



## **D4.3 – Public opinion survey: Country comparative reports**

## **D4.6 – Citizens' experiments: Data report**

**RECLAIM Work Package 4 (Lead: ARENA and SNS)**  
**Due month: 13 (D4.3) and 18 (D4.6)**

**Authors:**

**Martin Moland (ARENA)**  
**Asimina Michailidou (ARENA)**  
**Jacopo Custodi (SNS)**  
**Hans-Jörg Trenz (SNS)**





## Introduction

The era of post-truth politics and post-democracy is often related to a decay of truth and a dwindling trust in democratic government. This decline of trust raises significant questions about the role of journalism and the public sphere as arbiters of trust in society and arenas of critical debate to scrutinize the veracity of information and the reliability of political representatives (Michailidou and Trenz 2021). The question of what instills the greatest trust in news content has led to extensive research, driven by growing concerns that attacks on journalism by elites may erode public trust in the media (Damstra et al. 2021; Enli and Rosenberg 2018). Numerous studies have explored how citizens develop attitudes of trust in representative institutions and democratic government through the information provided by the news media (Barthel and Moy 2017; Brosius, van Elsas, and de Vreese 2020; Flew Terry and Jiang 2021). Factors leading to the erosion of trust in news vary. They include journalistic performance, which often suffers under economic and political pressure, and is marred by scandals in many countries (McNair 2006). Changing news consumption habits, resulting in fragmented audience segments crediting different news sources (Fletcher and Nielsen 2017; Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019), is another significant factor. Notably, regular attacks on journalism by governing elites and populist parties seriously undermine truth and critical opinion-making standards (Damstra et al. 2021; Enli and Rosenberg 2018). With lack of trust arguably constituting “the biggest challenge facing journalism” today (Fink 2019), it is crucial to understand what news consumers expect from modern journalism. Yet this news consumer-centric perspective remains under-investigated.

RECLAIM's empirical contribution to this issue is two-fold: First, we ask to what extent the *journalistic style* of a news story, as opposed to isolated elements such as the headline or use of images, influences perceptions of journalistic quality. Secondly, we investigate what characteristics news consumers value in a news story and the functions they expect journalism to fulfil.

To investigate these questions, RECLAIM WP4 fielded a public opinion survey (D4.3) combined with a survey experiment (D4.6) to determine if the demand for high-quality journalism is consistent across different European media systems (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Hallin and Mancini, 2004) and political culture and trust in institutions (Harteveld et al., 2013; Proszowska et al., 2021) and if varied news sources command similar levels of trust. To ensure these types of variation in our country sample, and to address also the scarcity of research on post-truth discourses and frequency of "fake news" in Central and Eastern Europe (Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019), we conducted our survey in Norway, Italy and Poland ( $N = 4521$ ) (Moland et al. 2023).

As discussed in our survey design (Moland et al 2023), this country sample configuration brings another significant advantage: a lot of experimental surveys dealing with post-truth and fake news are conducted in a single country (e.g., Appelman and Schmierbach 2018; Mothes 2017; Wölker and Powell 2018; Prochazka, Weber & Schweiger 2018), limiting the generalizability of the findings. This survey, therefore, provides us with a unique chance to broaden our understanding of how the features of news sources directly impact news credibility in various institutional settings. Extensive literature reviews of present studies on media effect moderators (Hinsley & Holton 2021; von Hohenberg & Guess 2022; Tsang 2021) were carried out to devise hypotheses about potential variables that might interact with the treatment vignette exposure to influence perceptions about the credibility of post-truth discourses. The conceptualizations developed by Kohring and Matthes (2007) served as our basis for developing sociological trust in journalism (Goold 2021), along with role conceptualizations by Michailidou and Trenz (2021) for journalists. These conceptual frameworks form the foundation for creating questions in the observational segment of the survey. We have thus tested popular perceptions about topic relevance, contextualisation, accuracy, and journalistic norm adherence in two ways: First, we have used a battery of questions capturing all four dimensions of trust in journalism (Q11), which has allowed us to probe what characteristics of news are seen as most crucial to news consumers today. We also conducted a survey



