if they travel (far) abroad. Political and economic ‘threats’,98 involving potential harmful behaviour of a deliberate kind by defined adversaries, are also relatively limited but do exist: at interstate level, because of the continuing ambiguity of Russia’s role in the region, and in the ‘transnational’ dimension as regards international terrorism, smuggling, organized violent crime and cyber-sabotage. The remaining categories of risk that loom large for individual citizens and aggregate national interests alike include some human processes that may indirectly affect security (consequences of migration and multi-ethnic societies); human accidents, especially those that affect the functioning of large-scale infrastructure (power, transport, heating, food distribution, cyber-communication) and nuclear events; cut-off of crucial supplies from outside by accident or intent (notably energy); and purely ‘natural’ processes such as specific natural disasters, pandemic disease, and the longer-term impact of climate change. (There are also important risks to the individual arising from the excesses of an advanced society such as over-eating and drinking, drug use, venereal disease, traffic accidents, etc., but these are rarely if ever seen as ‘security’ matters.)

Even among such similar neighbours as the five states members of the Nordic Council, the use of ‘societal security’ as a concept to deal with this new security environment has no single rule or definition. What can safely be said about it is that:

97 A whole further set of issues relate to the external impact of policy definitions, which can have roles of warning, intimidation and deterrence but also of transparency, self-legitimation, inspiration for imitation and cooperation, and so forth. These points are not pursued here except—later on—insofar as they relate to the role of definitions in easing/obstructing inter-Nordic cooperation.

98 The definition of ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ is a much discussed issue, but the present authors prefer to draw the distinction in terms of human intentionality rather than other criteria sometimes used (specific or diffused nature, functional dimension, etc.). For a thorough account based on this definition, see A.J.K. Bailes, ‘A world of risk’, Introduction to SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2007.
- It centres attention on the set of threats and risks that lie closest to the individual citizen and the workings of society as a whole, rather than those relating to state borders, sovereignty and integrity (traditional war, political blackmail, etc.). Thus it typically covers transnational and national non-military threats like terrorism and crime, and non-intentional and natural risks across the whole field surveyed in the last paragraph: a wider range than that traditionally connected with ‘internal security’, and coming closer to the idea of ‘human security’ which is commonly applied to poorer societies.

- Consequently, its main executors and ‘owners’ at official level are not the armed forces—although they may have specialized and supporting roles—but civilian departments and agencies, which may be grouped and coordinated in a variety of ways. In the existing Nordic examples, the armed forces are left in charge of ‘hard’ security matters such as military attack, which remain covered by a separate and long-standing ‘total defence’ concept.

- As it focuses on society’s ‘readiness’ and ‘robustness’ in depth, and covers many fields where property is privatized and initiative localized, societal security at least offers the potential for business entities, social groupings and individuals to play a part in their own preparedness and in protection, emergency response and re-normalization for society as a whole. At the very least, the authorities of local government will be expected to play a substantial part in policy execution and may indeed have major competences delegated to them.

- As most ‘societal security’ challenges arise from man-made and natural factors operating and/or having consequences across larger areas than any single nation-state, the concept provides a basis for international cooperation and community building that is independent from military alliance relationships and that can draw non-state as well as state actors into fruitful cross-border cooperation.

Supporters of ‘societal security’ sometimes claim that it also guards against the risk of over-enthusiastic state security policies becoming so oppressive and intrusive that they damage other values important for an advanced society, such as privacy, freedom of choice, freedom of movement, and respect for diversity. In principle, if society’s well-being is the starting-point and measure of policy and if the state’s duty is seen as preserving not just life but the quality of life, it should quickly become obvious if a proposed tightening of security in one field is going to cause disproportionate damage to society in some other dimension. While this is an important reminder of how democracy and human rights can and should enter the picture, it would be too much to claim that the mere use of words like ‘societal security’ will create the necessary safeguards in practice. More depends on the state’s sensitivity to public concerns and reactions, on the one hand, and on the ability of ‘society’ itself (whatever that means in a given territory) to make mature and balanced judgements on the trade-off between its security requirements and its broader needs, ambitions and values.

As of mid-2008, two Nordic states—Sweden and Norway—have adopted ‘societal security’ as the denominator of their overall national security policy, while retaining ‘total defence’ (although now with a very low profile in Sweden) as an insurance against residual military threats. Finland is conducting a comprehensive policy review in which...
the possible introduction of ‘societal security’ nomenclature is one of the issues under consideration. However, in practice the existing Finnish policy of ‘protecting the vital functions of society’ already displays much of the content, and the pattern of non-state involvement, that one would associate with societal security approaches elsewhere. Denmark, finally, prefers to define its policy in terms of ‘readiness’ and protection for internal ‘vulnerabilities’, but its handling of non-military threats and risks meets all the four criteria associated with ‘societal security’ above, while its military has given up territorial defence and now defines half of its raison d’être as supporting the civilian powers in societal emergencies.

It is thus fair to see societal security as a characteristic, and widespread, Nordic invention of the late 20th/early 21st century, and this view is borne out by its recent international handling. Efforts to introduce ‘societal security’ as a guiding principle and conceptual framework for the civil emergency policies of the EU have been made especially by Sweden but are supported by other Nordic members. The Nordic Council has adopted a motion calling for exploration of the potential for pan-Nordic cooperation in the societal security field, including a conference to debate the issue. The Presidium of the Nordic Council, at its winter meeting in 2007, expressed some irritation at slow follow-up, but commented that holding a conference in 2008 would be better late than never. (In the meantime, the Council had also noted the importance of including maritime security aspects in the debate.) The programme of the Presidium of the Nordic Council for 2008–2009 duly includes proposals to focus cooperation on the distinctively Nordic approaches to security building—defined as ‘civilian crisis management and societal security’—both at home and abroad; and a regional seminar is now expected to take place by autumn 2008, leading to a report tabled at the next full Nordic Council meeting. Meanwhile, the Nordic group of ministers have made a decision of their own (on 16 June 2008, discussed further in section 5, below) to commission an independent study of Nordic security cooperation across the board. It may, finally, be argued that the main subregional cooperation groups of the Nordic/Baltic region—the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS, established in 1992) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR, established in 1993)—have developed their agendas and priorities in a way that reflects a Nordic-supplied brand of collective ‘societal security’ thinking, even if they have never found it tactically appropriate nor necessary to use those precise words.

That said, the match between societal security terminology and actual practice is quite variable—and not always particularly close—in day-to-day Nordic reality. Sweden’s system, which labels itself most strongly as societal security-based, sometimes seems the least well-anchored in society as a whole, inter alia because it is reluctant to engage private...
business as a collaborator and cautious even in its use of social volunteers. There is also a widespread view—at least outside Sweden—that the system remains too ‘statist’ and top-down in nature, encouraging citizens to offload security concerns of all kinds upon the government, while the government itself has a somewhat ‘de-securitized’ outlook as a not unnatural consequence of 200 years of peace. Norway appears more security-minded, down to individual level, but the official societal security machinery ensures close public–private cooperation only in a limited number of ‘strategic’ sectors (oil and gas, power generation, shipping, etc.), and coordination at head-of-government level remains quite weak. Finland and Denmark, the two countries not (yet) using societal security terminology, come out relatively well in terms of the breadth of definition of essential social/economic functions, the exploration of all useful forms of public–private partnership, and the exploitation of bottom-up resources (although in Finland’s case still largely in the form of an old-style military conscription and reserve system). Aside from these substantial variations there are also diverging national solutions in terms of governmental structure—Denmark and Sweden, for instance, place their civil security coordinating mechanism under the defence ministry, while Norway (like Iceland) puts the ministry of justice/interior in the lead, and in Finland the largest formal scope for coordination lies with the trade ministry.