experiment (Deliverable 4.6) which tested the extent that the *journalistic style* of a news story, as opposed to isolated elements such as the headline or use of images, influences perceptions of journalistic quality. By testing what causal impact a newspaper's journalistic characteristics have on perceptions of its truthfulness, we contribute to existing literature on trust and new media (Moland et al 2023), shining a light on the extent to which not only the content, but also the form, of a journalistic story becomes an integral part of why a story becomes trusted. This has relevance to the question of how legacy news media can help counter a trend in which elites seek to undermine trust in journalism by publicly challenging its reliability (Gaufman, 2018; Kelemen, 2017; Ott, 2017; Waisbord, 2018).

For the survey experiment design, respondents in each country were exposed to one of three conditions: a control condition featuring a newswire story, a tabloid story designed to emulate the style of major tabloids in their respective countries, and a broadsheet story crafted to resemble high-quality broadsheet journalism (Michailidou et al. 2023). This approach has enabled us to determine how the journalistic style influences the perceived credibility of the information. It also sheds light on the role of various functions of journalism and story characteristics in fostering trust in contemporary journalism. Our starting point when constructing our survey design (Moland et al. 2023) was that truth in news is not an external input but rather an outcome of fact-finding, information-seeking and contestation. Journalists act as professional brokers, and trust in news is based on their ability to select reliable sources and provide credible assessments. Readers also understand that news represents *a* truth, not *the* truth. Trust is crucial, not only in the information but also in the institutions and procedures that produce news, fostering collective agreement in the political community. A well-functioning journalism and public sphere are essential to maintain democracy and combat fake news. Trust therefore has multiple dimensions, including trust in representatives, procedures and in the overall role of journalism. Extending this reasoning to the relationship between the public sphere, journalism and truth, we define this relationship as an arena of truth contestation (Michailidou and Trenz 2021), whereby the truth-value of information does not come from an inherent attribute but results from critical debates and journalism practices.

This has allowed us to make several important contributions to the existing literature on a perceived post-truth turn: First, by turning our attention to the question of journalistic style, rather than content, and its relationship to trust in news we find that readers tend to treat the style of journalism as a salient attribute for making up their mind about the content's truthfulness. We thus build upon an existing literature showing that elite cues (Van Duyn and Collier, 2019) by showing that journalistic choices such as the use of emotional language also tend to alter perceptions of a story's perceived trust. We also show that the use of hedging language commonly used to indicate uncertainty about the accuracy of a news report (Ratcliff, 2018) seems to be largely ineffective as a counterweight to the negative impact that increasingly emotive language has on perceptions of media trust.

This report begins by presenting country-level responses to questions regarding journalistic characteristics, functions, their perceived importance and fact-checking (D4.3). Subsequently, we present the results of our survey experiment (D4.6). Our survey experiment shows a causal link between the emotional tone of a news story and people's propensity to believe it less. This tendency persists even when all three stories contain hedging language making explicit that EU officials contest the information's accuracy. We conclude our reporting by revisiting our RECLAIM WP4 framing paper (Moland et al. 2023) and reflecting on how our survey findings shed light on how journalistic styles influence public trust in the accuracy of news and how pre-existing political beliefs moderate these views. We further discuss how these insights are instrumental in informing our interviews with media industry stakeholders, helping us understand how these actors perceive the demand for high-quality journalism and their strategies for meeting these demands in the face of the challenges posed by disinformation [Deliverable 4.8 (Custodi et al. 2023) and Deliverable 4.9 (Custodi et al., forthcoming)].

### D4.3 Country and comparative report on citizens' expectations of journalism

We begin by reporting on the results of the survey questions which were designed to capture media use habits (Q1-3) and individuals' expectations of journalism (Q8-9 and Q11-16) (p. 9 of D4.1) We have omitted descriptive questions that are either relevant only for the survey experiment, or ones that cover substantially similar ground as those already included in the report.