1.2 Security Concept as Instrument

The diversity among Nordic applications of societal security ideas helps to illuminate the wide range of instrumental functions that one single concept may play in a highly developed, democratic and pluralistic European environment. Its first-order and most straightforward effects may be defined as:

- *illuminating and extending* the official conception of national security interests, to bring theory and practice in line with 21st century realities (‘concept as catalyst’);
- *identifying and prioritizing* vital assets (and qualities of life, values, etc.) to be protected and the means for protecting them, across a broad front (‘concept as yardstick’);
- *coordinating* action for preparation, prevention, incident handling and recovery in the relevant fields (‘concept as gathering ground’); and
- *mobilizing* non-state capacities within society that may have existed before, but were not previously identified and honoured as ‘security’ contributions (‘concept as empowerment’).

In addition to these, individual countries appear to have used the concept for the more political and tactical purposes of:

- *legitimating* a transition away from older purely military concepts of national defence/security and, in particular, replacing (or reducing the primacy of) ‘total defence’ ideas that implied civilian subordination to the military;
- *reassigning* practical power and resources away from one agency of government (generally, the armed forces and defence ministry) towards others (generally, the interior ministry or equivalent); and, more broadly speaking, away from the military towards civilian authorities (‘concept as lever, or as weapon’);
• (in the more fully developed cases) legitimating and facilitating a new concentration of authority at the level of the head of government, which can also have as both aim and effect the reconciling of clashes of interest and demarcation disputes between individual ministries; and

• seeking common ground with other nations or with trends in European security thinking and development as a whole, by placing the security emphasis in a domain where alliance differences or varying military systems are no longer relevant and where national particularities might prove easier to overcome (‘concept as tool of international socialization’).

It should be clear from this catalogue that, whatever the intrinsic merits of the societal security concept, the implications and effects of introducing it in a given national situation will depend on a variety of factors and will not automatically produce ‘good’ results—namely, an improvement on what went before—in objective security terms. The decisive variables include long-standing national traditions, ways of thought, features of social and administrative structure, motives of those supporting the concept, motives and capacities of any opposing it, the nature and quality of structural adaptation, the roles given to non-state partners, the application of resources, and the quality of follow-through and follow-up in general. If these are in negative combination, the concept may remain a dead letter, or even have perverse effects by creating new gaps and disproportions in security provision and new frictions among the actors involved. If all the other factors are set positive, the national security elite may be capable of producing the same good results that the societal security concept is designed for without ever actually using that concept and that name. It is precisely this relativity that makes it interesting to ‘test-drive’ the concept by bringing it into contact with the everyday security realities of the one Nordic country that has not so far discussed introducing it—Iceland.

2. Iceland as a Test Laboratory

Why Iceland? The short answer is that this small but newly wealthy Nordic republic is having to embark on a gradual reassessment of its whole defence and security system following the unilateral departure of US troops—who had provided its only military cover and also several civil security assets—in autumn 2006. A government decision in late 2007 to launch a ‘risk assessment’ by an independent commission can be seen both as a recognition of this need and as a possible first step in efforts to build a new policy scheme and consensus, depending on how the report turns out (expected autumn 2008). Second, and by contrast with (especially) Sweden and Denmark, the Icelandic establishment’s understanding of security has never in the past extended much beyond classic, ‘Westphalian’ military definitions. Since safety in the cold war was equated directly with US military hardware, the notion of security was distinctly under-conceptualized and its multilateral or transnational dimensions were poorly grasped. Since only a few politicians and officials had any daily dealings with what was thought of as security work, and very few academics gained expertise in it, it was predominantly an elite and ‘top-down’ affair. Finally, since around half of all Icelanders were fiercely opposed to the US solution at the outset, the subject was also politically and socially divisive. These circumstances could hardly be farther removed from the ideal notion, and desired results, of a ‘societal’ security approach as outlined above.
At the same time, since Iceland has never created its own armed forces and is likely never to create them, it offers a laboratory where, in principle, a particularly pure version of civilian-owned, civilian-executed societal security might be experimented with. Given awareness of other Nordic and European experience, its policymakers also have the chance to learn from others’ trials and tribulations and to ‘jump ahead’ to a state-of-the-art solution. By pursuing the hypothetical question of whether the adoption of a societal security doctrine would be feasible and productive in the real-world setting of Iceland today, we can expect to gain a better understanding of Iceland but also—in a way that few other thought experiments would allow—of ‘societal security’ itself.

2.1 Iceland’s Prima Facie Threat/Risk Profile

In the areas generally recognized as falling under ‘societal security’, the first thing to stress about Iceland is that it has a distinctive and somewhat limited threat/risk profile even by Nordic standards. As usual in this region, any kind of internal conflict, large-scale violent crime and direct experience of terrorism are absent; non-Nordic immigration has also started growing only recently, though already generating some tensions. The country is 80% self-sufficient in energy, all from renewable sources; has no severe environment problems and may look forward mainly to easements of life from climate change.104 Rather few dimensions of civil security are thus left as priorities for policy to address, although the country’s small population, far-flung communications and often freakish weather make all of them potentially tricky to handle:

- the natural disasters proper to the country, which include volcanic eruptions, ‘glacier bursts’ and major earthquakes as well as the avalanches, storms, tidal extremes and floods that affect other Nordic neighbours;
- infrastructure breakdowns that might be triggered either by such natural events or by accident or (least likely) terrorist sabotage: the most serious could involve electricity distribution and district heating systems, cyber-breakdown, or a sustained blockage of traffic at the country’s international airports.105 Accidents at sea are of especial concern for both historical and practical economic reasons. Another vulnerable area is food security, given the amount that has to be imported through very few choke-points, although the country is close to self-supplying in several basics;
- a high-fatality human disease epidemic: animal epidemics could also have major economic impact, but less acute effects; and
- terrorist activity, perhaps especially in the form of hijacking and kidnapping. While it is hard to see Iceland becoming a target in its own right (unless for anti-whaling protestors!), there is real concern among experts that an incident directed against other

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104 There is, however, a growing awareness in Iceland of the more general consequences of temperature change and the melting of the Arctic ice, which is likely to boost local tourism and (especially maritime) traffic but could also lead to large-scale sea accidents, big-power competition over local resources, and possibly ecological changes harmful to fish. These issues are not discussed further in the present report because they belong more to the category of new-style external challenges than to ‘societal’ ones—although they are extremely relevant to impending moves on Nordic cooperation.

105 Keflavík International Airport has a throughput of over 3 million passengers per year, 10 times Iceland’s own population, and provides access for the huge majority of tourist visitors.
constituencies or to seize world attention might be staged there, and that a rather small number of determined terrorists would be sufficient to control important choke-points such as the facilities at Keflavik.

Three other sets of concerns could potentially be included in a ‘societal security’ concept tailored for Icelandic conditions, even if they normally lie outside mainstream Nordic definitions.

- One is economic and financial vulnerability, as demonstrated by a specifically Icelandic credit crisis in spring 2006 and by the speculative attacks aimed at Icelandic banks and the Icelandic currency during the global crisis of early 2008. This issue should logically militate for close cooperation between the government and private bankers and investors, helping to ensure that any future Icelandic security concept cannot become too ‘statist’ or anti-capitalistic.¹⁰⁶

- The same might be said of another issue that is just starting to arouse elite interest, namely, the ‘corporate social responsibility’ (also in security-linked fields) of these same large Icelandic corporations that are now responsible for the safety of several important assets—including flagship hotels and shops—that they have acquired in nearby parts of Europe, together with large numbers of foreign and Icelandic employees.¹⁰⁷

- Finally, as already mentioned, a minority of Icelandic politicians and some thinkers would argue that potential security issues related to growing Central European and non-European immigration need to be taken seriously and not smothered by ‘political correctness’. While political capital is normally made of this issue in relation to the supposed more violent lifestyle and criminal tendencies (drugs, smuggling, prostitution, begging) of certain immigrant groups, it would also be pertinent to consider whether clusters of foreign residents could be factors of special vulnerability in the case of natural disasters and service breakdowns that would bring risks remote from their personal experience.¹⁰⁸

2.2 Icelandic Resources and Responses

What concept and system does Iceland currently have for attending to non-military, internal or transnational factors of security? The country was relatively slow to develop a cold-war ‘civil defence’ structure of the type prescribed by NATO, establishing the AVRIK (National Civil Defence Agency) in 1962 and extending it to cover non-war emergencies such as volcanic eruptions in 1967. A system of local Civil Defence

¹⁰⁶ This issue would also be considered a security matter under Finland’s doctrine of ‘protecting the vital functions of society’, since the Finnish concept assigns high priority to the (largely private-owned) means of communication with and competition upon the global economic stage.