#### 1. News consumption, news source preferences and views of EU policies

News consumption is part of the daily media routine of the great majority of Europeans (Eurobarometer 2022). Our survey suggests that people across all three countries are more likely to spend somewhere between 30-60 minutes each day consuming news stories across all media, with a significant drop-off in responses from 30-60 to 60-90 minutes (Figure 1). Time spent for news is highest in Norway, while the propensity of Italian respondents for spending less time with news diminishes. These country differences are however much less pronounced than those found in comparative surveys 20 years ago (e.g. Hallin and Mancini 2004), which indicates a digitalization-driven convergence of public spheres insofar as news consumption habits is concerned.<sup>1</sup>




Figure 1: Daily news consumption among respondents broken down by country (Q1)

<sup>1</sup> Hallin and Mancini (2004:22 ) report a high of 720 per thousand adult population subscribers to news in Norway compared to a low of 78 per thousand in Greece.

Social media, and at an almost equal share Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, are our respondents' preferred news source (figure 2). Still, there is a large majority of respondents in all three countries reading traditional newspapers as a significant part of their news diets. The data also shows that unlike newspapers, news on social media, and partly also on TV and radio, can hardly be avoided. The number of respondents who never consume news through social media is insignificant. Platform differences only matter with regard to Youtube, which leaves more choices for users to blend out news, as seems to be the case in the Polish case.




Figure 2: Preferred news medium by country (Q3). Multiple responses possible.

Respondents also converge largely with regard to the choice of preferred topics (figure 3). The largest share of the respondents reads most frequently about national politics, with international (non-EU) politics coming in a close second. There is, however, a difference across the three countries when it comes to the time people spend reading about EU politics and the politics of other European countries: Here, we find that Norwegians spend less time reading about the politics of the EU or the European countries than those of the other countries. This result may be explained by how the three countries differ in their relationship to the EU: While Poland and Italy are both members of the EU, Norway has a looser association agreement with the EU that falls short of membership in important respects. This may make it less likely for Norwegian citizens to feel it is important to stay informed about EU politics.




Figure 3: Percentage of respondents consuming news about politics at different levels broken down by country (Q2)

As our survey experiment relies on a fictional news story about EU politics, we also measured attitudes of respondents towards the EU and their support of strengthening ties of their country with the EU. It is here, that our survey results indicate clear country differences (figure 4) with a clear *minority in Poland and Italy who would favour closer ties to the EU, but a much larger percentage in Norway in support of deeper integration into areas of the EU than they currently belong to*. This may be explained by how it is easier for Norwegians to conceptualize a closer relationship to the EU than it is for citizens of countries that are already members of the EU. There is also great support for the belief that the EU should do more to ensure green energy use and that it should do more to encourage member states and others to increase their use of green energy.




Figure 4: Views of EU policies broken down by country (Q4-6)

## 2. Reader demands for quality journalism

Moving to questions about journalistic quality, we find that what shapes the credibility of a news story is largely similar across countries (see figure 5). Generally, a story's credibility seems to hinge mostly on the way it presents opposing viewpoints on an issue, its grammatical correctness, whether it is credited to a specific person and the source from which the story stems. Spaces for user engagement, traditionally used to allow for interactive debate about a story or opening up the possibility of participatory journalism e.g. through user commenting, seem to be overall less relevant, even though not completely insignificant for establishing the credibility of a news source.




Figure 5: Characteristics of stories perceived by respondents to be crucial to credibility (Q8)

This seems to suggest that people's perceptions about what constitutes quality journalism mostly centres on traditional values of objectivity and unbiasedness. Respondents from all three countries also seem to place the greatest weight on the source of the story when assessing its credibility. The possibility for users to engage with news through online comments, on the other hand, is perceived as less relevant to journalistic quality.