¹⁰⁷ On 9 May 2008 Iceland’s first institute for corporate social responsibility was inaugurated, to be based at the University of Reykjavik and supported by several large companies as well as the Foreign Ministry. The accompanying publicity put emphasis on the need, and opportunity, for Icelandic businesses to learn from networking with Nordic neighbours (especially Norway and Denmark) now that they have such large overseas holdings in those countries and elsewhere. The initiative is further supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which has helped Iceland to develop a business outreach programme to poorer countries.

¹⁰⁸ After the Selfoss earthquake of May 2008, discussed later in this text, it was stated that the authorities were concentrating special help on the very young, the very old, and ‘people of foreign origin’.
Committees was set up, in parallel to rather than subordinated to AVRIK, under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs (henceforth MOJ), and a National Disaster Fund provides insurance for the social costs of the most predictable emergencies. The only official personnel earmarked for emergency action, aside from the Coastguard who proved their toughness in three ‘cod wars’ with the UK, were and are the regular police force—recently supplemented by a special-duties ‘Viking squad’ trained in the use of weapons. An extremely important role is played by the 4000-strong volunteer rescue force, the Iceland Association for Search and Rescue (ICE-SAR), which (together with the Red Cross) has formal cooperation agreements with the MOJ but has remained outside the government’s direct control.

The present (and long-standing) Minister of Justice, Björn Bjarnason, has been associated since he first took that post with a sustained effort to modernize the handling of traditional ‘internal security’ matters—namely, natural disasters, law and order, border control and anti-terrorism. In 2003 he renamed the system as one of ‘civil protection’ rather than civil defence, and replaced AVRIK by a coordinating civil protection department based in his ministry and using the police hierarchy for executive action. He was the member of the government who took earliest and most decisive action in response to the US military pull-out, announcing the plans to acquire new coastguard and helicopter assets, to systematize intelligence work, to step up security measures and drills at Keflavík, and in general to improve coordination and centralization of national assets. Under his latest Civil Protection Act, passed in May 2008, a stronger coordination and control centre for ‘emergencies of all types’ (i.e. not excluding military attack) will be co-located with the National Police Commissioner, with an 11-person group to ensure inter-departmental coordination, and for the first time a coordinating ‘Council’ for civil emergencies will be created at the level of the Prime Minister’s office—even if it is only expected to be convened for the gravest occasions.

Within the new coalition government, there is also something of a dialectic between him and the Foreign Minister, Social Democratic Alliance Party leader Íngrid Sólrun Gísladóttir, who has stood on the one hand for the continuing primacy of external security relationships (NATO, UN) and on the other for exploring a ‘softer’, more comprehensive approach to non-military security. (See below on how this might affect the ‘micro-political’ climate for introducing societal security ideas.)

Comparing Iceland’s general approach to security with that of other Nordic countries, what stands out for most observers is the relative detachment of the general population and the dislike for preparedness and planning. The first point is clearly related to the lack of armed forces (and hence of any conscription system); but it also reflects the fact that risks that do affect and are tackled by ordinary people—natural disasters, rough weather, isolation, supply problems—have not so far been linked in anyone’s mind with ‘security’, while the activities most Icelanders would classify as ‘security’—the US base and its successors—have been the business of a limited elite; and politically contentious, hence more comfortable to ignore.

The dislike for preparation and, consequently, for any extended structural machinery to identify dangers and practise solutions are usually attributed to (i) the historic Icelandic temperament based on ‘expect the unexpected and take each day as it comes’, and (ii) the

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109 This will include representatives of at least 7 central ministries and of the local authorities.
fact that improvisation does actually work pretty well in such a small, close-knit, skilled, robust and inventive society.

Thus, in contrast to some other Nordic settings (most obviously Sweden), the lack of apparent ‘societal security’ structure and activity does not mean that the average Icelander is not security-minded and security-capable when it comes to it—rather the reverse.

Much the same applies to private business entities, which may profess to see no connection between themselves and security but whose leaders and employees will in fact pitch in selflessly to help the community in any case where human lives and safety are at stake. These theses have been tested in a number of actual natural disasters in populated areas since the 1970s where first response and rescue was actually very effective but where the lack of clear rules and divisions of authority made itself felt afterwards through weaknesses in follow-up, reconstruction work and lesson-learning. In more recent disasters involving Icelandic citizens abroad, which have led to heart-searching about performance in some other Nordic countries—the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Lebanon evacuation—Iceland seems to have come out rather better, perhaps because the MFA was the only authority involved and worked sensibly ad hoc with private actors.

3. ‘Societal Security’ as an Official Policy for Iceland: Prima Facie Pros and Cons

In this section, the main arguments that can be made prima facie for and against the usefulness of an explicit ‘societal security’ concept for Iceland, against the background of the analysis above, are set out as a hypothesis to be tested by the results of the elite opinion survey.

3.1 Arguments in Favour

Like other Nordic states since 1990, if more belatedly, Iceland is clearly under pressure to move away in conceptual terms from a narrow, traditional and military view of national security. More than any other state, it also has to wean itself away practically and mentally from a former almost total strategic dependence on the USA. The logical and habitual content of the ‘societal security’ concept would make it a good candidate to serve both these purposes. For the first purpose, it stretches far beyond the military dimension without necessarily denying the importance of territorial defence. For the second purpose, it prescribes measures that for the most part Icelanders could take themselves and/or where they could seek the outside help they need from several sources besides Washington (including the EU and the UN system). As a new concept that is not, so far, tied to any particular ‘owner’ in Iceland, it might also serve the tactical purpose of a ‘neutral ground’ where different political forces and shades of domestic opinion could work towards a new consensus and division of powers.

Certain ‘softer’ or functional issues that have a central place in societal security thinking are objectively important for Iceland’s future security, economic success and welfare—notably the handling of natural disasters, protection of critical infrastructure, and public

health. Other Icelandic preoccupations such as finance and overseas investment might be accommodate within a tailor-made national definition, perhaps gaining inspiration from Finland’s ‘vital functions of society’ concept.

Iceland has strong business and social actors, and age-old popular instincts of self-sufficiency and solidarity, that could be mobilized to good effect as part of the ‘bottom-up’ and ‘resilience’ dimensions of a societal security framework.111

The involvement of such actors—aside from optimizing a very small state’s resources—would strengthen the national and social ‘ownership’ of security policy, and should help to give it a more ‘globalized’ and outward-looking character than if it was framed exclusively by professional politicians.

A switch to societal terminology and practice ought to ease Iceland’s cooperation with other Nordic states which apply the concept under the same or another name, and would give the country an even stronger say in possible further developments of the Nordic Council’s work on this topic. It might produce new ideas for meeting the widely felt need to ‘flesh out’ the security cooperation MOUs recently signed with Norway and Denmark, where implementation so far has focused on military visits. Depending on how the societal security dossier develops in Brussels, Iceland’s familiarity with the term might also open new doors for its dialogue and cooperation with organs of the European Union in such fields as infrastructure protection, health, energy, the environment and climate change.