The results shown in figure 5 dovetail with people's assessment of the relative importance of the functions that Kohring and Matthes (2007) see as constitutive of what news should do: That journalists report on news that are important to readers, that these news are contextualized in a way that makes it possible to understand why they are happening, that they are accurately depicted and that they are selected according to journalistic news criteria. Respondents place the greatest weight on whether journalists accurately describe what is happening, whether the work they do is objective and if it contextualizes current events. They place much less weight, however, on the relevance that the content has to their personal lives (Figure 6)




Figure 6: Perception of the importance of journalistic functions. % of sample, broken down by country (Q11)

Respondents perceive the news content they consume to also score highly on a number of quality criteria (see figure 7). While only a minority responds that the news content they consume fulfils each quality criteria “to a great extent”, a large majority claims that it does so to some extent. While this observation may of course be driven by the fact that people will select the news content that aligns with their values and beliefs about journalism (Hart et al. 2020), it does suggest that people spend time consuming journalism that aligns with their ideas about what quality journalism should be, and that they perceive such journalism to be available to them. Such quality features of news content, apart from information value, relevance and accuracy also contain the perception that news content to some degree is biased. This might be interpreted as a demand for opinionated news. Respondents are aware that the choices of their news sources is partly determined by their political preferences and have developed capacities to read news critically with an eye on possible biases of news selection and opinion. An equally plausible explanation is that people just think that news can’t be fully objective, without making any clear link to their own consumption patterns.




Figure 7: Respondents' perceptions of the news content they consume. % of respondents, broken down by country (Q13)

The same critical attitude is applied to the use of fact-checking services, which is still not a widespread practice among news consumers. Indeed, in all three countries we find that the largest share of those surveyed do not remember having used fact-checking services at all (figure 8, top panel). Among those who do remember having used fact-checking services, few people report that they believe that fact-checking services treat all politicians equally (figure 8, bottom panel). **This fact is particularly important given the centrality of institutionalized fact-checking efforts by journalists to combat misinformation, even though they are not effective in all contexts (Brandtzaeg, Følstad, and Chaparro Domínguez 2018; Clayton et al. 2020).** Consistent with the great politicization of journalism in Poland, we find that the share of respondents who believe that fact-checking services only treat politicians equally to a small extent is much greater in Poland than in the other countries surveyed.




Figure 8: Use of fact-checking services and perception that fact-checking gives all politicians an equal treatment. % of respondents, broken down by country (Q14-15)

As the largest share of respondents believe that fact-checking services are only somewhat likely to treat all politicians equally, it comes at no surprise that respondents in all three countries prefer fact-checking services to be run by independent organizations rather than traditional news media (see figure 9).

Altogether, our survey questionnaire reveals that respondents in Norway, Poland and Italy are not only regularly consuming news, but also share clear expectations in quality journalism in an era marked by post-factual information. Respondents are also overall satisfied by their daily news menu meeting these demands for information, accuracy, relevance, and opinion. The survey responses also furnish valuable context for the next tasks of the work package, in which we delve deeper into how news media professionals across various European countries strive to meet these demands.

### Readers' preferred fact-checking sources

Share of respondents preferring fact-checking from news media or independent organizations




Figure 9: Respondents' preferred fact-checking source. % of respondents, broken down by country (Q16)

#### D4.6: Survey experiment findings

The second part of our survey was an experiment meant to elicit greater understanding of how journalistic style relates to its perceived credibility. The treatment was a news story claiming that the EU had pressured Algeria to increase its export of gas to the EU. The fictive story makes clear that the information is coming from two anonymous sources inside the EU, and that it would be in line with the EU's stated goal of increased energy independence. However, we also write that an EU official rejects the allegations, calling them "fake news", but that the newspaper stands by its sources' credibility. We then vary the use of emotive language across the three treatment vignettes, so that each of them shares more or fewer of the characteristics of a tabloid story (Rowe 2010). We first asked whether respondents believed the stories were true, and whether they accurately "told the whole story". We then investigated how exposure to a vignette telling respondents that the story had been deemed false by a group of fact-checkers shifted perceptions of the story's information.

As Table A2 suggests, there are no statistically significant differences between the control group and the two treatment groups when it comes to important control variables like age, ideology and Euroscepticism.

We set out to investigate the following hypotheses:

*H1a:* Exposure to a vignette using a more emotive style of journalism (the tabloid treatment) is likely to be associated with less trust in the credibility of the information.