3.2 Arguments Against

None of the existing ways that the societal security concept is applied and instrumentalized elsewhere in Norden could simply be transplanted to Iceland, because of its objectively different size, geo-strategic setting and threat/risk profile. The ‘cohabitation’ of societal security with a continuing ‘total defence’ concept based on the armed forces is also out of the question because of Iceland’s lack of the latter. Finally, there could be psychological resistance in some Icelandic circles to the imposition of any outside norm, given the strong Icelandic feeling of specialness and the importance still attached to national independence.

Iceland’s history of pragmatism and improvisation in security matters casts doubt on the instrumental value of any mere ‘concept’. It is much easier to imagine decisive progress occurring here through new political deals between parties and individuals, plus the impetus of real-life events and experiences—including specific demands from external powers and institutions.

The earlier very narrow Icelandic understanding of security and defence makes it a particularly big, and perhaps impractical, jump to try to extend the understanding of these concepts in one fell swoop to the full societal security spectrum. This is a sharp contrast with Finland, where the security concept applied under the name of ‘total defence’ has already become wider than most other Nordics’, so that switching to societal security terminology would be hardly more than a matter of re-packaging.

111 It is this that led one well-informed respondent in our survey to reach the striking conclusion that ‘Iceland has only ever “done” societal security’ (while free-riding on others for the ‘hard’ variety…). A full but anonymous statistical summary of answers is available from Alyson Bailes at alyson@hi.is.
As confirmed by opinion research, it is hard to get non-governmental constituencies in Iceland to accept security roles and responsibilities for themselves in generic terms, or to put much effort into planning of any kind.

The fact that they nevertheless ‘get it right on the night’ more often than not, and arguably no worse than any other Nordics, weakens the case for and chances of using societal security as a ‘mobilizing’, ‘gathering’ or ‘empowering’ tool.

These same attitudes create a risk that, if ‘societal security’ were introduced as an official concept, it might end up as just another bit of ‘government-speak’ that would strengthen the temptations for further centralization and top-down handling of security, albeit with a somewhat wider group of officials involved.

The risk might be greater or less, depending on which politicians first appropriated the concept and also on whether the government set out from the start to develop it together with social partners and NGOs. A particularly interesting nuance here is that, in contrast to other Nordic countries where the introduction of ‘societal security’ has gone hand in hand with migration of power to the justice ministry or equivalent, in Iceland the majority view would be that that ministry has more than enough power already (and that too many burdens have already been loaded on the police). The ‘societal’ concept could thus be instrumentalized by people wishing to argue that the ownership of national security should be widened to include a larger and more balanced group of ministries and/or that the Prime Minister’s office should take more overall responsibility—a further illustration of the relativity of the concept in a real-life political context!

As noted, several ‘soft’ security dimensions that are critical for Iceland relate not to its internal circumstances but to its interdependence and engagement with the outside world: tourism, transport, cyber-communications, food deliveries, imported disease, migration, and other players’ reactions to climate and environmental change in the North. Elsewhere in Norden, the application of societal security concepts to such external and transnational factors is one of the weaker sides of thinking and practice—even if Sweden has done much to explore a continent-wide version of the concept for EU purposes. As a result, societal security experts from elsewhere would have little guidance to offer Icelandic state and non-state elites on how best to play their hand (and allocate resources) in the corresponding external institutions and relationships.

4. Lessons of the Opinion Survey

A survey of 35 Icelanders (and 3 well-qualified foreign residents or observers speaking in a personal capacity) was carried out by the authors between April and June 2008, using a questionnaire in parallel English and Icelandic versions. The respondents were selected from the public administration, business and services organizations, the Icelandic Parliament (Alþingi), academic institutions, media leaders and NGOs. The acceptance/completion rate, out of the full initial sample, was a respectable 47% and was higher among public servants, academics, media and independent consultants than in other groups. As indicated by the term ‘elite’ survey, all the interviewees were more likely to be in positions somehow relevant to national security management, and in most cases were also better informed, than the average Icelandic citizen. The authors do not consider this a weakness given the specialized and sophisticated nature of the enquiry. In fact, in terms of policy relevance, it should be a bonus that the sample reflected many of
those constituencies that would be concerned in any real-life decision to ‘go for’ societal security. An effort was made to balance respondents in other respects such as age, gender, profession and known political leanings: but if anything the sample has a leftward and centrist bias, partly because the more professional (and often conservatively inclined) security elite is so small. (One group of informants, working in disaster response services, are also poorly represented because during the time of the survey they were preoccupied with responses to a Richter 6.3 earthquake!)

4.1 The Main Story

The first thing that stood out from the answers to the survey was their variety and inventiveness—which reflects Icelandic individualism but probably also the lack of an entrenched ‘security culture’ that would generate more stereotyped answers or, at least, awareness of what answer ‘should’ be given. Many respondents commented that they had to do some original thinking to answer the questionnaire and found it enlightening—it remains to be seen how this may feed back into the real-life Icelandic security debate, in accord with the ‘observer effect’! Thus, while some macro-differences could be found e.g. between those on the left or right of politics, women and men, or those who had or could not be said to have had ‘ownership’ of official policy up to now, there was also great ‘micro-variation’ at the level of the individual.

The other, frankly somewhat unexpected result was the clear majority in favour of experimenting with the introduction of a ‘societal security’ doctrine or, at least, something similar under another name. Among those respondents who gave an explicit answer, the majority in favour was of 27 against 5, with one ‘not sure’.

Two broad features that help explain this were that:

- All the positive responses came from outside the ‘hard’ security elite (though including several officials with more specialized security responsibilities, and academic or political figures with security expertise).
- All the same respondents answered ‘Yes’ to the question of whether the Icelandic system already had elements of societal security without naming it as such (see more below).

These positions were also shared by all the small group of qualified foreign observers who took part in the survey. Thus, of the possible instrumental roles of the concept set out in section 2 above, we may immediately identify two as having broad support among the positive respondents:

- the concept as catalyst, for moving to a more up-to-date security paradigm and a larger ‘ownership’ of security within society; and
- the concept as empowerment, i.e. recognizing and better mobilizing positive security contributions being made outside the traditional elite.

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112 Details of the questionnaires are omitted here for reasons of space but the texts, and a full but anonymous statistical summary of answers, are available from Alyson Bailes at alyson@hi.is.
113 A couple of respondents explicitly suggested that the Icelanders like, need and respond quickly to ‘new’ things.
Analysing the answers of this positive group in more detail, we find that the positive aspects of societal security most often mentioned were:

- the possibility of better coordination between different dimensions and security and different actors (‘concept as gathering ground’); as will be seen later, several interviewees also saw the concept having a ‘gathering’ or reconciling effect between Right and Left;
- the possibility to devote more attention to ‘new’ aspects of security, including climate change, economic threats, terrorism but also ‘down-to-earth’ problems of society like social violence, deprivation, and traffic safety; here we see a mixture of the concept as (new) yardstick for security priorities, but also a hint of the concept as an (internal-political) lever to the extent that respondents felt the existing official structures or balance of personalities had not allowed justice to be done to these aspects before; and
- the possibility of helping Iceland to realize its own strengths/values better and display them to others: here we see a mixture of the mobilization theme and the role of the concept as a tool of international socialization. However, as discussed further below, the number of respondents overall who were interested in the international effects of the doctrine was significantly smaller than those who saw it as, simply, good for Iceland itself.

What conclusion to draw from these positive results is a less obvious matter and will be returned to in the final section below.