*H1b:* The negative treatment effect of exposure to the tabloid news treatment will be smaller among those who want their country to have a looser connection to the EU.

*H2:* Exposure to a vignette showing that fact-checkers have called the story fake will lead to less trust in the story's information.

*H3:* The negative effect of seeing a story called fake will be greatest among those expressing above median trust in journalism.

*H4:* The effect of exposure to the tabloid treatment is likely to be greater among those belonging to the right compared to those belonging to the left.

*H5:* The effect of exposure to the fact-checking vignette will be greater when respondents are already exposed to a style of journalism discordant with the type of news source they have expressed the greatest trust in.

As outlined in Michailidou et al. (2023), in order to increase the believability of the experiment as well as its external validity, we wrote stories in the styles of the leading tabloid and broadsheet newspapers of each country, together with a control condition mimicking the house style of Associated Press. The survey respondents were then randomly assigned to each of the three experimental conditions. For ease of exposition, we transformed the measures of the story's perceived credibility and journalistic accuracy, labelling the "Strongly" and "Somewhat" categories of both agreement and disagreement and analysing them via linear probability models. For testing the effect of fact-checking we used an ordinary least square regression model to test the effect of exposure to each of the treatment conditions on the decreased trust in fact-checking, both alone and in interaction with a range of theoretically important variables.

As Figure 10 shows, there is a clear effect of the journalistic style of a story and how it is perceived, both in terms of its truthfulness and the journalistic accuracy of it. As the figure clearly shows, tabloid stories are perceived to be both less accurate and less likely to be true than the broadsheet and control stories. Figures

11 and 12 illustrate that the patterns are largely similar across the three different countries in which the survey was fielded.




Figure 10: Treatment effects of exposure to vignettes on perceived news story veracity and accuracy

There are, however, differences across the three countries surveyed when it comes to how journalistic styles shape its credibility (see figures 11 and 12). Poland stands out for the strong effect to the broadsheet story, while the main reaction found in the other two countries mainly comes through decreased trust in tabloid journalism. Poland stands apart from the other two countries also when it comes to the perception that quality journalism tells the “full story”: There is a statistically significant positive effect of being exposed to the broadsheet treatment in Poland, but not in Italy and Norway. Thus, we find in Poland a different reaction to what we theoretically expected.




Figure 11: Treatment effects of exposure to vignettes on perceived news story veracity broken down by country





Figure 12: Treatment effects of exposure to vignettes on perceived news story accuracy broken down by country

Figure 13 furthermore indicates that readers' pre-existing attitudes towards the EU matter on how they perceive fake news: While there is a negative effect overall of being exposed to the tabloid treatment on the perception that the article tells the full story, this effect turns positive among those that are Eurosceptic. We find the same when surveying the perceived accuracy of the story. As figures A1 and A2 in the Annex suggest, these results largely converge across countries.



*Figure 13: Interaction between treatment exposure and Euroscepticism*

Figure 14 furthermore implies that when respondents were exposed to a vignette saying that a fact-checking team labelled the story as “fake news”, this had similar effects across all three groups. In essence, there is a general inclination, as suggested by the positive coefficient in the control condition, for people to place somewhat less trust in the story after encountering the fact-checking vignette. Although this trend is less noticeable among those who were presented with the broadsheet story, the difference is not significant enough to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.





Figure 14: Increased distrust as a result of being told a story is false

We also hypothesized that there would be an outsized effect of being exposed to the treatment effect among those with an above median trust in journalism. However, Figure 15 shows that the effect of having a trust in journalism that is above, rather than below, median is statistically indistinguishable from zero. We thus reject our fourth hypothesis.



*Figure 15: Effect of fact-checking vignette among those with trust in journalism above and below median*

We now turn to our fifth hypothesis, which assumes that there is a more pronounced scepticism towards the media among right-wingers, together with greater familiarity with conservative media outlets that more frequently use tabloid journalistic tools (Sparks and Hmielowski 2023).