The respondents who were negative on the idea were divided between those who thought introducing societal security as a ‘label’ would not change anything, and those who thought the idea would help the wrong people—either offering the right wing a new chance to impose controls on society and divert more resources to security, or giving the left wing a chance to cast off ‘hard’ security (implying, also, partnership with the USA and NATO) altogether. For those who feared authoritarianism, the danger of the concept lay in the way it mixed ‘hard’ threats like terrorism with natural hazards (or ‘security’ with ‘safety’): for those who saw it as a kind of ‘anti-security’, the sense of being already on a historical slippery slope since the US withdrawal may have played a role. These apparently contradictory perceptions deserve to be taken seriously because they highlight the painful polarization of opinion that has characterized Icelandic security debates up to now, and the sense of precariousness of the country’s present policy balance—a perfectly fair perception given the profoundly disruptive impact of the 2006 events, two serious currency crises in two years, and the unusual and perhaps transient composition of the currently ruling Grand Coalition.

4.2 Detailed responses to other questions

A large majority of respondents (32 to 6) shared the diagnosis offered earlier in this paper that Icelanders’ level of understanding and concern about security had been relatively low up to now (except for a small elite), and the majority of these thought this level was too low and/or the concern was wrongly focused. The views were widely held that:

- Iceland had a parochial and particularist vision;
- Iceland had relied on others for its security; and
- Iceland had an out-of-date conceptual view which missed the significance of new threats ranging from terrorism to climate change and economic vulnerability.
All respondents saw some change in Icelandic preoccupations since the cold war period. The focus on Russia and ‘hard’ security had diminished (though re-awoken by occasional scares) and priorities had become more varied—a couple of people added that opinions were actually too easily blown back and forth by short-term trends. The general direction of the shift was seen as being towards new internal preoccupations linked with social and economic change and especially urbanization—economic vulnerability and inequalities, social stresses, immigration and crime; towards global ‘new threats’ like terrorism, and natural challenges like climate change. (There is not necessarily a contradiction to be between these answers and the views expressed under the last question about lack of up-to-date priorities. The majority understanding seems to be that Icelandic perceptions are moving in the right direction under pressure of events, but have not yet reached a balanced and up-to-date synthesis.)

(Question 3): A large majority, 34 to 3, believed that the Icelandic system and experience already had elements that could be related to ‘societal security’, when the latter was defined as an approach that:

• put the focus on society;
• embraced all issues that might affect society and the safety of individuals; and
• acknowledged the active role of non-state players.

By far the most common example cited was the large size of and good work done by volunteer rescue services, as well as other NGOs devoted to meeting social needs. No respondent showed anything but positive views about this phenomenon, although it was remarked that volunteerism was also good fun and rewarding. Some respondents showed concern that such non-state groups should not be inadvertently damaged by a more formal societal security approach, for instance if this facilitated efforts to bring them under more direct governmental discipline. In addition, many respondents (mostly working in official contexts) mentioned the capacities of the existing civil protection system, the range of specialized expertise available on non-military security, and the protective nature of Icelandic social policies. A couple of others suggested that Icelanders in general had a sense of social solidarity and respect for the community, which showed at its best in moments of crisis. Finally, only one person volunteered a positive reference to the business sector, which was seen as one channel for feeding more cosmopolitan security experience back into the country, while another was concerned that the security responsibilities going with Icelandic business’s expansion had not yet been properly grasped.

The interviewees—who had been told about other Nordic countries’ use of ‘societal security’ in their official policies—were rather evenly divided on whether it was helpful for Iceland to be influenced by this wider Nordic practice. Of those who reacted positively, about half took the relaxed view ‘Why not?, while others saw stronger merit in learning from other Nordics’ experience (good and bad) or using their example to provoke debate. Those who were negative cited both the objective differences in Iceland’s position, and subjective attitudes such as Iceland’s insistence on its independence and uniqueness, social egalitarianism, greater openness to US ideas, less ‘modern’ thinking etc etc. It is fair to add here that many of those who did advocate a societal security approach, and were open to Nordic lessons, also stressed that the concept would have to be properly
adapted to Icelandic conditions and carefully explained in terms that made sense to an Icelandic public.

This last point was also frequently made when interviewees were asked if the actual words samfélagsöryggi (the most direct possible translation of the Swedish sambälsäkerhet or Norwegian samfunnssikkerhet) would be positively received and well understood. Two-thirds of respondents did not see why not, given proper explanation (preferably with concrete examples). Several commented that the novelty of the expression would help, that bringing ‘security’ into contact with the concept of ‘society’ would have positive and modern overtones, and that the expression seemed broad and flexible enough to accommodate all Icelandic concerns. A few people also hoped it might provide a way of reconciling the previously polarized views of Right and Left, or of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security proponents. Those who were negative thought exactly the opposite, i.e. that the expression could be ‘captured’ by one school of thought striving to upset the present policy balance. Either it would be interpreted in a pacifistic sense and give new ammunition to those attacking Iceland’s efforts to maintain its hard security, or it could be manipulated by those with authoritarian tendencies to curb liberties in the name of collective ‘social’ needs.

Of those with negative views, those who were worried by the authoritarian scenario saw some interest in trying to find alternative language that would be more focused on the individual, such as ‘human security’; or would more explicitly widen the understanding of ‘security’ as such; or would keep the word ‘security’ out of the societal realm altogether. Otherwise, most of those who discussed alternatives were pro-societal security but ready to consider alternative ways of ‘selling’ it. Perhaps the most interesting option they came up with is using the adjective borgarlegur or samborgarlegur, which has a nuance relating to the citizen rather than society as a collectivity. Other ideas were to work within the existing concepts of comprehensive ‘national’ security, civil protection and emergency management; or to find an Icelandic equivalent to vulnerability-based analysis and ‘preparedness’ that feature strongly e.g. in the Danish approach.

When interviewees were asked to name at least four areas they thought would need to be prioritized when or if a societal security-based policy was introduced, the responses were as shown in the table below.

Table: The most frequently mentioned security dimensions and number of mentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural disasters</th>
<th>Economy incl. fish</th>
<th>Maritime safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime, law+order</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate/environment</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>External ‘hard’ security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Others mentioned: drug/alcohol abuse, sexual violence, gender inequality, traffic safety/accidents, gun control, border security, drug smuggling+people trafficking, ‘climate

114 Clearly, the number of mentions is much larger than that of respondents as interviewees were allowed to mention as many items as they wished. The most favoured topics in numerical terms were also those most often mentioned first in people’s lists. A full but anonymous statistical summary of answers is available from Alyson Bailes at alyson@hi.is.

The first thing standing out here is that the items and their prioritization closely match the attempt made earlier in this paper to sketch an ‘objective’ multi-functional security profile for Iceland. In both cases, general economic and financial security (which most respondents mentioned in broad terms, only a minority citing fisheries as a main issue) enters the picture to a greater extent than it does in—notably—the Swedish and Norwegian ‘societal security’ concepts. In fact, the Icelandic ‘basket’ of issues resembles the Finnish concept of ‘vital functions of society’ more closely than anything else in the region. These results are intriguing because they suggest that, just as Icelanders may be ‘walking the walk’ of societal security without knowing it (the voluntary services, power of business, etc.), some sectors at least of the educated elite can actually ‘talk the talk’ very accurately on the basis of their own experience and common sense. Moreover, the range of issues given a one-off mention (at the end of the table) suggests that Icelandic imaginations can stretch the security concept very far into the ‘softest’ and most individual areas of social experience when given the chance.

Two other local features are worth noting. Whereas in other Nordic countries ‘hard’, military defence is separated from and exists parallel to civilian-administered societal security, a significant minority of Icelandic respondents clearly saw no reason not to combine the two in a single comprehensive concept. Since a single civilian government system has always been expected to look after both, and one of the problems in recent years has been to reach financial and political balance within it between the Ministries of Justice (internal security) and Foreign Affairs (external security), it would in fact make a lot of sense to tailor any new Icelandic security concept to encompass and balance this whole spectrum. Some of those who included the ‘hard’ item were clearly looking for a new reconciliation along this path, while others were simply concerned to give external and military security its due.