Figure 16 seems to offer tentative evidence for this, even if the overlap between treatments along parts of the ideology variable means that the statistical significance of the interaction effect overall is insignificant (see Table A1 in the Annex). However, the predicted values hint that those on the right-wing of the political spectrum have a somewhat higher propensity to believe that the story is true than those on the left-wing side. However, the differences between treatment conditions become smaller among those most strongly to the right, indicating that the effect of journalistic style matters less for credibility among those with the strongest right-wing orientations (Hameleers, Brosius, and de Vreese 2022).





Figure 16: Interaction between treatment exposure and ideology. Predicted values across the full range of the ideology variable

Our last hypothesis was that being exposed to a style of journalism discordant with the respondents' preferred style of journalism would lead to stronger reactions to the fact-checking treatment. Thus, someone who normally prefers broadsheet journalism would, based on a logic of motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006), be more likely to find a verdict that a story was false plausible if it was written in a tabloid style dissimilar to what the reader themselves find to be inconsistent with high-quality journalism.



*Figure 17: Effect of discord between preferred journalistic style and treatment exposure on fact-checking perceptions*

We reject this hypothesis, as the coefficients clearly indicate that there is no correlation between being exposed to a treatment different from the one whose journalistic style the respondent has a preference for. In other words, while there is an average decrease in trust in a story among those who see the vignette claiming the story is false, this effect does not depend on the type of journalism that the respondents typically prefer.



## Closing Remarks and Future Plans

A key objective of this survey was to systematically map the viewpoints of news consumers regarding the issue of dis/misinformation and how it relates to journalism. The significance of this empirical investigation lies in its contribution to the existing body of literature on disinformation and its dominant focus on the production of news to add original insights about news consumption and demands for quality news. Given that comparative empirical analyses within the domain of journalism are relatively recent and remain scant (Custodi et al. 2023a), the focus of this report has been to document converging preferences and news habits across the three countries analysed. Country differences, where mentioned, need to be further explored, but overall need to count less than expected in light of a shared positive attitude to trusted news sources.

While our survey experiment shows that news consumers' perception of fact-checking credibility does not vary much depending on the style of journalism, we know too little about how fact-checking is perceived when it relates to media sources that readers are more or less likely to have a favourable opinion of. While there is much to suggest that the effectiveness of fact-checking depends on political attitudes, it is still somewhat uncertain whether trust in different news media will have a similar effect. It will be important for future research to shed light on how the credibility of fact-checking interacts with readers' perceptions when applied to sources they trust.

Our report shows a clear link between the type of journalism that a reader is exposed to, and their susceptibility to accepting embedded misinformation within a story. This tendency exists even when respondents are randomly exposed to stories where only the form, not the facts, of the story are varied. However, we did not observe a link between individuals' propensity to prefer certain types of journalism and their readiness to believe that a story is false after it has been fact-checked and identified as such. This may be seen as a positive development, given the importance of fact-checking services as complements to traditional media in several countries. However, it is only part of the picture: Previous work (e.g. Walter et al. 2020) has found a strong correlation between political beliefs, general institutional trust and news consumers' willingness to adjust their beliefs in response to fact-checking. This suggests that some news consumers, based on their political leanings and trust in institutions, may be less likely to accept the results of fact-checks of stories from specific news sources.

However, WP4's scope extends beyond this survey. Our upcoming deliverables (labeled as 4.9 and scheduled for release in spring 2024) shift the focus to a different aspect of the issue, moving back to the role of professional journalists, rather than news consumers. This shift lets us examine the post-truth phenomenon from the equally crucial perspective of news production. Furthermore, as explained in RECLAIM Deliverable 4.8 (Custodi et al., 2023b), the interviewed journalists will belong to different journalistic outlets, each with their own journalistic styles. This will allow us to relate news consumer demands for quality journalism to the efforts made by those who supply this journalism. This will result in a multifaceted empirical analysis of mis/disinformation in the domain of journalism – something that is currently lacking from scholarly literature.