Finally, most of those who listed immigration as a problem were people with liberal sensibilities who were concerned to find a way of handling its specific side-effects—notably, increased crime and street violence—without sliding into xenophobia. The issue is relatively new in Iceland and only one minor party has sought to exploit it politically, with mixed success, yet there is a very general view that it will loom larger in future (see also below).

When asked about the possible impact of a switch to societal security on the governance of security in Iceland several people found the question perplexing, perhaps because there has been little awareness here of the inter-departmental tussles and new centralizing measures that have accompanied this part of security policy evolution in other states. Of those who did reply, most (20 against 9) thought some change would be necessary and

115 It may, of course, readily be argued that this result was a trick of the timing, prompted by the grave currency and credit crisis suffered by Iceland in early 2008—which the media had reported in highly securitized terms of ‘attack’ and ‘defence’, and which had painful consequences for just about every Icelandic household. However, several interviewees when noting this point added that the lesson learned about economic and financial vulnerability would now remain part of the Icelandic mindset for good. A full but anonymous statistical summary of answers is available from Alyson Bailes at alyson@hi.is.
this was not necessarily a bad thing—while five of the nine saw specific pitfalls that should be avoided. The most frequent likely change mentioned was an increase in central coordination under the Prime Minister's authority, although several added that the PM's staff is not really designed or sized for such duties at present. More specific suggestions included new committee structures (the UK model may have been in people's minds here), new cyber-networks, a more widely based coordinating agency, or a new 'Ministry of Security' (though there were also voices warning against this last!). Seven respondents hoped that there would be a more comprehensive and balanced assessment of priorities and better coordination in carrying them out, while six hoped that the contributions of business, NGOs and individuals would be better recognized and mobilized. Of those who saw a likely shift of power and/or resources between ministries, six expected this to be in favour of 'softer' functions while only one thought the Ministry of Justice would increase its coordinating role (but NB also the strong warnings offered by some about an 'authoritarian' danger). While too much should not be made out of a very few replies, these responses do fit with the remark made above that Iceland has gone further than most already in concentrating 'societal security'-related functions in one Ministry, so those looking for change are almost by definition likely to be seeking either greater power-sharing or checks and balances though greater involvement of the Prime Minister.

A majority (20 to 10) thought that adopting a societal security concept would have some positive effect on Iceland's external cooperation. Those who disagreed thought that cooperation was already as good as it needed to be, or that the 'societal' path was a bad one (because it distracted from hard security needs, or over-complicated the matter, or would let the wrong people speak for Iceland); or that other Nordics might have a greater interest in Iceland's 'conformity' than in actually providing what the country needed. Those with more positive views thought that a more comprehensive definition of security would clarify both Iceland's own strengths—and potential contributions—and what it most needed to get from others. They foresaw easier comprehension with partners, and one made the shrewd point that sub-state agencies and groups could more easily move together across borders if their roles were more similarly defined. Not everyone was clear about which foreign relationships were likely to benefit, but most mentions were made of cooperation with other Nordics (15) followed by the EU (12), NATO (10), and a few references to the Icelandic role in global organizations (the UN and its agencies, the World Bank for development work, environmental efforts, etc).

A clear majority, 22 to 7, thought Icelandic conditions would (continue to) shift in a direction that should increase interest in and acceptance of a societal security-type approach over the next 5–10 years. Reasons were seen as being partly external—the ever more obvious impact of globalization, including hazards like climate change and energy competition, and growing economic interdependence—and partly internal, such as worsening economic and social stresses, further growth of immigration, and the simple fact of generation change. A mention was made of growing awareness of business's security problems and growth in business's own security awareness. Four respondents volunteered their view that Iceland would have to join the EU during this period: another saw no change unless Norway took that step first!

Interviewees were given a chance to add their own comments at the end, but most did not. A few, still pondering on how a societal security policy might be introduced in practice, talked about using the opportunity of the present threat assessment report to
launch such a debate, or consulting other Nordics about the best way ahead, or building up ‘soft security’ cooperation with Nordic, US and UK partners in the meantime. Some wanted to re-emphasize individual policy concerns, for instance the need not to let hard security be neglected; to promote specific issues like the environment; to restore the central balance of power vis-à-vis the Ministry of Justice; or to preserve the ‘peace’ theme and the non-military tradition in Iceland’s identity. A couple warned that prospects for this or, indeed, any other major policy development would depend critically on developments in national and municipal politics over the next few years, including the fates and actions of individuals.

5. Brief Conclusions

The last comment reported above from the opinion survey provides a good place to start a final assessment of this study’s findings. It is a pertinent reminder of the unusually open, personalized and volatile nature of Icelandic politics, where external forces can drive the country rapidly in one direction or the other, but Icelandic responses are rarely easy to predict according to outsiders’ logic.

It is right to start, nevertheless, by noting that this ‘test-drive’ exercise brought many positive results regarding societal security. It has shown that the concept can be grasped, and often remarkably well adapted and developed for local conditions, by a group of decision makers and opinion formers, most of whom have never encountered it before and a majority of whom are not security experts. True, there were several hints in the survey that the novelty of the concept was part of its charm and even those who liked it most could imagine ‘wrapping the parcel’ in different ways. However, it cannot be an accident that several of the promising features seen by Icelanders in this particular doctrine—a catalyst for change, a mobilizer of non-state forces, a gathering ground for different expertises and political views, an enabler of international cooperation—were the same that have guided the hopes and aims (if not always the results!) of Nordic elites striving to develop societal security in other settings.

At the same time, this Icelandic enquiry has highlighted yet again the malleability of the ‘societal’ concept and the relativity of its implications and effects. If it were to be implemented in Iceland, on the basis of what an outsider would see as the nation’s main priorities or of what our respondents here were asking for—and as noted, these two recipes come remarkably close—the product would be significantly different from the way it works in Sweden, Norway and potentially in Finland. Indeed, the questionnaire replies ring true in suggesting that the uniqueness of any Icelandic variant would probably be the key to its local acceptability and effectiveness. Some of the potential adaptations have been noted in the foregoing section: e.g. high priority for general financial and economic vulnerabilities (which immediately dictates close liaison with business), inclusion of ‘hard’ security under the same conceptual umbrella, and higher recognition for volunteer and NGO contributions while preserving their independence and ‘cool’ image. Other adaptations would flow from physical realities such as the wider range of natural disasters facing Iceland, the high importance of all maritime dimensions, and the need for a climate security policy that can cope with likely beneficial changes as well as hazards.

Finally, in governance terms it is reasonable to accept that any new Icelandic structures should be very ‘light’ and designed to achieve networking, synergy, good prioritization
and operational coordination between a range of empowered authorities rather than building any kind of ‘super’-agency either in the form of a further expanded Ministry of Justice (‘Ministry of Security’?) or within the Prime Minister’s office. The traditional Icelandic instinct to preserve room for improvisation and to push initiative downwards and outwards makes sense given the population’s qualities, with the caveat that the implications of a growing part of that population being foreign need some sober thought. Indeed, as shown again by the latest Selfoss earthquake, the work is still in progress of finding a local/central balance that assures the locals of the help they need (especially post facto), but stays out of their way when they—and the volunteers—can manage best by themselves. These observations also suggest that care will be needed in the manner of moving towards a societal security policy in Iceland: only if the impetus is seen as coming as much from the ‘bottom up’ as from ‘top down’, and if voices from outside the traditional security managers’ elite are given a fair hearing, can the necessary modicum of confidence and active buy-in be guaranteed from the centre–left as well as centre–right segments of popular opinion.