## References

- Barthel, M, and Patricia Moy. 2017. "The Media and the Fostering of Political (Dis)Trust." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, edited by K Kenski and K Hall Jamieson, 581–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brandtzaeg, Petter Bae, Asbjørn Følstad, and María Ángeles Chaparro Domínguez. 2018. "How Journalists and Social Media Users Perceive Online Fact-Checking and Verification Services." *Journalism Practice* 12 (9): 1109–29. doi:10.1080/17512786.2017.1363657.
- Brosius, Anna, Erika J van Elsas, and Claes H de Vreese. 2020. "Bad News, Declining Trust? Effects of Exposure to Economic News on Trust in the European Union." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 32 (2): 223–42. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edz025.
- Clayton, Katherine, Spencer Blair, Jonathan A. Busam, Samuel Forstner, John Glance, Guy Green, Anna Kawata, et al. 2020. "Real Solutions for Fake News? Measuring the Effectiveness of General Warnings and Fact-Check Tags in Reducing Belief in False Stories on Social Media." *Political Behavior* 42 (4): 1073–95. doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09533-0.
- Custodi, Jacopo, Martin Moland, Asimina Michailidou and Hans-Joerg Trenz (2023). RECLAIM WP4 D2.1, WP4 framing paper.
- Custodi, Jacopo, Hans-Joerg Trenz, Martin Moland and Asimina Michailidou. 2023. RECLAIM WP4 D4.8 Journalists' responses: design and planning of interviews.
- Damstra, Alyt, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Elena Broda, Elina Lindgren, Jesper Strömbäck, Yariv Tsfati, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2021. "What Does Fake Look Like? A Review of the Literature on Intentional Deception in the News and on Social Media." *Journalism Studies* 22 (14): 1947–63. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2021.1979423.
- Enli, Gunn, and Linda Therese Rosenberg. 2018. "Trust in the Age of Social Media: Populist Politicians Seem More Authentic." *Social Media + Society* 4 (1): 205630511876443. doi:10.1177/2056305118764430.
- Eurobarometer (2022). Media & News Survey. Brussels: EP Flash Survey2832/FL011EP.
- Fink, Katherine. 2019. "The Biggest Challenge Facing Journalism: A Lack of Trust." *Journalism* 20 (1): 40–43. doi:10.1177/1464884918807069.
- Fletcher, Richard, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. 2017. "Are News Audiences Increasingly Fragmented? A Cross-National Comparative Analysis of Cross-Platform News Audience Fragmentation and Duplication." *Journal of Communication* 67 (4): 476–98. doi:10.1111/jcom.12315.
- Flew Terry, and Yuan Jiang. 2021. "Trust and Communication: Looking Back, Looking Forward." *Global Perspectives* 2 (1). Los Angeles: University of California Press, Journals & Digital Publishing Division. doi:10.1525/gp.2021.25395.
- Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. 2004. *Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics*. Communication, Society and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hameleers, Michael, Anna Brosius, and Claes H de Vreese. 2022. "Whom to Trust? Media Exposure Patterns of Citizens with Perceptions of Misinformation and Disinformation Related to the News Media." *European Journal of Communication*, February. SAGE Publications Ltd, 02673231211072667. doi:10.1177/02673231211072667.