A point that has already come through clearly is that if the Icelanders do move towards their own brand of societal security, they will do it to please themselves, not the other Nordics. Nevertheless, other factors have already set the stage for greater Icelandic interest in their Nordic neighbours’ experience and in their potential help. On the ‘hard’ side of security and the more conservative side of politics, the value of new defence cooperation MOUs with Denmark and Norway is appreciated and there have been hopes that the new military cooperation between Norway, Sweden and Finland might have some useful spinoffs for Iceland (e.g. the hints about possible air defence cooperation in the far North). The decision of Nordic ministers on 16 June to commission a specific, and hopefully comprehensive, pan-Nordic study of the state of security cooperation\footnote{For a press release, in Icelandic, see \url{http://www.norden.org/webb/news/news.asp?lang=5&id=7946}.} will provide a better entrée for Iceland to this debate than previous bilateral/trilateral initiatives and will doubtless be appreciated for that.

More specifically, Iceland’s growing focus on the Arctic security issues linked with melting ice, oil/gas exploitation and possible militarization is one of the factors pushing it towards a more active role in regional policy making, and may offer scope to make common cause with Norway in particular. In the left and centre of politics, where the chance to diversify security relationships is seen as a silver lining in the cloud of problems caused by the US departure, Nordic cooperation has always been ideologically acceptable and the transition from earlier ‘social’ to ‘societal’ cooperation in softer security areas should not be particularly difficult. In this part of the picture, therefore, an Icelandic move towards ‘societal security’ could be seen not so much as a catalyst but rather as a way to add extra oil to the wheels of regional partnership, also in the context of possible further development along these lines in the Nordic Council and the group of Nordic ministers.

Drawing any conclusion about what may actually happen within Iceland itself is far more difficult. Alongside all its positive findings, the survey has also drawn attention to Icelandic fears, frustrations, a perhaps excessive self-critical or self-punishing streak, and the difficulty of reconciling the most strongly felt views at both ends of the political spectrum. Although the range of concerns listed in section 4.2 above is conceptually...
impressive, looked at in another way it also underlines how hard it would be to devise a single policy concept that all parts of the elite could recognize and want to ‘own’ (while this study has not even touched on the probably diverging agendas of the man and woman in the street).

An obvious conclusion is that if anyone can overcome these problems and find a way ahead to a more comprehensive and balanced security concept (under whatever name), it must be the Icelanders themselves. The way ahead for them is perhaps best seen as a kind of critical path that may branch off unexpectedly at each key point. The first is of course the expected presentation of the risk assessment commission’s report—which is not particularly likely to advocate ‘societal security’ as such but will certainly cover many of the relevant dimensions and will need to say something about combining, balancing and reconciling them. The next question is how the government may want to proceed with it: most probably starting with some kind of study and debate within parliament, before ever considering the step to officially proposing a new policy and/or machinery. A parallel issue is how long the right–left coalition itself will survive and, if it does run its course to the next elections, whether there will be personnel changes within it—and with what results. Naturally, the result of the next general elections will be of great importance; and in simplified terms it may be said that any result other than a clear dominance by the right wing would keep the way open for further moves towards ‘societal’-type policies, although with differing degrees of cross-party support depending on the exact composition of parliament.

However, even systematizing the factors to this extent gives a misleading impression since there are so many other ‘wild cards’ involved. The interplay between these issues and the increasingly open speculation about Iceland’s entry to the EU is one obvious complication. Change in Iceland can be extremely fast, very slow or retrograde, depending on a number of external and internal triggers. Perhaps the safest conclusion to offer in closing is the same as that emerging from most Icelanders’ answers to question 10 above: over the medium to long term, both external and internal pressures seem bound to guide Iceland towards a more comprehensive understanding and practice of security, and towards agendas that come to resemble more closely its Nordic and West European neighbours.

117 Another issue still hanging open in this connection is whether the government will proceed to create a new security thinktank of some kind and if so in what form—academic institute, inter-party political group, networking agency or what. For a paper on this issue see ‘Skipulögð umfjöllun á Íslandi um öryggis- og alþjóðamál eftir brothvarf varnarliðsins’. Þröstur Freyr Gylfason, Stjórnmal og stjórnshlýsla, 2. tib. 2. árg. 2006 <http://www.stjornmalogstjornshlysla.is/images/stories/eg2006h/throstur.pdf>. The new Defence Agency at Keflavik has academic liaison among its duties and will possess research funds but is probably not the direct or final answer to this question.
Conclusions: Geography and the Changing Security Agenda

In terms of traditional security, Northern Europe has always found itself—at least in part of its territory—at an important strategic intersection. During the cold war, the two main areas of tension were around the Danish Straits, and in the northern part of Norway and Russia’s Kola Peninsula. In the 1990s, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, German unification, the recovery of the Baltic states’ independence, and the withdrawal of the Soviet and then Russian armies from Baltic territory resulted in a shifting to the east—at least as far as Kaliningrad—of the first area of tension in the Baltic Sea. The strategic geography of the second area of tension has been less altered, as shown both by the continuing Norwegian anxiety about vulnerability in Northern Europe and by the Russian interest in keeping ‘the High North’ as a sanctuary against any possible Western aggression. However, as noted above in the context of the Baltic states’ concerns, a new significance has also been given to the expanse of territory around Pskov and Novgorod in the west of Russia. Overall, Russia still nurtures the perception of the Baltic Sea area and of its northern frontier with the West as a front line of defence against further Western expansion. Historically, this expansion has ranged from the former German Drang nach Osten to the alleged ‘aggressive’ plans of NATO. If the strategic landscape of the area has changed dramatically since the 1980s, Russia still looks at its security—exactly as the Soviet Union used to do—through a geographical prism.

Considered as a partial solution to this problem, the value of territorial disarmament has declined but not disappeared. The ‘apartness’ of the region has certainly been reduced by NATO enlargement to include the Baltic states, the eastern part of Germany and Poland, but it has also been affected by smaller changes like the termination in 1995 of the Norwegian ban on military activities in the north of the country or Finland’s and Sweden’s joining the Open Skies Treaty—not to mention the strategic implications (see below) of Baltic, Finnish and Swedish membership of the European Union. As Western nations’ military priorities shift towards preparing their forces to play their full

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118 This excerpt is taken from SIPRI Policy Paper no. 13, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 2006; the full text is available at <http://www.sipri.org>.
part in overseas crisis operations under many different flags (under the EU and NATO as well as the UN), the fact that the North European states are ‘on the periphery’ is becoming less relevant for determining a nation’s military responsibilities, force posture and capability plans. However, the national defence perceptions and policies of the Nordic and Baltic states remain near the most traditional end of the Western spectrum in the emphasis that they still place, also for psychological and identity reasons, on the protection of national territory. This helps to explain why the legacy of territorial disarmament has survived so fully and in such manifold forms in Northern Europe—certainly more so than in any other erstwhile cold-war ‘frontier zone’. Its manifestations still range from islands with a status that is distinct from their tutelary power (Åland, Greenland and Svalbard), through whole countries with a special status (Finland and Sweden as non-aligned states and Iceland’s non-armament), to more specific limitations like those on the stationing of NATO forces on the territory of the Nordic countries and any new NATO members. To an extent, territorial disarmament applies to Russia as well, providing a more direct means to ease Baltic and Nordic neighbours’ concerns over Russian strategic weight. Apart from the disputed case of Kaliningrad, the CFE Treaty remains the major constraint on Russian force strength and activities in Northern Europe as elsewhere.

Now as always, it is difficult to assess the precise impact and the real beneficiary of any given measure of territorial restraint. The subjective and conditional dimension of such constructs was emphasized by the French lawyer Georges Scelle: ‘These military servitudes tend to be short-lived. They last as long as the balance of power that imposed them remains stable’. Indeed, history shows that this kind of disarmament can work only if it is in the interest of the great powers: if not, it will be disregarded and violated at need. The Nordic states’ chosen method of ‘subtracting’ their territory from use by a potential belligerent was carefully designed and employed to influence Russia’s own motivation. The more a great power is confident in the credibility of the setting aside of the territory, the less it will be tempted to use it for its own military purposes. In this light it can be argued that the Nordic states’ territorial provisions were (and continue to be) supplemented by larger elements of avoidance or exclusion in their national policies, including the fact that none of them—other than Denmark, on the fringe of the region—has joined both the EU and NATO, the two strongest organizations in Europe.

In this last context, however, even the important strategic subtext may matter less in practice than the widespread Nordic preference for avoiding full integration in the multilateral frameworks—notably the EU—that limit states’ sovereignty and may seem to threaten their distinctive identities. Examples of such a ‘Euro-allergy’—and of Euroscepticism within the countries that are already EU members—include Greenland’s vote to withdraw from the European Communities in 1986; the significant exemptions from EU obligations still held by the Åland and Faroe islands; the two occasions (September 1972 and November 1994) when Norway decided by popular referendum not to join the EU; the fact that Finland joined the European Free Trade Area through a tailor-made institutional arrangement in 1961 and the Council of Europe only in 1987; Denmark’s four EU opt-outs, including one from the ESDP; and the Danish (2000) and Swedish (2003) referendum votes against joining the Economic and Monetary Union. The more the European continent unites under the aegis of the EU and NATO, the more this Nordic ‘double abstention’ will come under pressure. The progress of EU and NATO
enlargement is steadily pushing the Nordic states into a corner in respect of their increasingly untypical partially integrated status as well as in a geographical sense.

This does not mean, however, that existing or even new measures of territorial disarmament as such must be seen as conflicting with the widening and deepening of the European architecture. Some ‘disarmed’ territories have an apparently stable status quo (Åland, Greenland and Svalbard), while other situations may have to evolve quite soon (Iceland after the prospective US troop withdrawal and Finland and Sweden with the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty). As a further complication and as noted above, both the EU and NATO have shown themselves consistently willing in the past to find technical fixes to accommodate any special territorial arrangements and restrictions (including sub-territories with unusual status) that otherwise acceptable new members may bring with them.

A more pertinent question, perhaps, is whether Nordic measures of ‘subtraction’ any longer make sense—or have a net positive effect—in terms of the substantive security agenda affecting these countries and their surrounding seas. It is shown above that the awareness of old-fashioned military threats remains more present in this part of Europe than elsewhere and that existing measures of territorial disarmament are still seen by both sides as relevant to dealing with it (even if the creation of new measures of this sort now looks very unlikely). However, for the Nordic nations as much as any other group of European states, the present-day security agenda has been extended to include a huge range of other risks and threats for which formal state boundaries, or any other types of territorial limit, are virtually irrelevant. These challenges range from the deliberate human threats of international terrorism, crime, smuggling, sabotage (including cyber-sabotage) and illegal migration; through various risks posed by weapons of mass destruction outside the context of traditional war (including possible terrorist use, accidents and pollution); to risks over which humanity has less control such as violent weather and climate change, exhaustion of the environment and natural resources, and epidemic diseases of people, animals and crops. Not only do the traditional Nordic devices of abstention, restraint and dissuasion mean little or nothing in these contexts, but the transnational dimension in which such challenges arise and the highly interconnected nature of their impact are steadily reducing the historic elements of singularity in the Nordic (and Baltic) states’ security plight. In short, both the ‘passive’ and potential ‘active’ significance of geography as a factor capable of limiting security problems has been much eroded and seems bound to decline further in future.

Two different views, one optimistic and one more questioning, could be taken of the interconnection between these facts and the surviving pattern of territorial disarmament in Northern Europe. On the positive side, it may be argued that, since the traditional arrangements only refer to specific traditional military activities, and since those activities are generally acknowledged to be of only marginal relevance to any of the new challenges mentioned, there is nothing in the special Nordic statuses per se that need inhibit either a proper national response to the perceived risks or the engagement of all the territories concerned in international cooperation for such ends. Thus, all the Nordic states—whether members of the EU or not—are full members of the Union’s Schengen system of border security and immigration control, and all can benefit from the protection this regime offers against border-related problems ranging from possible terrorist infiltration to excessive numbers of asylum seekers. All the Nordic members of the EU have access
to a large number of ‘functional security’ policies and instruments being developed by
the Union, from disease control (the EU European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control is located in Stockholm) through mechanisms to coordinate practical EU aid
for internal emergencies of many kinds, to the latest demands in 2006 for a strategically
aware EU energy security policy. Denmark, Finland and Sweden all joined in the political
declaration of a new ‘solidarity’ commitment promising mutual assistance between EU
members in the event of major terrorist attacks or comparable national disasters that
was adopted following the March 2003 terrorist atrocities in Madrid, and none of them
felt it necessary to make reservations relating to their own or their possessions’ special
territorial regimes. Coming back to the East–West strategic context of former Nordic
territorial exceptions, it is also worth noting that the Nordic states were among the first
to point out that the EU’s security cannot be guaranteed in any of these dimensions
without some measure of cooperation or at least dialogue with Russia and other former
Soviet states whose territory is so often involved as the transit zone or even the source
of various non-traditional menaces.

Without denying any of these points, a more searching reflection on the handling
of non-traditional security changes in the North European region may bring out some
more specialized areas of difficulty. For example, new preventive and punitive security
controls over the movement of people and goods—tighter export controls, container
searches, port and harbour security measures, stricter immigration controls, and tighter
security in air and sea transport—have been a strong feature of new security strategies
in the Euro-Atlantic space as a whole, reflecting the multiple value that such disciplines
can offer against criminals of all kinds, from terrorists to people traffickers. How easy
is it, in both legal and practical terms, to assure the full application of such measures in
special territories like Åland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Svalbard? The threat to
these territories even in the new dimensions may be very small, but there would still be
reason to worry if they risked becoming loopholes or vulnerable ‘back doors’ in the new-
style European territorial regime. Again, the use of military resources to deal with new
internal threats is not wholly irrelevant, even if there are some Nordic cultural dispositions
(especially in Sweden) that militate against exploring it. What would happen if terrorists
or criminals seized the port of Mariehamn and could not be dislodged without the use
of professional armed forces, or if any of the special-status territories suffered a natural
catastrophe that could only be remedied with the help of specialized military equipment?
While many of the historical arrangements described here have the equivalent of an
override clause in cases of supreme national defence, it would be something of a lawyer’s
dream to start arguing over whether security emergencies of the new, non-war kind could
justify invoking such provisions or not.

Last but not least, it may turn out that the largest problem posed by traditional territorial
restraints for the adjustment of the states and populations of Northern Europe to the
new threat spectrum lies in their subjective and psychological significance, as explored
in the previous section. The self-wished ‘apartness’ of many Nordic communities
and their territorial subdivisions has not up to now been a problem either for the
inhabitants themselves or for Europe as a whole, and it has often brought benefits for
both. Nowadays, however, an aspiration for apartness and the restrictive, conservative
and passive behaviours that it is liable to lead to are more and more out of place in a
Europe that shares not just a single market but increasingly also a single security space
and a single set of factors conditioning life and death. If the habit of territorial opting out leads the peoples and decision makers to wilfully underplay the new, non-territorial challenges that face them, or to offer less solidarity and integrated cooperation to other European states than is necessary for the safety both of the latter and of the Nordic people themselves, the Nordic specialities that have hitherto been viewed as useful or at worst eccentric could quite soon show themselves in a more negative light. Conversely, if clinging to these elements of special status can provide these states with a kind of psychological ‘safety blanket’ that helps them make the effort to reach out to other European states in the non-traditional spheres of security—and, indeed, to continue making an above-average contribution to the tackling of shared security challenges at the global level—then all of Europe might find new reasons for continuing to look upon them with tolerance or actual favour.
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