- Hart, William, Kyle Richardson, Gregory K. Tortoriello, and Allison Earl. 2020. “‘You Are What You Read’: Is Selective Exposure a Way People Tell Us Who They Are?” *British Journal of Psychology* 111 (3): 417–42. doi:10.1111/bjop.12414.
- Kalogeropoulos, Antonis, Jane Suiter, Linards Udris, and Mark Eisenegger. 2019. “News Media Trust and News Consumption: Factors Related to Trust in News in 35 Countries.” *International Journal of Communication*. <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/10141>.
- Kohring, Matthias, and Jörg Matthes. 2007. “Trust in News Media: Development and Validation of a Multidimensional Scale.” *Communication Research* 34 (2): 231–52. doi:10.1177/0093650206298071.
- McNair, Brian. 2006. *Cultural Chaos. Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World*. London: Routledge.
- Michailidou, Asimina, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. 2021. “Rethinking Journalism Standards in the Era of Post-Truth Politics: From Truth Keepers to Truth Mediators.” *Media, Culture & Society* 43 (7). SAGE Publications Ltd: 1340–49. doi:10.1177/01634437211040669.
- Michailidou, Asimina, Martin Moland, Jacopo Custodi, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. 2023. “Journalistic Style and Trust in News Content Veracity: A Cross-National Survey Experiment.” OSF Registries. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/3Q269.
- Moland, Martin, Asimina Michailidou, Jacopo Custodi and Hans-Jörg Trenz. 2023. RECLAIM WP4 D4.1 *Public opinion survey - citizens' expectations*.
- Moland, Martin, Asimina Michailidou, Jacopo Custodi, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. 2023. “Survey Data from RECLAIM: Reclaiming Liberal Democracy in the Post-Factual Age.” Harvard Dataverse. doi:10.7910/DVN/YQUPWQ (RECLAIM Deliverable 4.2).
- Ratcliff, Chelsea L. et al. 2018. “News coverage of cancer research: Does discourse of scientific uncertainty enhance credibility”. In: *Risk and health communication in an evolving media environment*, edited by Dan O’Hair, 156-175.
- Rowe, David. 2010. “Tabloidization of News.” In *The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism*, edited by Stuart Allan, 350–61. Routledge Companions. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Sparks, Jessica F., and Jay D. Hmielowski. 2023. “At the Extremes: Assessing Readability, Grade Level, Sentiment, and Tone in US Media Outlets.” *Journalism Studies* 24 (1): 24–44. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2022.2142646.
- Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge. 2006. “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3). [Midwest Political Science Association, Wiley]: 755–69.
- Van Duyn, Emily, and Jessica Collier. 2019. “Priming and Fake News: The Effects of Elite Discourse on Evaluations of News Media”. *Mass Communication and Society* 22 (1):29-48. doi:10.1080/15205436.2018.1511807.
- Walter, Nathan, Jonathan Cohen, R. Lance Holbert, and Yasmin Morag. 2020. “Fact-Checking: A Meta-Analysis of What Works and for Whom.” *Political Communication* 37 (3): 350–75. doi:10.1080/10584609.2019.1668894.

## ANNEX

### Descriptive statistics




Figure A 1: Interaction between Eurocepticism and treatment exposure broken down by country




Figure A 2: Interaction between Euroscepticism and treatment exposure

	<b>Veracity</b>	<b>Accuracy</b>
Control	0.533*** [0.476, 0.590]	0.349*** [0.182, 0.515]
Tabloid	-0.149* [-0.298, 0.000]	-0.119 [-0.295, 0.056]
Broadsheet	0.038 [-0.077, 0.153]	-0.009 [-0.084, 0.066]
Left-right	0.002 [-0.022, 0.026]	-0.016 [-0.060, 0.028]
Tabloid X Left-right	0.007 [-0.021, 0.034]	0.014 [-0.031, 0.059]
Broadsheet X Left-right	0.004 [-0.038, 0.046]	0.011 [-0.015, 0.037]
Num.Obs.	2997	3010
R2	0.024	0.028
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001		

Table A 1: Coefficients for interaction between treatment exposure and left-right orientation

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>Tabloid</b>	<b>Broadsheet</b>	<b>p-value Control vs. Tabloid</b>	<b>p-value Broadsheet vs. control</b>
Age	2.16	2.13	2.15	0.38	0.69
Education	6.41	6.48	6.47	0.33	0.42
Euroscepticism	1.99	2.04	2.00	0.11	0.67
Gender	1.48	1.49	1.49	0.40	0.33
Ideology	3.93	3.89	3.85	0.57	0.22
Income	8.27	8.15	8.27	0.55	0.99
Media use	2.05	1.99	2.04	0.10	0.84
Preferred medium	1.83	1.86	1.87	0.28	0.20
Trust in journalism	5.14	5.15	5.17	0.76	0.55
Urban/Rural	2.42	2.45	2.45	0.52	0.47

Table A 2: Balance statistics for survey experiment